Chambers v. State, 4 Div. 816

• Citation: 264 Ala. 8,84 So.2d 342
• Decision Date: 22 December 1955
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 816
• Parties: Sonny CHAMBERS, alias Sonny Boy, v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Page 342

84 So.2d 342

264 Ala. 8

Sonny CHAMBERS, alias Sonny Boy, v. STATE of Alabama.

4 Div. 816.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 22, 1955.

The following charges were refused to defendant:

'I-A. The Court charges the jury that if, after a consideration of the evidence in this case and based upon such evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant acted upon a well grounded, honest and reasonable belief that it was necessary to cut to save himself from great bodily harm or death, or that he cut before an impending necessity arose, then this is a doubt as would authorize the acquittal.'

'4. I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that if you believe from the evidence that the deceased made a sudden unprovoked murderous attack upon the defendant, deceased at the time being armed with a deadly weapon and in the act of effectuating upon the defendant his murderous purpose, then, I charge you, the defendant was under no duty to retreat but had the right to stand his ground and kill his assailant.'

'7. If the jury find from the evidence that the conduct of the deceased, S. B. Sanders, was such as to reasonably lead the defendant to believe that the deceased was about to inflict some great bodily harm on his person, and that the defendant, acting on such reasonable belief of great bodily harm, cut the deceased and killed him, then the jury should acquit.'

Roy L. Smith and Smith & Smith, Phenix City, for appellant.

John Patterson, Atty. Gen., and J. Noel Baker, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

MERRILL, Justice.

Appellant was tried in the Circuit Court of Russell County under an indictment charging first degree murder. He was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 25 years in prison. From the judgment of conviction and the judgment overruling his motion for a new trial, he appeals.

The physical encounter between appellant and the deceased, in which the deceased sustained knife wounds which caused his death, took place in a drinking place in Phenix City. There were several eyewitnesses to the affair. The evidence as to the particulars of the difficulty is in dispute. Evidence for the state was to the effect that there was no argument between appellant and the deceased prior to the fatal encounter and that the attack made on the deceased by the appellant was unprovoked. The appellant adduced evidence to the effect that he had done nothing to provoke the difficulty and that he killed the deceased in self-defense.

The appellant took the stand to testify in his own behalf. On his cross-examination by the solicitor, the following transpired:

'Q. And you pleaded guilty to killing a man over in Georgia, and you were sentenced----

'Mr. Smith: (Interrupting) We object to that, your Honor, and move for a mistrial. Bringing in some highly prejudicial reference to some former charge----

'The Court: I will overrule your objection. I will let him ask that.

'(Exception by Mr. Smith.)

'Q. You pleaded guilty over in Georgia to killing a man and were sentenced for a killing a man to from ten to twenty years, and you pleaded guilty; and you were on parole when you killed S. B. Sanders? A. I didn't kill him.

'Q. You pleaded guilty to it and were sentenced to the penitentiary, weren't you, for from ten to twenty years? A. Yes, sir.

'Mr. Smith: Now if it please the Court, we make a motion for a mistrial and ask that the case now be withdrawn from the jury. This is calculated for no reason other than to prejudice the minds of the jury, and we object to it.

'The Court: I will overrule your objection.

'(Exception by Mr. Smith)'

The appellant contends that the allowance of this testimony was error as it was an attempt to prove the commission of the present offense by going into the particulars of another offense having no bearing on or relation to the instant case.

We are cognizant of the line of cases holding that in prosecution for a particular offense, evidence, as to the guilt of the accused of another distinct offense, unconnected with the one charged, it not admissible as substantive evidence to prove guilt of the offense charged. 6 Ala. Digest, Crim. Law, k369(1). However, when the accused takes the stand to testify in his own behalf, he does so in a dual capacity--(1) as the accused and (2) as a witness. In his capacity as a witness his credibility may be impeached in the same way or ways in which the credibility of any other witness may be impeached. Stone v. State, 208 Ala. 50, 93 So. 706; Pitts v. State, 261 Ala. 314, 74 So.2d 232. 'A defendant, who testifies for himself as a witness, may be impeached in the same manner as other witnesses, by showing that he has been convicted of crime involving moral turpitude, or that he has made contradictory statements, or that he is a person of bad character.' Carpenter v. State, 193 Ala. 51, 69 So. 531, 532; Gast v. State, 232 Ala. 307, 167 So. 554; Vaughn v. State, 235 Ala. 80, 177 So. 553; Title 7, § 435, Code 1940.

We think the matter complained of was properly allowed as an attack on the credibility of the witness for the purpose of impeaching his testimony. We are strengthened in our conclusion that no error prejudicial to appellant was committed by a portion of the oral charge to the jury wherein the lower cour...