Chambers v. State, 1 Div. 789

• Decision Date: 28 August 1984
• Docket Number: 1 Div. 789
• Citation: Chambers v. State, 455 So.2d 1008 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)
• Parties: Mary Lee CHAMBERS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 1008

455 So.2d 1008

Mary Lee CHAMBERS v.STATE.

1 Div. 789.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Aug. 28, 1984.

Paul D. Brown, Mobile, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Glenn L. Davidson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

HARRIS, Judge.

The appellant, Mary Lee Chambers, was indicted on June 1, 1983, by the Mobile County Grand Jury for the crime of murder.Appellant later pled not guilty to the indictment and was tried on December 13 and 14, 1983.The jury found her guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter, and the Court sentenced her to ten years' imprisonment in the penitentiary.

A review of the facts reveals that on April 7, 1983, the Mobile Fire Department received a call regarding a life threatening situation.The paramedics arrived at the emergency address and were greeted by a black female in the yard who stated that she thought her child had stopped breathing.Upon entering the residence, the paramedics found a three year old black female lying across a bed.They testified at the appellant's trial that the child was cool to the touch, cyanotic and without any vital signs present.

The autopsy performed by Dr. Gary Cumberland, a certified pathologist, revealed externally numerous bruises and scars on the body of the deceased.He further testified that a compression abrasion inside the lip, which would be consistent with a gag or a cloth-like material tied very tightly into the mouth, was found.The pathologist also observed a bruise or contusion on the front part of the neck consistent with injury caused by a type of cloth having been tied around the neck, and U-shaped contusions on the back side of the legs which coincided exactly with the dimensions of the distal portion of a piece of electrical cord found in the house.Dr. Cumberland testified that, on the basis of his examination, the cause of death of the child was "asphyxia secondary to obstruction of the airway."

The first issue for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to suppress statements made by the appellant supposedly induced by promises of leniency on the part of the law enforcement officers.

In support of her assertion, appellant relies on the premise that a confession is not admissible if it is induced by promises encouraging the accused to believe that his or her case will be lightened or meliorated and dealt with more favorably.Kendrick v. State, 55 Ala.App. 11, 312 So.2d 583(1975).

We have meticulously searched the record for any statements the law enforcement officers made to the appellant that would suggest some type of leniency if she would confess and have found none.Several statements made by the officers during the interrogation urged the appellant to tell the truth, but such statements are permissible.Eakes v. State, 387 So.2d 855(Ala.Crim.App.1978).Statements made by law enforcement officers during the questioning of an accused that it would be better for him to tell the truth and statements that the accused has lied do not render any subsequent confessions or statements that the accused makes inadmissible.Furthermore, confessions or statements are not inadmissible because they have been obtained by propounding to the accused questions assuming his guilt.Golden v. State, 439 So.2d 813(Ala.Crim.App.1983);Raines v. State, 428 So.2d 206(Ala.Crim.App.1983);andBennett v. State, 409 So.2d 936(Ala.Crim.App.1981), cert. denied, 409 So.2d 936(Ala.1982).

The use of an accused's statements for trial purposes has been extensively litigated.Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 43686 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694(1966), advanced the proposition that exculpatory or inculpatory statements stemming from custodial interrogation may be used at the accused's trial if procedural safeguards were implemented to insure the accused's rights against self-incrimination.Miranda, supra, sets forth specific measures that should be followed prior to questioning an accused person.The person "must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."Miranda, supra.See alsoRomine v. State, 384 So.2d 1185(Ala.Crim.App.1980).These rights may be waived if the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.Miranda, supra.

In the case at bar, the appellant affirmatively waived her "rights" and answered the law enforcement officers' questions.The trial judge conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury on appellant's motion to suppress statements she made at her custodial interrogation.The court found that the statements were voluntarily made and were not induced by threats or promises operating to lead the appellant to believe she would be harmed if she did not make a statement or gain any favor by making a statement.

Hale v. State, 420 So.2d 821(Ala.Crim.App.1982), held that the question of whether a statement is made voluntarily is one of law and should be determined by the trial judge.See alsoMyers v. State, 401 So.2d 288(Ala.Crim.App.1981).In considering whether a confession or inculpatory statement is voluntarily made, the trial judge need only be convinced from a preponderance of the evidence as to the rules of voluntariness.Hale, supra, andLego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618(1972).Furthermore, this court has consistently held that it will not overturn a trial court's finding as to the issue of voluntariness of a statement unless his decision is wrong and against the great weight of authority.Raines v. State, 428 So.2d 206(Ala.Crim.App.1983);Snider v. State, 422 So.2d 807(Ala.Crim.App.1982);Morgan v. State, 363 So.2d 1013(Ala.Crim.App.1978);Hurst v. State, 356 So.2d 1224(Ala.Crim.App.1978);Carter v. State, 53 Ala.App. 43, 297 So.2d 175(1974);McNair v. State, 50 Ala.App. 465, 280 So.2d 171(1973)."Even where there is credible testimony to the contrary, if the evidence is fairly capable of supporting the inference that the rules of freedom and voluntariness were observed, the ruling of the trial judge need only be supported by substantial evidence and not to a moral certainty".Bennett v. State, supra;Snider, supra, andMcNair, supra.

On the other hand, the credibility and weight to be given any statement that an accused makes is a determination for the jury.Snider, supra;Lewis v. State, 295...