Chamblee v. Old Dominion Sec. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:13cv820 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | DARRELL D. CHAMBLEE, Plaintiff, v. OLD DOMINION SECURITY COMPANY, L.L.C., et al., Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court on DEFENDANT OLD DOMINION SECURITY COMPANY, L.L.C.'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED BY DARRELL D. CHAMBLEE (Docket No. 3); DEFENDANT CHAD ELLIS' MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED BY DARRELL D. CHAMBLEE (Docket No. 6); DEFENDANT TROY GRAY'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FILED BY DARRELL D. CHAMBLEE (Docket No. 8); DEFENDANT OLD DOMINION SECURITY COMPANY, L.L.C. AND CHAD ELLIS' MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS AS UNTIMELY (Docket No. 12); DEFENDANT TROY GRAY'S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS AS UNTIMELY (Docket No. 14); and PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME TO RESPOND TO DEFENDANTS' OLD DOMINION SECURITY COMPANY L.L.C.'S, ELLIS & GRAY'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (Docket No. 18). For the reasons set forth below, DEFENDANT OLD DOMINION SECURITY COMPANY, L.L.C.
AND CHAD ELLIS' MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS AS UNTIMELY (Docket No. 12) and DEFENDANT TROY GRAY'S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS AS UNTIMELY (Docket No. 14) will be denied; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME TO RESPOND TO DEFENDANTS' OLD DOMINION SECURITY COMPANY L.L.C.'S, ELLIS & GRAY'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (Docket No. 18) will be granted; DEFENDANT CHAD ELLIS' MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED BY DARRELL D. CHAMBLEE (Docket No. 6) and DEFENDANT TROY GRAY'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED BY DARRELL D. CHAMBLEE (Docket No. 8) will be granted; and DEFENDANT OLD DOMINION SECURITY COMPANY, L.L.C'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FILED BY DARRELL D. CHAMBLEE (Docket No. 3) will be granted in part and denied in part.
Darrell D. Chamblee ("Chamblee"), originally filed his Complaint in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond. Upon removing the case to the Eastern District of Virginia, the defendants, Old Dominion Security Company, L.L.C. ("ODS"), Chad Ellis ("Ellis"), and Troy Gray ("Gray"), filed motions to dismiss the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. 5B Charles A. Wright &Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1357 (3d ed. 1998). Therefore, the facts will be recited mindful of that precept.
From January 2008 until May 24, 2011, Chamblee, an African-American, was employed as a Security Officer with ODS. During that period, Chamblee worked at the Mary Washington Hospital in Fredericksburg, Virginia. Chamblee received "regular promotions" and achieved the rank of lieutenant.
On March 28, 2011, ODS announced "various management structural promotions and changes" at the Mary Washington Hospital even though it had not posted any promotion or job opportunities. Chamblee complained to Gray, the Vice-President of ODS, that he had not been given the opportunity to apply for the position of captain and also that he had been passed over when a white female, Officer Ferrell, was promoted. Chamblee previously had complained to Gray about racial tensions between himself and Ferrell, but Gray did not investigate those complaints. On March 31, 2011, Chamblee and Gray met to discuss these matters, but Gray did not initiate an investigation into either of them. On April 6, 2011, Chamblee filed his first charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging race and gender discrimination.
On May 23, 2011, Chamblee participated in an ODS training session. During the course of that training session, an incident was reported at "2300 Fall Hill." Chamblee did not respond tothe report of the incident because that site did not lie within "Chamblee's administrative or operational control" during the training session. On May 24, 2011, Ellis called Chamblee to his office to discuss Chamblee's failure to respond to the report. During that meeting, Ellis terminated Chamblee's employment with ODS. Chamblee alleges that Ferrell (who is not a party to this action) provided false information about the incident that led to his termination.
On June 8, 2011, Chamblee filed a second complaint with the EEOC alleging retaliatory termination in addition to gender and race discrimination. After filing for unemployment compensation, Chamblee was rehired by ODS, but in a new position forty-seven miles away from the Mary Washington Hospital, without supervisory responsibilities, and as a "new hire." He voluntarily terminated his employment with ODS in September 2011.
Chamblee filed this action in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond on November 15, 2013. Thereafter, the Defendants timely removed it to this Court. On December 17, 2013, ODS and Ellis filed motions to dismiss, and Gray filed his motion to dismiss on December 18, 2013. The filing of those motions triggered Local Rule 7(F), which requires the opposingparty to file responsive briefs and supporting documentation within eleven days of service. E.D. Va. Local Civ. R. 7(F)(1). For documents filed in the Electronic Case Filing system, parties receive three additional days to file responsive briefs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) & 5(d)(3); E.D. Va. ECF Policies & Procedures, at 33. Therefore, Chamblee had fourteen days to file his brief in opposition to the motions. Because the fourteenth day was New Year's Day, his brief was due to the Court on January 2, 2014. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
Chamblee did not file his memorandum in opposition until January 7, 2014, five days after the due date. PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS (Docket No. 8). Subsequently, all three defendants moved to strike the opposition as untimely.
Rule 6(b) provides two avenues for a party to take when it needs an extension: (1) move for an extension before the expiration of the deadline; or (2) thereafter, move for an extension for "excusable neglect." Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Chamblee did not move the Court for an extension before January 2, 2014, therefore, he must show good cause and "excusable neglect." See Eagle Fire, Inc. v. Eagle Integrated Controls,Inc., 2006 WL 1720681, *3 (E.D. Va. 2006). To that end, after the Defendants filed their Motions to Strike, Chamblee moved for an enlargement of time for response. The Local Rules of the Eastern District of Virginia state that requests for an extension will "in general, be looked upon with disfavor." E.D. Va. Local Civ. R. 7(1). However, Rule 6(b) "gives the court extensive flexibility to modify the fixed time periods found throughout the rules, whether the enlargement is sought before or after the actual termination of the allotted time." 4B Wright & Miller, supra, at § 1165.
In Pioneer Ins. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, the Supreme Court listed four factors that courts should consider when determining whether to grant relief under the ambit of "excusable neglect." The factors are: (1) the danger of prejudice to the adverse party; (2) the length of the delay; (3) whether the delay was within the reasonable control of the movant; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. While "ignorance of the rules or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute 'excusable' neglect," the concept is not strictly limited to omissions caused by circumstances outside the movant's control. Id. at 392; see also Eagle Fire, 2006 WL 1720681, *4.
Here, Chamblee acknowledged that the omission stemmed from a mistake construing the applicable rules. (Plaintiff's Motionto Enlarge Time, at 1). He argues that granting the extension will not prejudice the Defendants and that the delay was not occasioned by "bad faith."
While the delay was within the reasonable control of Chamblee, the Court notes that, once he became aware of the error, he has acted promptly. Indeed, he filed his Motion to Enlarge Time within two days of the Defendants' Motions to Strike, and he filed a PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO ENLARGE TIME (Docket No. 21) within a day of DEFENDANT TROY GRAY'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME (Docket No. 20). See Gilyard v. Northlake Foods, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1010-11 (E.D. Va. 2005) (). Ultimately, Chamblee's Opposition to Def endants' Motions to Dismiss was only five days late. The delay was minimal and did not affect the proceedings. See id.; see also Lee v. Amerisit Assisted Living, 2006 WL 1701341, at *1-2 (W.D. Va. 2006) (). Moreover, the evidence does not suggest that Chamblee was engaged in purposefully dilatory tactics. To deny Chamblee's motion under these circumstances would "divorce 'excusable' from 'neglect.'" Gilyard, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
The Defendants argue that the decision in Eagle Fire controls and requires the denial of Chamblee's motion. However, the facts here are quite different than those in Eagle Fire, wherein the Court declined to grant an extension to a party who had deliberately engaged in a pattern of dilatory behavior. Eagle Fire, 2006 WL 1720 681, *4 ( ). That did not happen here.
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