Chambers v. Toohey

• Decision Date: 29 September 1936
• Parties: CHAMBERS v. TOOHEY, Com'r of Labor.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

187 A. 49

CHAMBERS

v. TOOHEY, Com'r of Labor.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Sept. 29, 1936.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by William F. Chambers, claimant, opposed by John J. Toohey, Commissioner of Labor of the State of New Jersey. On rule to show cause why a peremptory writ of mandamus should not issue.

Peremptory writ ordered to issue. Argued before PERSKIE, J., in chambers, pursuant to statute.

John C. Grimshaw, of Newark (Samuel W. Harris, of Newark, of counsel), for relator.

William J. Egan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PERSKIE, Justice.

Is the relator, an employee, entitled to participate in the fund (1 per cent.) created by virtue of chapter 74, P.L.1919, p. 138 (as amended by P.L.1928, p. 66 [Comp.St. Supps.1924, 1930, § 34—317 et seq.]), amended by chapter 81, P.L.1923, p. 162, as amended by chapter 55, P.L.1936, p. 145 (N.J.St.Annual 1936, §§ **236—92, **236—93) ?

The facts are stipulated. On October 3, 1929, relator was employed by one August Soffel, at Colt's Neck, N. J., and lost the sight of his right eye; it was a compensable accident. Some fifteen or eighteen years prior thereto relator lost the sight of his left eye; it was not a compensable accident. The result of the two accidents rendered relator totally and permanently physically disabled.

Compensation from the 1 per cent. fund was paid relator from'September 3, 1931, to February 15, 1935, at which time he was removed from the list of those receiving benefits. His removal appears to have followed the decision of the Supreme Court case of Addotta v. Blunt, 114 N.J.Law 85, 176 A. 105, in which it was held that (under the title of the act of 1923, supra) a prior noncompensable accident followed by a compensable accident did not entitle relator to compensation from the fund in question; both accidents had to be compensable.

Thereafter the Legislature amended the act of 1923, supra, by the passage of the act of 1936, supra. By virtue of the last-stated act relator was again placed on the list of those entitled to benefits, and payments to him started on May 14, 1936. Respondent has refused to make any payments covering the period beginning February 15, 1935 (the date relator was removed from the list), to May 14, 1936 (the date relator was again placed on the list).

This application is to enforce such payment. Respondent resists payment on the ground that the act of 1936, supra, has no retroactive application. I think that respondent's claim is without merit.

The apposite rules of construction in determining whether a statute is to be given retroactive effect are well established. Courts, of course, try to effectuate the purpose of the Legislature. State v. Clark, 29 N.J.Law, 96. The previous state of the law, the circumstances leading to the enactment of the challenged act, the evils the act is designed to remedy, are factors to be considered. McGregor v. Home Insurance Co. of Newark, 33 N.J.Eq. 181. The legislative intent is the guiding star. Clarkson v. Ley, 106 N.J.Law, 380, 148 A. 745. Bearing these principles in mind plus the added one that in general all legislation affecting workmen's compensation should be, and is, liberally construed in favor of the...