Chamblin v. Chamblin
| Decision Date | 10 April 1936 |
| Docket Number | No. 23316.,23316. |
| Citation | 362 Ill. 588,1 N.E.2d 73 |
| Parties | CHAMBLIN v. CHAMBLIN et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit by Mathilda Chamblin against Charles Edward Chamblin and others. From a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity, complainant appeals.
Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Mason County; A. Clay Williams, judge.
Edward Pree, of Springfield, Nelson O. Howarth, of Chicago, and Jasper S. Gullo, of Springfield, for appellant.
Covey & Woods, of Lincoln, for appellees.
Mathilda Chamblin filed a suit in equity in the circuit court of Mason county in April, 1933, against Charles Edward Chamblin for separate maintenance. The bill also prayed to have set aside a conveyance of lands in said county from Chamblin to A. E. Hilliard and from him to Lossie Reynolds. Chamblin was defaulted. The other defendants answered. Upon a hearing, the bill was dismissed for want of equity, and this appeal followed.
Chamblin and his wife, Mathilda, were married August 17, 1929. She instituted a suit for separate maintenance in Mason county, January 27, 1930, and later dismissed it. They finally separated October 4, 1930. On March 2, 1931, Chamblin instituted a suit for divorce against complainant in the district court of Washoe county at Reno, Nev. Service was had by publication, and Mrs. Chamblin was also served in Mason county, Ill., with a summons and a certified copy of the bill of complaint. By advice of her counsel she did not appear, and a default decree was entered against her April 17, 1931. She again filed a suit for separate maintenance in Mason county, Ill. That suit was dismissed, and thereafter the conveyances in controversy were made the recorded. The complainant them brought a suit in Reno, Nev., to set aside the divorce decree. Upon the hearing, a decree was entered in her favor from which Chamblin appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada. 55 Nev. 146, 27 P.(2d) 1061, 1062. That court reversed the decree and remanded the cause, with directions to the lower court to dismiss the suit at her costs. While those proceedings were pending, Chamblin filed a second suit for divorce in Reno. Evidence was heard and a decree was entered against appellant. She appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, but upon the decision of that court in the first case, her appeal was dismissed, and the second suit for divorce was also dismissed.
Appellant claims that the decree for divorce in Nevada was obtained through fraud, and that the courts of Nevada had no jurisdiction because Chamblin was not a bona fide resident of that state when he brought suit. She relies upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this court, which hold that the constitutional provision requiring full faith and credit to be given to the judicial proceedings of another state does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court which rendered the judgment or decree, either as to the person or the subject-matter, notwithstanding a recital therein of the jurisdictional facts. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L.Ed. 897;Simmons v. Saul, 138 U.S. 439, 11 S.Ct. 369, 34 L.Ed. 1054; National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 25 S.Ct. 70, 49 L.Ed. 184. In consonance with those holdings, we have repeatedly announced the same doctrine. Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill. 589, 44 N.E. 841,35 L.R.A. 70;Field v. Field, 215 Ill. 496, 74 N.E. 443;Forsyth v. Barnes, 228 Ill. 326, 81 N.E. 1028,10 Ann.Cas. 710;Pembleton v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 289 Ill. 99, 124 N.E. 355. But it is to be observed that in each of the cases cited, the judgment or decree had not been previously assailed on jurisdictional facts in the state where it was rendered.
In the divorce proceeding, the complaint alleged that Chamblin was a bona fide resident of the state of Nevada for the required statutory period. His testimony supported that allegation, and the decree found he had been such a resident for a sufficient period of time. In the proceeding filed by Mrs. Chamblin in Nevada to set aside that decree, it was alleged that the decree was obtained through the fraud and perjury of Chamblin; that he was not physically present in the state of Nevada for the minimum time required by the statute of that state before filing his suit, and that he was not a bona fide resident of Nevada at the time the suit was instituted. These issues are the same as are presented by her in the present case. The Supreme Court of Nevada found that she had been duly served with process; that she had opportunity to appear and defend; and that she was charged with knowledge that her husband would produce the testimony which she claimed constituted perjury. In the course of the opinion, the court said, ‘From the very nature of the grounds of fraud relied upon, it is seen that it is not extrinsic or collateral to the matter tried by the court in the suit resulting in the decree of divorce.’
The finding of jurisdictional facts by the nisi prius court in Nevada was not conclusive and could be attacked by compl...
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