Chambers v. State, 52A04-0511-CR-634.
| Decision Date | 30 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 52A04-0511-CR-634.,52A04-0511-CR-634. |
| Citation | 848 N.E.2d 298 |
| Parties | Lannell CHAMBERS, Sr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, J. Michael Sauer, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Kelly A. Miklos, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.
Lannell Chambers, Sr. was found guilty following a jury trial of three counts of dealing in cocaine as a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Chambers to three concurrent fifteen-year sentences. Chambers now appeals his convictions and his sentence. We reverse.
Chambers raises two issues for our review. We find the first issue raised by Chambers to be dispositive, and we restate it as whether the trial court properly denied Chambers' motion to dismiss pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B).
On June 22, June 23, and July 7, 2004, Chambers sold cocaine to John Featherstone, a police informant. Chambers was arrested on July 16, 2004. On July 21, 2004, the State charged Chambers with one count of dealing in cocaine as a Class A felony, three counts of dealing in cocaine as a Class B felony, two counts of possession of cocaine as a Class D felony, and three counts of maintaining a common nuisance as a Class D felony. Chambers filed a motion, pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B), requesting a speedy trial on September 3, 2004. The trial court granted this motion, thus giving the State seventy days, or until November 12, 2004, to bring Chambers to trial. The trial court scheduled Chambers' jury trial for October 25, 2004.
At a pre-trial hearing on October 11, 2004, the State made a motion to continue the trial pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(D). The State informed the trial court:
I'm asking for a Motion to Continue that [sic] trial due to the lack of ah evidence ah received from the Indiana State Police Laboratory. We do have ah I would say two ... two thirds of the items received back as of Friday. There is still an item left out there. Um, unknown and I could have it today, I could have [sic] tomorrow. I don't know, I can't predict when their [sic] gonna give it to me, but I do know that you're required to send out a venire two weeks ahead of time. A speedy trial motion was filed September 3rd, um you'd have 70 days from that date. Also within the ah Criminal Rule 4 rules, there's a provision that ... that date may be ex ... extended 90 days for the inabil ... unavailability of evidence.
* * *
[A]s soon as we received notification of the fast and speedy trial the items were requested to be tested by the State Police laboratory in Fort Wayne. They are running a nine month backlog according to them. They did move them up in there [sic] schedule which is proof that we have two of the three items submitted test ... test returned. And we are awaiting the results on the third. Um, I can not proceed with the trial in it's [sic] entirety without all the evidence having been tested. So I'd ask that it be continued at the Court's earliest convenience.
Transcript at 13. Chambers' attorney reminded the trial court judge that "we've asked to have this set as a speedy trial." Id. at 14. Despite this, the trial court relied on the State's representations and granted the State's motion based on the State's "inability to have all of the information available ...." Id. The trial court scheduled Chambers' jury trial for January 10, 2005.
On November 22, 2004, Chambers filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B). Chambers alleged that the State was required to bring him to trial by November 12, 2004, and had failed to do so. He noted that the delay of his trial could not be attributed to him and was not due to congestion of the trial court's calendar. He also asserted that the State had not "in good faith shown that the delay in availing the evidence for trial was not [the State's] fault." Appellant's Appendix at 49. The next day, the trial court issued an order denying Chambers' motion to dismiss.
On January 3, 2005, the trial court granted Chambers' motion for a continuance and reset the trial for March 7, 2005. Pursuant to an agreement between Chambers and the State, the trial court entered an order on February 28, 2005, continuing the trial to April 25, 2005. On March 30, 2005, new counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Chambers, and filed a motion to continue the trial. The trial court granted this motion on April 4, 2005. Chambers pled guilty to dealing in cocaine as a Class B felony on May 11, 2005. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on June 9, 2005, where it ultimately rejected Chambers' plea agreement with the State and scheduled a jury trial for September 12, 2005.
On August 18, 2005, Chambers renewed his motion to dismiss pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B). A hearing was held on August 24, 2005. At this hearing, Chambers' counsel noted that on October 11, 2004, the State requested a continuance because it was missing certain evidence, namely drug test results that had been sent to the Indiana State Police Laboratory. Through discovery though, Chambers learned that the missing drug test results "had been completed ... by the State Police lab on October 5th, of 2004, six days before the request by the State was made to continue."2 Tr. at 34. Chambers' counsel argued that the continuance obtained by the State on October 11, 2004,
was number one never needed, especially in light of the fact that the test results were completed and . . . and you know even before the request was made, and a simple phone call, I would think could have confirmed that . . . but the fact is that ... that date never should have been continued at that point. Um, and . . . the Court then rescheduling the trial out to January 10th of this year that put it beyond the 70 days.
Id. at 34-35. Chambers' counsel concluded that, pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B) Chambers should have been discharged. The State responded as follows:
As to the drug test results, I didn't bring my file to look at that [sic] certification I made to the Court. It was an honest one through my officers, they did not have the results. Now whether it's stamped on the lab results or not it was not available to . . . we did not have those at that time.
Id. at 35-36. The trial court noted,
[T]he State at the time of the motion to continue back in October that was on October the 11th, stated it did not have the evidence that was necessary for them to go forward. And I think that . . . that's what Criminal Rule 4D says. That if the State doesn't have the evidence and can have the evidence within the next 90 days than [sic] um the trial can be continued, and that is not a violation of Criminal Rule 4 . . . .
Id. at 36-37. The trial court pointed out that after October 11, 2004, every continuance in the case was attributable to Chambers. The trial court denied Chambers' renewed motion to dismiss.
On September 9, 2005, the State amended the Information and charged Chambers with three counts of dealing in cocaine as a Class B felony. The remaining charges were dismissed. Chambers' jury trial began on September 12, 2005. The jury ultimately found Chambers guilty on all three counts. The trial court sentenced Chambers to enhanced terms of fifteen years for each of his convictions and specified that the sentences should be served concurrently. This appeal ensued.
Chambers argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B). We agree.
Chambers filed his motion for a speedy trial on September 3, 2004, and the trial court granted this motion. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution guarantee an accused individual's right to a speedy trial. Cole v. State, 780 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), trans. denied. This fundamental principle of constitutional law has long been zealously guarded by our courts. Id. To this end, the provisions of Criminal Rule 4 implement a defendant's speedy trial right. Id. Specifically, Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) provides:
If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.
"This rule requires that, upon a motion for a speedy trial, a defendant must be tried within seventy days, unless (1) the defendant caused the delay, or (2) the court's calendar is congested." Jackson v. State, 663 N.E.2d 766, 767 (Ind.1996). The onus, though, is on the State, not the defendant, to expedite prosecution. Id. at 769. "`[A] defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.'" Id. (quoting Crosby v. State, 597 N.E.2d 984, 988 (Ind. Ct.App.1992)).
Chambers notes that he filed his motion for a speedy trial on September 3, 2004, which meant that the State had seventy days from that date, or until November 12, 2004, to bring him to trial. The State did not bring Chambers to trial by this date. The State's failure to bring Chambers to trial by November 12, 2004, cannot be attributed to any delay caused by Chambers or congestion of the trial court's calendar. Chambers argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the State did not bring him to trial within seventy days after his motion for a speedy trial was filed, and therefore, pursuant to Criminal Rule 4, he should have been discharged.
However, the State did not bring Chambers to trial...
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