Chambers v. State, A11–1954.

• Citation: 831 N.W.2d 311
• Decision Date: 31 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. A11–1954.,A11–1954.
• Parties: Timothy Patrick CHAMBERS, petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

831 N.W.2d 311

Timothy Patrick CHAMBERS, petitioner, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A11–1954.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 31, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Because the rule announced in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), only applies to nonhomicide offenders and does not apply to those convicted of homicide, appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the Graham rule.

2. The rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), is a new rule of criminal constitutional procedure that is neither substantive nor a watershed rule implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Therefore, appellant is not entitled to the retroactive benefit of the Miller rule in a postconviction proceeding.

3. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's postconviction petition without a hearing because the petition was untimely under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2012), and none of the exceptions in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b) (2012), apply.

Michael C. Davis, Saint Paul, MN; and David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie Rosenberg, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and G. Paul Beaumaster, Rice County Attorney, Benjamin Bejar, Nathaniel Reitz, Assistant Rice County Attorneys, Faribault, MN, for respondent.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

Appellant Timothy Chambers was found guilty by a Rice County jury of firstdegreemurder and related charges arising out of a motor vehicle collision that occurred on May 3, 1996, in which a deputy sheriff was killed. The district court sentenced Chambers on the first-degree murder conviction to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. We affirmed Chambers' conviction and sentence on direct appeal, concluding, among other things, that his life sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In 2007, Chambers filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the postconviction court denied. We affirmed the postconviction court on appeal. In May 2011, Chambers filed a second petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The postconviction court denied Chambers' petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the petition was time barred under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2012), and that none of the exceptions to the time bar applied. On appeal, Chambers relies upon recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court to support his argument that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, and that those cases satisfy an exception to the time bar under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(3). Because we conclude that the cases upon which Chambers relies are either not applicable to Chambers, or do not apply retroactively to him, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of the petition.

On May 3, 1996, 17–year–old Timothy Chambers walked to the Priordale Mall in Prior Lake to fill out a job application. As Chambers was leaving the mall, he saw a parked Lincoln Town Car with the keys inside. Chambers took the Lincoln and drove it away from the mall. The Lincoln's owner reported it stolen shortly after Chambers took it, and Chambers was soon stopped by Deputy Donald Buchan of the Scott County Sheriff's Department. When Buchan exited his squad car, Chambers drove the Lincoln into Buchan's car and then drove away. Buchan and other officers pursued Chambers for over 30 miles. During the pursuit, Chambers caused the Lincoln to bump against Buchan's squad car, drove through several red lights, and then hit a truck stopped at an intersection. When Chambers reached I–35, he turned south and operated the vehicle at speeds of 90 to 110 miles per hour. Near the Dakota/Rice County border, two semi-trucks blocked both lanes on I–35 in an attempt to slow Chambers, but he avoided the trucks by driving into the median and then exiting I–35.

At the top of the exit ramp, Rice County Deputy Sheriff John Liebenstein set up a roadblock with his unmarked squad car. Liebenstein left space for other vehicles to go around the roadblock. According to eyewitness testimony, when Chambers drove up the exit ramp toward the roadblock, he accelerated the Lincoln and hit the unmarked squad car on the passenger side between the front and rear wheels. It was unclear whether Liebenstein was seated in the squad car or standing outside it; but following the collision, Liebenstein was found dead approximately 70 feet from the point of impact. There was no evidence that Chambers attempted to slow down or avoid the roadblock.¹

A grand jury returned a four-count indictment against Chambers, charging him with: first-degree murder of a peace officer,Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(4) (2012); second-degree felony murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2012); fleeing a police officer resulting in death, Minn.Stat. § 609.487, subd. 4(a) (2012); and theft of a motor vehicle, Minn.Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(17) (2012). Because Chambers was alleged to have committed first-degree murder when he was over the age of 16, he was automatically certified to stand trial as an adult. SeeMinn.Stat. §§ 260B.007, subd. 6(b), 260B.101, subd. 2 (2012). After a jury trial that spanned nearly three weeks, the jury found Chambers guilty of all four charges. The district court convicted Chambers of the first-degree murder count and sentenced him to the statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release under Minn.Stat. § 609.106, subd. 2(1) (2012).

On direct appeal, Chambers argued, among other things, that the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release imposed upon him violated the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. State v. Chambers ( Chambers I ), 589 N.W.2d 466, 479 (Minn.1999); seeU.S. Const. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment); Minn. Const. art. I, § 5 (prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment). Chambers did not argue that a life sentence without the possibility of release was disproportional to the crime of first-degree murder of a peace officer. Consequently, we focused on whether the punishment comported with evolving standards of decency to determine whether the sentence was cruel or unusual. Chambers I, 589 N.W.2d at 480. To make that determination, we looked to the standards expressed by the Legislature, noting that the Legislature is “constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that recent amendments to the relevant criminal statutes indicated that the Legislature intended to apply a life sentence without the possibility of release to a 17–year–old convicted of first-degree murder of a peace officer. Id. Based on decisions of federal courts on the question, as well as decisions from our court, we concluded that Chambers had failed to meet his heavy burden of proving that his sentence is “well nigh universally rejected,” and so his sentence did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Id. We therefore affirmed Chambers' conviction and sentence on March 4, 1999. Id. at 481.

In 2007, Chambers filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirmed the postconviction court's summary denial of Chambers' petition in 2009. Chambers v. State ( Chambers II ), 769 N.W.2d 762, 763 (Minn.2009). Chambers subsequently filed a second petition for postconviction relief, asserting that he was entitled to relief under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), which held that a sentence of life without the possibility of release imposed upon juvenile nonhomicide offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The postconviction court summarily denied the second petition, concluding that Graham did not apply, that the petition was time barred under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, and that none of the exceptions to the time bar applied.

Chambers appealed the denial of his second petition for postconviction relief. While his case was pending before this court, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. We ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs to address the potential impact of Miller on Chambers' second petition for postconviction relief.

I.

Chambers first argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion when it concluded that Graham was not applicable, that his petition was time barred under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, and that none of the exceptions to the time bar apply. We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn.2012). In particular, we review the postconviction court's legal determinations de novo and its factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Id.

Initially, we must determine whether Chambers' second petition was untimely under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a). When direct appellate review is not available, a person convicted of a crime who claims that his conviction was obtained in violation of the constitution or other law may file a petition to secure relief from the conviction and sentence, or other appropriate relief. Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2012). Generally, a petition for postconviction relief is untimely if it is not brought within two years of either the entry of judgment of...