Chambers v. Smithfield City, 19252

Decision Date14 February 1986
Docket NumberNo. 19252,19252
Citation714 P.2d 1133
PartiesCraig M. CHAMBERS and Linda C. Chambers, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SMITHFIELD CITY and Robert Richardson, Defendants and Respondents.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Christopher L. Daines and David R. Daines, Logan, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Steven R. Fuller and B.H. Harris, W. Scott Barrett, Logan, for defendants and respondents.

HALL, Chief Justice:

Plaintiffs brought this action to invalidate the procedure by which defendant Smithfield City grants variances of its zoning ordinances, and to enjoin the issuance of a building permit to defendant Robert Richardson to build a single family residence upon property for which Richardson was granted a variance.

In 1982, defendant Richardson purchased a .67 acre lot in Smithfield, Utah. Prior to the sale, the lot was part of a one-acre parcel upon which a residence was already built. The lot sold to Richardson is located in a RE-1 zone. The purpose of the RE-1 zone is to serve as a buffer zone between residential and agricultural zones. To that end RE-1 allows residential use with a one-acre minimum building lot and also allows some animal use. At the time of the sale, Richardson was aware that the property was zoned RE-1 and that it required a one-acre minimum for building.

On March 11, 1982, Richardson proposed to the city that the city rezone his property from RE-1 to RE-1-12 so that a single family dwelling could be constructed on his .67 acre lot. Richardson withdrew his request for rezoning after a meeting with the city planning and zoning commission. On April 15, 1982, Richardson applied to the Smithfield City Board of Adjustment for a variance to allow him to build a residence on his property. The Board approved Richardson's request. 1 Richardson then applied to the city's zoning commission for approval of the variance. The zoning commission also approved the variance. Finally, Richardson applied to the city council for approval of the variance. The council approved the variance. 2 At least one plaintiff was present at all three meetings when the variance application was approved, and registered opposition to the variance at all three meetings.

Following final approval of the variance, plaintiffs, owners of the land adjacent to Richardson's property, filed a complaint in the district court asking the court to declare invalid the procedures under which the variance was granted and to enjoin the issuance of the building permit to Richardson. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants relying exclusively on the boilerplate findings of fact from the Board of Adjustment to support his decision. No additional evidence was taken.

Plaintiffs' first point on appeal is that there is no reasonable basis in the evidence to justify granting a variance to Richardson. Plaintiffs thus contend that the decision to grant the requested variance was arbitrary and capricious.

U.C.A., 1953, § 10-9-12 requires that an applicant, in order to justify a variance, show at a minimum that the variance would not substantially affect the comprehensive zoning plan; that there are special conditions attached to the property which are not attached to other property in the same district; that unnecessary hardship would result if the variance was not granted; and that enjoyment of a substantial property right which is attached to the other property in the area would be denied.

As the Court said in Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment: 3

What must be shown by the applicant for the variance is that the property itself contains some special circumstance that relates to the hardship complained of and that granting a variance to take this into account would not substantially affect the zoning plan. 4

Richardson has failed to meet this burden. There is simply no evidence in the record to support any one of the Board's findings. In fact, what evidence exists tends only to support a denial of the variance.

The RE-1 zone has as its purpose to serve as a buffer between residential and agricultural zones. To that end, RE-1 allows residential use with a one-acre minimum building lot, as well as some animal use. The main distinction between the RE-1 zone and other residential zones is the one-acre minimum building lot size. Thus, to grant a variance to build a home on a lot markedly smaller than the lot size required by the zoning classification would substantially affect the comprehensive zoning plan and clearly violates the spirit of the zoning ordinance.

Second, there is no evidence of special conditions attached to the property itself which do not also attach to other property in the vicinity. The property is neither unusual topographically or by shape, nor is there anything extraordinary about the piece of property itself. 5 Simply having land which a previous owner has subdivided and sold does not constitute special circumstances.

Finally, Richardson has not demonstrated that the denial of the variance would cause difficulties and unnecessary hardship. It is true that Richardson might suffer some economic loss by reason of not being allowed to build a house upon the lot he bought. However, as we said in Xanthos, hardship is not demonstrated by economic loss alone. 6 It must be tied to the special circumstances, none of which have been proven here.

Further, Richardson brought his loss upon himself. Richardson bought the small lot with full knowledge of the zoning requirements in the district. To grant a variance allowing building on a smaller lot than is required by the zoning ordinance simply because the applicant has purchased a smaller lot, would make a mockery of the zoning plan. This Court will not condone such a result.

Plaintiffs' second point on appeal is that the procedure for granting a variance set forth in Smithfield City Ordinance No. 4-2-d.6 should be declared invalid since it conflicts with the enabling statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 10-9-12. The challenged portion of the ordinance reads as follows:

Whenever unusual circumstances exist, the Smithfield City Council may grant variances for building purposes on an individual lot basis or piece of property, even though said building and/or lot may not be in conformance with existing zoning laws. The Smithfield City Council will consider such exceptions only when recommended by both the Board of Adjustments and the Planning Commission.

Thus, according to the ordinance a variance request must be submitted to both the Board of Adjustment and the planning commission for a recommendation. The recommendations are then submitted to the Smithfield City Council which makes the final determination whether or not to grant the variance.

This procedure does not comport with the...

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9 cases
  • Cromwell v. Ward
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1994
    ...they certainly were not required to do so in light of appellants' affirmative statement of compliance. See also Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1986), where the court stated: "[T]here is no evidence of special conditions attached to the property itself which do not al......
  • Sandy City v. Salt Lake County
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • January 17, 1992
    ...of adjustment are entirely different from those concerning city boards of adjustment.' " Id. at 899 n. 4 (quoting Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1986)). ...
  • Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • February 10, 2000
    ...Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1163, 1164 (Utah 1990) (reviewing administrative evaluation for property tax purposes); Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133, 1134 (Utah 1986) (reviewing administrative procedures for processing zoning variance requests); Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1033 (reviewing......
  • Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • November 6, 1987
    ... ...         Michael Z. Hayes and Ronald L. Dunn, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant ...         Jane Allen, Salt Lake ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • 1988-89 Cases Affecting State and Local Government
    • United States
    • Utah State Bar Utah Bar Journal No. 2-5, May 1989
    • Invalid date
    ...on appeal, and the second ordinance succeeding on appeal.) --------- Notes: [1] 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). [2] 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986). [3] 487 U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988). [4] 484 U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988). [5] 390 U.S. 629......
  • Article Title: Utah Zoning Law: Enforcement
    • United States
    • Utah State Bar Utah Bar Journal No. 2001-06, June 2001
    • Invalid date
    ...1980). 21. 685 P.2d 550 (Utah 1984). 22. Id. at 551. 23. 497 P.2d 633 (Utah 1972). 24. Id. at 634. 25. 712 P.2d 188 (Utah 1984). 26. 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 27. Id. at 191. 28. 527 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1974). 29. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). 30. Id. at 396. 31. 870 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1994). 32. Id. at......

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