Chambers v. Shaw

• Decision Date: 31 October 1883
• Citation: 17 N.W. 223,52 Mich. 18
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: CHAMBERS v. SHAW.

17 N.W. 223

52 Mich. 18

CHAMBERS v. SHAW.

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 31, 1883

Provisions of a will considered in connection with the events and effect given to the evident intent of the testator to provide only for those named therein, and to leave nothing to be disposed of under the statute of descents or distribution.

Error to Genesee.

William H. Wells, for plaintiff and appellant.

Long & Gold, for defendant.

GRAVES C.J.

Ejectment and verdict for defendant by direction of the court. September 17, 1860, Enoch N. Chambers died seized of the premises. He left a will, a copy of which is given below. ^[1] It is the same the court had before it in Shaw v Chambers, 48 Mich. 355; [S.C. 12 N.W 486.] But there the inquiry was of a different nature, and the opinion was confined to the question. It is a misapprehension to suppose that it bears on the nature of the legal interest given to the devisees. At the testator's death no issue had been born to him, but his wife, Mary E. Chambers, who survived him, was then pregnant, and the child, a son, was born on the twenty-third of December following. April 30, 1862, the child died, and in September of the next year Mrs. Chambers, who was childless, and remained unmarried, also died. She left a will by which she devised the premises in fee-simple absolute, and the defendant holds that title. The husband, Enoch M. Chambers, left brothers and sisters, and the plaintiff claims that the title now in question devolved to them, and did not pass by the will, and he holds and asserts that title. His position is not entirely clear. It seems to be this: That the will operated merely as a gift of the property as personalty to Mrs. Chambers for life, subject to a charge for the support of the unborn child during its minority, and subject further to the condition that in case the child should reach majority, it should take one-half of the corpus; that the child having died during minority, and the life interest having determined, the residuary and possessory interests are in the brothers and sisters, or rather in the plaintiff, who holds their rights.

For the purpose of this case we have no occasion to review the will in all its aspects, or in reference to the contingencies which are possible.

We are not called on to define the boundary between the rights and interests of the mother and the child. We are to connect the provisions of the will with the events, and ascertain its effect on the legal title in issue. Turning to the will, the mind is immediately struck with two very significant indications, and, as there are no conflicting signs or repugnant implications, they become substantially conclusive.

1. The testator intended to dispose of all his estate, both real and personal.

It was his purpose not to die intestate, in respect to any property or any interest in any property. It was clearly not his intent to leave a remainder to be disposed of under the statute of descents or of distribution. And, in our opinion, the provisions of the will were sufficient to carry out the intent.

2. The wife and the expected child were the exclusive objects of his bounty. He referred to no one else. His mind was to give all and to these two. That the child was competent to take is not questioned. The interest vested on the testator's death. Comp.Laws, �� 4080, 4097. The possession only was postponed. The entire estate passed to the mother and child absolutely, and whether the quality or quantity which went to the one as against the other was either more or less, is not...