Champagne v. State

• Decision Date: 24 April 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 2D17-3072
• Citation: 269 So.3d 629
• Parties: Renaldo CHAMPAGNE a/k/a Renaldo Sampson, DOC #495786, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

269 So.3d 629

Renaldo CHAMPAGNE a/k/a Renaldo Sampson, DOC #495786, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3072

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 24, 2019

Renaldo Champagne, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa; and Helene S. Parnes, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellee.

BLACK, Judge.

Renaldo Champagne challenges the denial of his postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Champagne does not challenge the life sentence imposed on his conviction for robbery with a firearm; he contends only that the twenty-year sentence imposed on his conviction for false imprisonment, a third-degree felony, is illegal. We conclude that Champagne's twenty-year sentence is legal, and we certify a question of great public importance.

Champagne was sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code, chapter 921, Florida Statutes (2005) (CPC). Section 921.0024(2) states that when "the lowest permissible sentence under the [CPC] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the [CPC] must be imposed." Champagne asserts that because the lowest permissible sentence under the CPC (LPS) does not exceed the statutory maximum for his primary offense or the collective statutory maximum of his primary and additional offense, his sentences must not exceed the respective statutory maximum for each offense. However, Champagne's interpretation is not supported by the statutory language, and the plain language of the statute must control. We conclude that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence which must be imposed when the LPS exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for each offense and therefore that Champagne's sentence is legal.

I. Background

Champagne was convicted of robbery with a firearm, a first-degree felony punishable by life in prison, see § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005), and false imprisonment, a third-degree felony, see § 787.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). A CPC scoresheet was prepared for sentencing.¹ The robbery count was scored as the primary offense on Champagne's scoresheet, and the false imprisonment count was scored as an additional offense. Champagne's total sentence points were 348.2, and the LPS was 240.15 months in prison. The court found that Champagne qualified as a three-time violent felony offender and imposed a life sentence on the robbery count.² The court then sentenced Champagne to twenty years (240 months) in prison on the false imprisonment count.³

In his postconviction motion, Champagne argued that his twenty-year sentence is illegal based on his reading of section 921.0024(2) and Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554 (Fla. 2003). He asserted that because the 240.15-month LPS does not exceed the statutory maximum of life for the primary offense, his sentence on the additional offense, a third-degree felony, cannot exceed the statutory maximum of five years. Champagne's interpretation of the law would mean that in instances like his, where the LPS does not exceed the statutory maximum for the primary offense, the sentences for any additional offenses must not exceed the individual statutory maximums for those offenses. Essentially, Champagne contends that the LPS is a collective minimum sentence.

The postconviction court denied Champagne's motion, finding that section 921.0024 does not require the LPS to be imposed "only if it exceeds the statutory maximum for the primarily scored offense. Rather, the [c]ourt must look at each individual offense and compare the statutory maximum for that specific offense to the [LPS] pursuant to the scoresheet." Thus, it concluded that because the 240.15-month LPS exceeded the five-year statutory maximum for false imprisonment, Champagne's twenty-year sentence is legal. We agree.

II. Standard of Review

Where a sentencing error involves "a violation of the sentencing maximums provided by the [l]egislature," it may be corrected by a rule 3.800(a) motion. Martinez v. State, 211 So.3d 989, 991-92 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Wright v. State, 911 So.2d 81, 84 (Fla. 2005) ). "[A] sentence that patently fails to comport with statutory or constitutional limitations is by definition ‘illegal.’ " Id. at 991 (quoting Plott v. State, 148 So.3d 90, 94 (Fla. 2014) ). Champagne's twenty-year sentence is clearly in excess of the maximum provided by section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2005) ; therefore, we must examine the applicable language of the CPC and existing precedent to determine if Champagne's sentence is also at odds with the CPC. See Nat'l Deaf Acad., LLC v. Townes, 242 So.3d 303, 309 (Fla. 2018) ("[W]e begin with the statutory definition ... enacted by the [l]egislature and interpreted by this Court and the district courts of appeal. We then examine how that statutory definition has been applied by courts ...."). "Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo," and "[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, ... the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Eustache v. State, 248 So.3d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) ).

III. Applicable law

A. Statutory language

The CPC provides that "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b). It also provides that "[t]he penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense" and that "[t]he severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record." § 921.002(1)(c), (d). "Primary offense" is defined as the "the offense at conviction pending before the court for sentencing for which the total sentence points recommend a sanction that is as severe as, or more severe than, the sanction recommended for any other offense committed by the offender and pending before the court at sentencing." § 921.0021(4). "Prior record" is defined as "a conviction for a crime committed ... prior to the time of the primary offense." § 921.0021(5). Additional offenses, those "for which an offender is convicted and which [are] pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense," § 921.0021(1), are scored and included in the total sentence points calculation, which is then used solely to determine the offender's LPS, see § 921.0024(1)(a), (2). Additional offenses are also referenced as part of the CPC's sentencing range: "The permissible range for sentencing shall be the [LPS] up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing." § 921.0024(2). The LPS "is assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced," § 921.00265(1), and it "is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure," § 921.0024(2).⁴

However, unlike the CPC's sentencing range which references "the statutory maximum ... for the primary offense and any additional offenses," the CPC's requirement that the LPS be imposed when the LPS "exceeds the statutory maximum sentence" does not reference primary or additional offenses, statutory maximum s, or multiple sentences: "If the [LPS] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the [CPC] must be imposed." § 921.0024(2); cf. id. ("The [LPS] is any nonstate prison sanction in which the total sentence points equals or is less than 44 points, unless the court determines within its discretion that a prison sentence, which may be up to the statutory maximum s for the offense s committed, is appropriate." (emphasis added) ). But see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.992(a) ("The maximum sentence is up to the statutory maximum for the primary and any additional offenses as provided in s. 775.082, F.S., unless the [LPS] exceeds the statutory maximum." (emphasis added) ). The CPC also provides that the trial court "may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense," § 921.002(1)(g), and expressly allows for concurrent or consecutive sentencing, § 921.0024(2).

The LPS is a minimum sentence; the question is whether it is an individual minimum sentence, required to be imposed on each offense at sentencing for which it exceeds that offense's statutory maximum, or a collective minimum sentence. If the LPS is an individual minimum sentence, our analysis is complete and the LPS was legally imposed. But as is apparent, the language of section 921.0024(2) is not consistent; both singular and plural terms are used, and the terms statutory maximum and statutory maximum sentence are used without explanation or definition. Although the supreme court has interpreted section 921.0024(2), it has not addressed the issue presented to us. And as will be seen, courts have not consistently applied the language.

B. Precedent

1. Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554 (Fla. 2003)

In Butler, the supreme court determined that sections 921.002(1)(g) and 921.0024(2), respectively providing that a court may sentence an offender up to the statutory maximum for any offense and that a court must impose the LPS where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, are not in conflict and can be harmonized. 838 So.2d at 556. In so concluding, the supreme court held that "when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the [LPS], the [LPS] becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose." Id.

Butler was sentenced to the LPS, 75.6 months in prison, on his possession of cocaine conviction. He subsequently filed a postconviction motion alleging that the 75.6-month sentence was illegal because it exceeded the five-year statutory maximum sentence for...