Champagne v. Ward

Decision Date19 January 2005
Docket NumberNo. 2003-CC-3211.,2003-CC-3211.
Citation893 So.2d 773
PartiesGerald CHAMPAGNE, Sr. v. Sharonda L. WARD, Independent Fire Insurance Company and Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

Porteous, Hainkel & Johnson, James Stephen Thompson, Chauntis Trenelle Jenkins, John J. Hainkel, Jr., New Orleans, Counsel for Applicant.

Thomas Everett Campbell, Jacqueline Rose Anderson Campbell, and Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd., John P. Wolff, III, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Respondents.

JOHNSON, Justice.

Following the Louisiana Legislature's enactment of La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii) by Act No. 444 of 1987, courts have differed on the impact of the amendment as it applies to the interpretation of uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UM") coverage in automobile accident cases occurring in Louisiana and involving a Louisiana resident but where the contract of insurance was issued and delivered in a foreign jurisdiction. The first, second, and third circuit courts of appeal have held that a choice-of-law analysis, pursuant to La. C.C. arts. 3515 and 3537, is the starting place to determine which state's law should apply, while the fourth and fifth circuit courts of appeal have held that La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii) mandates that Louisiana law automatically applies. Plaintiff urges this court to adopt the reasoning of the fourth and fifth circuit courts of appeal, while plaintiff's UM provider, Mississippi Farm Bureau, advances the conclusions reached by the first, second, and third circuits. We granted this writ of certiorari to address the split in the circuits.

For the reasons assigned below, we find that a choice-of-law analysis, as codified in La. C.C. arts. 3515 and 3537 and embraced by the first, second, and third circuit courts of appeal, is the appropriate methodology for determining which state's law applies to the interpretation of UM contracts in multistate cases such as the present one, even when the accident occurs in Louisiana and involves a Louisiana resident. Accordingly, we reverse the lower courts' rulings, and we conclude that Mississippi law applies.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 15, 2000, plaintiff, Gerald Champagne, and defendant, Sharonda Ward, were involved in an automobile accident that occurred in New Orleans, Louisiana. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was a resident of Mississippi, and the vehicle which he was driving was covered by a policy of insurance negotiated and issued in Mississippi. Defendant was a resident of Louisiana and was driving a vehicle covered by a policy of insurance negotiated issued in Louisiana.

On November 14, 2001, plaintiff filed a suit for personal injuries in Louisiana's Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Named defendants are Ward, along with her insurance company, Independent Fire Insurance Company, and plaintiff's UM provider, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (hereinafter "Mississippi Farm Bureau").1

In response to the suit, Mississippi Farm Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the following facts are undisputed:

1. The accident occurred on November 15, 2000, wherein Gerald Champagne was westbound on North Miro Street in New Orleans, and while attempting a left turn, was struck by Sharonda Ward.
2. A policy of automobile liability insurance was issued in Louisiana by Independent Fire Insurance Company to Sharonda L. Ward for the accident at issue with $10,000 of single limit of liability.
3. A policy of underinsured/uninsured motorist insurance was issued and delivered in Mississippi by Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company to plaintiff Gerald Champagne in the amount of $10,000.
4. Mr. Champagne resides in Mississippi, and his vehicle is garaged in Mississippi.
5. The provisions of the Mississippi Farm Bureau policy contained a "dollar for dollar" setoff regarding uninsured motorist coverage.

According to Mississippi Farm Bureau, this case is governed by Louisiana's choice-of-law statutes, specifically, La.C.C. arts. 3515 and 3537, infra, which mandate that Mississippi law be applied to the interpretation of plaintiff's UM contract. Under Mississippi law, and according to the terms of plaintiff's policy, Mississippi Farm Bureau's liability is reduced on a "dollar for dollar" basis by the amount of liability coverage available from the tortfeasor. In this case, where plaintiff has $10,000 in UM coverage and the tortfeasor has $10,000 in liability coverage, UM benefits are unavailable to plaintiff.2

Plaintiff responded to Mississippi Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment by arguing that this dispute is governed by La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a)(iii), under which he is entitled to recover UM benefits from Mississippi Farm Bureau.

The trial court denied Mississippi Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment without assigning written reasons. In an unpublished action, the court of appeal denied Mississippi Farm Bureau's application for supervisory writs, stating:

On showing made, the writ application is denied. We cannot review the insurance policy because the relator has not made it part of the record in the application for supervisory writs.

Subsequently, the majority of the court of appeal granted rehearing, solely to allow Mississippi Farm Bureau "to supplement the record with a copy of the insurance policy at issue."3 However, the appellate court ultimately concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for summary judgment.

Mississippi Farm Bureau filed an application for certiorari with this court, and by order dated February 20, 2004, we granted the application. Champagne v. Ward, XXXX-XXXX (La.2/20/04), 866 So.2d 834.

DISCUSSION
Standard of Review

Appellate courts review grants of summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ocean Energy, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov't, 04-0066 (La.7/6/04), 880 So.2d 1. The movant bears the burden of proof. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). If the movant meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to plaintiff to present factual support adequate to establish that he will be able to satisfy the evidentiary burden at trial. Richard v. Hall, 03-1488 (La.4/23/04), 874 So.2d 131, 137. Thereafter, if plaintiff fails to meet this burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact and defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. This court has recognized that a "genuine issue" is a "triable issue," an issue in which reasonable persons could disagree. Jones v. Estate of Santiago, 03-1424 (La.4/14/04), 870 So.2d 1002, 1006 (citing Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., 93-2512 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751). Further, this court has defined a "material fact" to be one in which "its existence or nonexistence may be essential to plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery." Id.

La. R.S. 22:1406 v. Choice-of-law Analysis

The issue for our consideration is whether Louisiana law automatically applies to a foreign UM policy in a multistate case when the accident occurs in Louisiana and involves a Louisiana resident, or whether our courts must engage in a choice-of-law analysis to determine which state's law is applicable.

Foreign insurers generally argue that the State of Louisiana has no authority to modify contracts written in other states. However, Louisiana has expressed as a public policy its intent to protect Louisiana residents and others when an accident occurs on Louisiana roads. Our stated goal is to promote full recovery for innocent automobile accident victims by mandating minimum liability insurance coverage and making coverage available when the tortfeasor is uninsured or underinsured. See Martin v. Champion Ins. Co., 95-0030 (La.6/30/95), 656 So.2d 991, 994

.

The first, second, and third circuit courts of appeal have held that courts must conduct a choice-of-law analysis to determine which state's UM law applies, even when the accident occurs in Louisiana and involves a Louisiana resident. See, Zuviceh v. Nationwide Ins. Co., XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 1st Cir.5/11/01), 786 So.2d 340, writ denied, 2001-2141 (La.11/09/01), 801 So.2d 373; Adams v. Thomason, 32,278 (La.App.2d Cir.3/1/00), 753 So.2d 416, writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.6/16/00), 764 So.2d 965; Anderson v. Oliver, 91-1102 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1/7/98), 705 So.2d 301, writ denied, 98-0755 (La.5/8/98), 718 So.2d 434.

Conversely, the fourth and fifth circuit courts of appeal have held that Louisiana law automatically applies to any UM policy when the accident occurs in Louisiana and involves a Louisiana resident, including a UM policy issued and negotiated in a foreign jurisdiction. See, Dekeyser v. Automotive Casualty Ins. Co., 97-1251 (La.App. 4th Cir.2/4/98), 706 So.2d 676

; Austin v. Western World Ins. Co., 99-2541 (La.App. 4th Cir.5/17/00), 765 So.2d 390,

writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.9/22/00), 768 So.2d 1288; Crutchfield v. Landry, XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4th Cir.1/31/01), 778 So.2d 1249; and Drew v. Martello, 98-1141, 98-1142 (La.App. 5th Cir.2/23/99), 729 So.2d 90.

Historical Overview of La.R.S. 22:1406

The Louisiana Legislature enacted Louisiana's uninsured motorist law by Act No. 187 of 1962, which amended La. R.S. 22:1406 to add subsection (D). The law was passed to aid a growing class of automobile-accident victims who were left uncompensated because their injuries were caused by uninsured drivers. See, W. Shelby McKenzie, Louisiana Uninsured Motorist Coverage — After Twenty Years, 43 L. La. Rev. 691 (1983). The Louisiana Legislature has amended this statute numerous times since its inception. Id. at 691-694; also See, Historical and Statutory Notes to La. R.S. 22:1406.

Relevant to this discussion, in 1972, the law was amended by Act No. 137 which introduced the concept of "underinsured" pr...

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