Champagne v. Hamey

CourtMissouri Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtFox
Citation189 Mo. 709,88 S.W. 92
PartiesCHAMPAGNE v. HAMEY
Decision Date20 June 1905
88 S.W. 92
189 Mo. 709
CHAMPAGNE
v.
HAMEY
Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.
June 20, 1905.

1. RAPE — ACTION FOR DAMAGES — INSTRUCTIONS.

In an action for damages owing to plaintiff's having been ravished by defendant and caused to become a mother, it was error to refuse to instruct that if at the time of the assault or within a reasonable time thereafter plaintiff had an opportunity to make an outcry and she did not do so, and did not do so as soon as an opportunity offered, or at any time prior to the birth of her child she did not complain of the assault, and that she continued on friendly relations with defendant, the jury should take such facts into the case in determining whether the defendant did have carnal knowledge with plaintiff by force, and that if the defendant did not have sexual intercourse with plaintiff, or even if he did with her consent, he was not liable.

2. APPEAL — REVIEW — ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL — BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

Alleged erroneous argument of counsel cannot be reviewed on appeal unless timely objections and exceptions are made and the same appear with the matter complained of in the bill of exceptions.

3. RAPE — NECESSITY FOR CORROBORATION OF PROSECUTRIX.

Corroboration of prosecutrix is not necessary to make out a charge of rape either in a criminal or a civil case.

4. RAPE — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY.

In an action for damages owing to plaintiff's having been ravished by defendant and caused to become a mother, evidence considered, and held insufficient to show that any rape was committed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Buchanan County; A. M. Woodson, Judge.

Action by Jessie Champagne against John Hamey. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

This cause is here upon an appeal from a judgment against the defendant in the Buchanan county circuit court. The cause of action upon which this judgment rests is thus stated by the plaintiff:

[88 S.W. 93]

"Plaintiff, for cause of action, states that she is an infant of the age of 17 years; that she was on the 7th day of June, 1899, just a few days past 16 years old; that her mother is dead, and that Mrs. Erwin was her foster mother and took her when she was about two years old; that she lived with her foster mother until the latter part of March, 1900.

"That the defendant is the son-in-law of her foster mother, and married her foster sister; that her foster mother, defendant, and her foster sister live almost in the same yard; that during all her lifetime plaintiff had at times helped her foster sister and worked for her sister, and looked to the defendant and plaintiff's foster sister for protection, and was given by consent under their control.

"That her foster mother lived on the property belonging to the defendant, and relied on defendant for support; that the house in which the plaintiff and her mother lived was close to the house in which defendant and his wife, plaintiff's foster sister, lived.

"Plaintiff further states that in the evening, on or about the 7th day of June, 1899, defendant came to the house where plaintiff lived with her foster mother, and found plaintiff alone, and found plaintiff's foster mother was away from home; that defendant, finding plaintiff alone, caught plaintiff and threw plaintiff on the bed, and took a large pillow and placed it over plaintiff's face, so that plaintiff could not holloa, and threatened plaintiff, and forcibly ravished plaintiff and had intercourse with plaintiff; that plaintiff fought until she was exhausted, but that defendant accomplished his purpose; that on account of said aforesaid act plaintiff became pregnant with child, and on the 3d day of March, 1900, a child was born, being the child of defendant.

"Plaintiff further states that on account of said aforesaid act of defendant plaintiff's life is ruined, and that plaintiff is disgraced, and that she is compelled to support her child, all of which is caused by said defendant by his criminal acts as aforesaid; wherefore, plaintiff says she is damaged in the sum of twenty thousand dollars. Wherefore plaintiff prays judgment in the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), and for such other and further relief as the court may deem proper."

The answer was a general denial.

The facts upon which this judgment is sought to be supported were substantially as follows:

The plaintiff testified that she was 16 years of age in May, 1899. The alleged assault occurred June 7, 1899. Her mother having died, Mrs. Erwin, the defendant's mother-in-law, took her to raise when she was two years old, and from that time on she lived with Mrs. Erwin in a two-story house on a farm belonging to the defendant's father. The defendant was raised on the same farm. He was a married man, 36 years of age, and his family consisted of his wife and children, the oldest 11, and the youngest 3 years old at the time of the alleged assault. The defendant, his wife and children, the defendant's father and the plaintiff's father, lived in a two-story house on the same farm in the same yard, about 80 feet from the house in which Mrs. Erwin and plaintiff resided.

The testimony of the plaintiff is that on the evening of June 7, 1899, she was alone in her home. About 8:30 o'clock she was standing in the front room combing her hair. It was dusk, and getting dark. Some one entered and threw his arms around her waist and kissed her. She jerked free, and, turning, recognized the defendant. She ran towards the door, but before she could escape he caught her again, dragged her to a bed in the room, and threw her upon it. She struggled to get away from him, but she could not. She tried to scream, but he forced a pillow over her mouth and prevented her. She testified that she resisted, but he raised up her clothes and raped her; that she fainted, and when she regained consciousness the defendant was standing by the side of her bed. He helped her up, saying, "My God, Jess, don't tell my wife," but she says she didn't say that she would or that she would not. Then he went over to his house, while she went out on the porch and sat down. She testified that at the time she was a pure, innocent girl, a few months past 16 years old, strong and healthy; that she had never had intercourse with any man. Upon cross-examination plaintiff testified that the doors and windows to her home and defendant's home were open, and that at the time her foster mother, her father, defendant's father, and his wife were in the other house in the same yard, not more than 90 feet away.

The plaintiff made no complaint that she was under restraint or influence of threats, or that she apprehended any violence from the defendant. It further appears that she made no complaint or outcry during the struggle before the pillow was placed over her mouth or after its removal, nor was there any indication or exhibition of anguish on the part of the plaintiff after it is claimed that this outrage was perpetrated upon her, but it does appear that she went out on the front porch and sat down to cool off. When the inquiry upon cross-examination was made of the plaintiff as to why she didn't make an outcry after the pillow was removed from her mouth, her reply was that "she didn't know." She further testified that the defendant held the pillow over her mouth with one hand and she had hold of his other arm with both of her hands, and, upon inquiry as to how the defendant effected an entrance, she replied she didn't know, that she supposed she fainted.

There is an entire absence of any testimony

[88 S.W. 94]

as to the result of the outrage charged to have been committed upon plaintiff. There was no testimony that any of her clothing was disordered or torn; there was no evidence of any indication of any laceration of her private parts, or that she bled, or that her person was scratched or showed any signs of violence; and it may be added that there is an absence of any testimony showing the physical condition and mental anguish which would ordinarily follow. It is also shown by the evidence that her foster mother came home 10 or 15 minutes after the occurrence, and that plaintiff made no complaint to her, nor were there any signs or indications, as testified to by her mother, that she had been outraged. Plaintiff made no complaint to her father, to the defendant's wife or his father, nor to any other person. Her conduct and actions toward the defendant subsequent to the alleged commission of the outrage upon her person were the same as before the assault was made. They frequently met, and were upon friendly terms. It also developed that she never spoke to the defendant about the commission of this assault until about three months after her child was born. Then, she says, for the first time she mentioned it to him. She went out in the field where he was ploughing and asked him to support the child. He refused. Then she said to him. "This is your child," and he replied, "Oh, no, Jessie, you can't come that." And then, according to her own story, he said to her, "Did you tell your father about this?" and she said, "No." "And he said, `Well, let us go right over here and see your father now,' didn't he? A. That is what he said; yes, sir. Q. And he walked over there with you, and you saw your father? A. Yes, sir. Q. With you? A. Yes, sir. Q. This man that ravished you? A. Yes, sir."

Mrs. Erwin, the plaintiff's foster mother, testified that after the date of the alleged assault the plaintiff and defendant were just as friendly as they were before; that she noticed no difference in them, and they continued to live as one big family; that the plaintiff never mentioned the occurrence to her; and that at no time upon her return home did she find the plaintiff in an excited condition.

The defendant denied that he had ever had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, or that he ever knew or heard of any claim that he had been intimate with her until about three months after the child...

To continue reading

Request your trial
28 practice notes
  • Howard v. Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co., No. 32092.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 12 de junho de 1934
    ...v. Railroad Co., 265 Mo. 97, 117, 175 S.W. 177; Chesapeake & O. Railroad Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 51 Sup. Ct. 453; Champagne v. Hamey, 189 Mo. 709; Sexton v. Met-St. Ry. Co., 245 Mo. 254; McCarthy v. Ry. Co., 90 Atl. 490; Coin v. Lounge Co., 222 Mo. 488, 121 S.W. 6; New York C. Railroad......
  • State v. Thomas, No. 38550.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 4 de outubro de 1943
    ...State v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 410; State v. Witten, 100 Mo. 525; State v. Patrick, 107 Mo. 147; State v. Boyd, 178 Mo. 2; Champagne v. Hamey, 189 Mo. 709; State v. Goodale, 210 Mo. 275; State v. Bowman, 213 S.W. 64; State v. Bigley, 247 S.W. 169; State v. Taylor, 8 S.W. (2d) 29; State v. King, 11......
  • Sullivan v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., No. 30356.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 31 de dezembro de 1932
    ...Railroad Co., 136 Mo. 583, 38 S.W. 308; Petty v. St. Louis & M. Railroad Co., 179 Mo. 277, 78 S.W. 1003; Champagne v. Hamey, 189 Mo. 727, 88 S.W. 92; Sexton v. Met. St. Railroad Co., 245 Mo. 272, 149 S.W. 21; Dunphy v. St. Joseph Stockyards Co., 118 Mo. App. 522, 95 S.W. 301; Davidson v. St......
  • State v. Rosegrant, No. 34553.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 23 de abril de 1936
    ...to support a material issue of fact, such issue should not be submitted to the jury." State v. Eslick, 216 S.W. 976; Champagne v. Hamey, 88 S.W. 92. In charging offenses under disjunctive statutes the pleader may charge all the acts constituting the offense, but in giving instructions the t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
28 cases
  • Howard v. Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co., No. 32092.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 12 de junho de 1934
    ...v. Railroad Co., 265 Mo. 97, 117, 175 S.W. 177; Chesapeake & O. Railroad Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 51 Sup. Ct. 453; Champagne v. Hamey, 189 Mo. 709; Sexton v. Met-St. Ry. Co., 245 Mo. 254; McCarthy v. Ry. Co., 90 Atl. 490; Coin v. Lounge Co., 222 Mo. 488, 121 S.W. 6; New York C. Railroad......
  • State v. Thomas, No. 38550.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 4 de outubro de 1943
    ...State v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 410; State v. Witten, 100 Mo. 525; State v. Patrick, 107 Mo. 147; State v. Boyd, 178 Mo. 2; Champagne v. Hamey, 189 Mo. 709; State v. Goodale, 210 Mo. 275; State v. Bowman, 213 S.W. 64; State v. Bigley, 247 S.W. 169; State v. Taylor, 8 S.W. (2d) 29; State v. King, 11......
  • Sullivan v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., No. 30356.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 31 de dezembro de 1932
    ...Railroad Co., 136 Mo. 583, 38 S.W. 308; Petty v. St. Louis & M. Railroad Co., 179 Mo. 277, 78 S.W. 1003; Champagne v. Hamey, 189 Mo. 727, 88 S.W. 92; Sexton v. Met. St. Railroad Co., 245 Mo. 272, 149 S.W. 21; Dunphy v. St. Joseph Stockyards Co., 118 Mo. App. 522, 95 S.W. 301; Davidson v. St......
  • State v. Rosegrant, No. 34553.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 23 de abril de 1936
    ...to support a material issue of fact, such issue should not be submitted to the jury." State v. Eslick, 216 S.W. 976; Champagne v. Hamey, 88 S.W. 92. In charging offenses under disjunctive statutes the pleader may charge all the acts constituting the offense, but in giving instructions the t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT