Chambliss v. City of Philadelphia

Decision Date31 December 1987
Docket NumberAFL-CIO
Citation535 A.2d 291,112 Pa.Cmwlth. 290
PartiesLloyd V. CHAMBLISS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, District Council 47,, and Kirschner, Willig, Weinberg & Dempsey. Appeal of CITY OF PHILADELPHIA.
CourtPennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Jesse Milan, Jr., Chief Asst. City Solicitor, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Robert A. Davitch, Sidkoff, Pincus & Green, Philadelphia, for Lloyd V. Chambliss.

Aaron J. Beyer, Meltzer & Schiffrin, and Aaron Jay Beyer, Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Philadelphia, for American Federation of State County, Municipal Employees.

Stephanie Resnick, Cozen & O'Connor, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before COLINS and PALLADINO, JJ., and KALISH, Senior Judge.

PALLADINO, Judge.

The City of Philadelphia (City) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) which granted a preliminary injunction to Lloyd V. Chambliss and ordered him reinstated to his former employment with the City. 1 For the reasons set forth below, we reverse. 2

In 1971, Chambliss was hired as an Area Youth Worker with the City's Department of Welfare. On January 8, 1979, Chambliss was injured in a work-related accident for which he was placed on disability leave. As a result of emotional difficulties associated with his injuries and absence from work, Chambliss began psychiatric treatment with Dr. Clancy D. McKenzie in May of 1980, such treatment continuing until the end of 1982.

On August 4, 1980, Chambliss returned to work. However, approximately one week later, Chambliss failed to appear for work, and the City subsequently separated him from employment under the Philadelphia Civil Service Regulations for job abandonment.

Following his separation, Chambliss filed a grievance against the City under the terms of the relevant Collective Bargaining Agreement alleging harassment and related charges. The controversy went to binding arbitration, and hearings were held on April 12, 1983 and May 2, 1983. At the hearings, Dr. McKenzie testified that Chambliss had suffered severe depression as a result of his physical injuries but that this disorder finally subsided towards the end of 1982.

The arbitrator subsequently ruled in favor of Chambliss and ordered the City to reinstate him to his position as of July 28, 1983. The City did not appeal the arbitrator's award. In anticipation of his return to work, Chambliss reported to the City's medical dispensary for a medical examination pursuant to Philadelphia Civil Service Regulation 9.1411. 3 At the examination, the treating physician requested Chambliss to release all of Dr. McKenzie's psychiatric records pertaining to his treatment of Chambliss. Chambliss initially executed a release of records. However, he later revoked the release following conversations with Dr. McKenzie, stating that the file contained some personal and confidential material. When Dr. McKenzie failed to release Chambliss' file, the City refused to reinstate him to his former position.

On August 27, 1985 Chambliss filed a complaint in civil action with the trial court seeking reinstatement, back pay and damages based upon both his employment contract with the City and the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4 On August 13, 1986, Chambliss filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and writ of mandamus against the City, seeking immediate reinstatement pending the conclusion of his principal litigation. The trial court granted Chambliss' motion 5 on October 12, 1987, and the City has appealed this order to this court. Before us 6 at this time, therefore, is the limited issue of whether the trial court properly granted Chambliss' preliminary injunction for reinstatement.

In Willman v. Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh, 505 Pa. 263, 269, 479 A.2d 452, 455 (1984) (quoting Zebra v. Pittsburgh School District, 449 Pa. 432, 437, 296 A.2d 748, 750 (1972)), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:

In order to sustain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff's right to relief must be clear, the need for relief must be immediate, and the injury must be irreparable if the injunction is not granted.

With regard to the irreparable harm element of the test, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated:

'The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.'

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90, 94 S.Ct. 937, 953, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974) (quoting Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. Federal Power Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.Cir.1958)) (emphasis added).

In his action against the City, Chambliss seeks reinstatement to his former position as an Area Youth Worker pursuant to the prior award of an arbitrator. Should he prevail, 7 he will be entitled, as the trial court recognized, to monetary damages to compensate him for lost wages as well as any other monetary damages the trial court shall deem appropriate. Despite that, the trial court concluded that the harm currently being suffered by Chambliss is irreparable in a legally cognizable sense because "no award of lost wages can provide this plaintiff with the therapeutic and psychic benefits of his return to work." 8

We cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion. The expert testimony of Dr. McKenzie, Chambliss' psychiatrist, clearly shows that as of 1983 Chambliss' past depression had subsided, that he is currently no longer in need of psychiatric treatment, and that he is fully able to return to work. It follows that Chambliss is therefore in the same position as any other individual who seeks reinstatement to his or her former job in an action against the former employer. It is undisputed that such individuals will be fully compensated for lost wages and other damages should they prevail upon the merits of their actions. While we remain sympathetic to the plight Chambliss has experienced in seeking his job back, we are not prepared to hold that the mere denial of reinstatement pending litigation constitutes an irreparable harm to all of such individuals mandating that preliminary injunctions shall issue. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not have reasonable grounds to sustain the preliminary injunction.

Accordingly, the order of the trial court granting a preliminary injunction is reversed.

COLINS, J., dissents.

ORDER

AND NOW, December 31, 1987, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting a preliminary injunction in the above-captioned matter is reversed.

KALISH, Senior Judge, concurring.

I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it reverses the decision of the trial court.

However, since this was an action carved within the framework of a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 1 the trial court based its grant of a preliminary injunction on the nature of that action, without any evidence whatsoever of the nature of the communications between Chambliss and the psychiatrist, holding that there is no doubt that Chambliss would prevail on the merits, requires some explanation because I feel that there is a misconstruction of the nature of the section 1983 action.

The first inquiry in any section 1983 action is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of any right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Whether or not there is a deprivation of a right of privacy of a constitutional dimension, permitting a section 1983 action is more elusive than the trial court suggested. While a right of privacy, not particularly articulated in the Constitution, may show constitutional protection...

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2 cases
  • Keen v. City of Philadelphia
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • March 16, 1989
    ...injunction is a showing of immediate and irreparable harm which cannot be compensated by damages. See Chambliss v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 290, 535 A.2d 291 (1987). In this case, the trial court determined that, because an officer is automatically suspended if arrested......
  • Frizalone v. Com., Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Com'n
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • December 31, 1987

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