Champaign v. CenturyLink Commc'ns
| Decision Date | 01 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-CV-232 KG/SCY |
| Parties | HARVEY CHAMPAIGN, Plaintiff, v. CENTURYLINK COMMUNICATIONS and its SUBSIDIARIES, LUMEN TECHNOLOGIES, INC., and its SUBSIDIARIES, and QWEST COMMUNICATIONS and its SUBSIDIARIES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
This matter is before the Court on two related motions: Defendants Century Link Communications' and Lumen Technologies Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) and Plaintiff Harvey Champaign's Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). Mr. Champaign Responded to the Motion to Dismiss and included a vast submission of attachments styled as appendices. (Docs. 13-21). Defendants replied. (Doc. 26). Mr. Champaign's Motion for Leave to File received a Response but he did not timely reply. (Doc. 11). Both motions are now fully briefed.
This case concerns Mr. Champaign's employment at Qwest Communications. He alleges, in Count I, racial discrimination under the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA), NMSA 1978 §§ 28-1-1 to 14; in Count II, religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; in Count III retaliation via the NMHRA; in Count IV common law retaliatory discharge; and in Count V, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Complaint (Doc. 1) at 56-74.
Mr Champaign filed this case pro se in the Eleventh Judicial District Court of New Mexico on January 10, 2022 id. at 16, and the operative complaint he subsequently filed there March 14, 2022, id. at 56. He filed his lawsuit after receiving an “Order of Non-Determination” from the state Human Rights Bureau on January 4, 2022. Id. at 18. He also received a Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, issued on June 20, 2019. Id. at 19. Defendants removed the case to this Court via federal question jurisdiction because of the Title VII claim and, alternatively, based on diversity jurisdiction.[1]Notice of Removal (Doc. 1) at 7-13.
Mr. Champaign's Complaint names three corporate defendants. (Doc. 1) at 56. The first of those three, Qwest, answered the Complaint. (Doc. 3). The Motion to Dismiss before this Court is brought by the other two Defendants, CenturyLink and Lumen, arguing that neither was Mr. Champaign's employer and therefore that the claims against them are improper for numerous reasons, including lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim against them. (Doc. 4) at 4-13. Defendants also argue that the common law claims are barred by the statute of limitations and the Title VII claim is barred by a failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or failure to file within the administrative time constraints. Id. at 14-15.
Mr. Champaign's Response argues that because Qwest publicly rebranded as first CenturyLink and later Lumen that he did, in fact, work for them, and those entities are properly named defendants. (Doc. 13) at 14-15. He also urges that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled for his Title VII claim because he was waiting on the New Mexico Human Rights Bureau before filing this lawsuit, id. at 17, and for his IIED claim because his emotional distress incapacitated him and prevented him from filing suit earlier, id. at 19.
Before filing his Response, Mr. Champaign also filed a Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). In it, he asks to include a new claim for respondeat superior, based in negligent hiring and retention and negligent training and supervision. Questions about whether that is one or multiple claims aside, Defendants responded in opposition and argued that the new claim is untimely and futile. (Doc. 11).
The Court, having considered the briefing and applicable law, and for the reasons explained below, grants the Motion to Dismiss and denies the Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.
A court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all “well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Santa Fe Alliance for Public Health and Safety v. City of Santa Fe, 993 F.3d 802, 811 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal citation omitted) cert, denied sub nom. Santa Fe All. For Pub. Health & Safety v. City of Santa Fe, 142 S.Ct. 1228 (2022). A complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. ). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). If a plaintiff fails to allege an essential element of their claim, the complaint is appropriately dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Ellis ex rel. Est. of Ellis v. Ogden City, 589 F.3d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 2009).
Because Mr. Champaign does not show that CenturyLink or Lumen employed him, or had any other relationship with him through which either could have caused him harm, he fails to state a valid claim against both.
Each of the claims that Mr. Champaign brings, except intentional infliction of emotional distress, are employment-based causes of action, and thus a necessary element of each claim is that the defendant was the plaintiffs employer. Taking the complaint count by count, the NMHRA, makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual on the basis of age or race. Smith v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020, ¶ 8 (). For a plaintiff to prevail, he must demonstrate that his employer discriminated against him in terminating his employment because of his race. Id. at ¶ 9. Next, to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII, an employee must show that: (1) he or she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; and (3) he or she was fired for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. Thomas v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000). Third, in order to establish a claim of retaliation under the NMHRA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between these two events.” Charles v. Regents of New Mexico State Univ., 201 l-NMCA-057, ¶ 8 (quoting Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 2004-NMSC-018, ¶ 33). “An adverse employment action occurs when an employer imposes a tangible, significant, harmful change in the conditions of employment.” Id. (quoting Ulibarri v. State of N.M. Corr. Acad., 2006-NMSC-009, ¶ 16). Fourth, retaliatory discharge is premised in the improper firing of an employee by an employer. See, e.g., Shovelin v. Cent. New Mexico Elec. Co-op., Inc., 1993-NMSC-015, ¶¶ 22-26. For an employee to recover under retaliatory discharge, the employee must show a causal connection between his actions and the retaliatory discharge by the employer. Chavez v. Manville Prod. Corp., 1989-NMSC-050, ¶ 16.
Last, while IIED does not require an employment relationship, it nonetheless requires showing some factual connection between the defendant and plaintiff such that the defendant caused emotional harm. The following elements must be proven to establish a claim of IIED: “(1) the conduct in question was extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiffs mental distress was extreme and severe; and (4) there is a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the claimant's mental distress.” Trujillo v. N. Rio Arriba Elec. Co-op, Inc., 2002-NMSC-004, ¶ 25 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also UJI 13-1628 NMRA.
Here, the complaint fails to allege facts showing that CenturyLink and Lumen were Mr. Champaign's employer or are otherwise liable for the misconduct alleged. Viewed through the dismissal standard, the Complaint fails to state a claim against CenturyLink and Lumen.[2] The analysis, however, goes beyond the four corners of the Complaint because CenturyLink and Lumen have presented evidence, via affidavit, that each is a corporate entity distinct from Qwest and that neither ever employed Mr. Champaign. (Doc. 4-1) at ¶¶ 7, 13, 1719. Mr. Champaign counters by showing that Qwest rebranded and renamed itself first from Qwest to CenturyLink and second from CenturyLink to Lumen. (Doc.13) at 14-15; (Doc. 13-1) (employee communication, external press releases, and third-party webpages describing corporate history and re-branding). Mr. Champaign additionally attaches a great deal of “appendices” which tangentially relate to the corporate names or structures of the named Defendants, but which are not further explained or argued. See (Docs. 14, 14-1) (Lumen Wikipedia page); (Docs. 15, 15-1) (CenturyLink Securities and Exchange Commission filings from SEC website); (Docs. 16, 16-1) (2011 CenturyLink and Qwest merger SEC filing from SEC website); (Docs. 17, 17-1) (continuation of merger filing); (Docs. 18, 18-1) (continuation of merger filing); (Docs. 19, 19-1, 19-2) (continuation of merger filing; 2020 press release announcing CenturyLink rebrand to Lumen).
The Court notes that its consideration of the above-referenced attachments and evidence converts this issue from a motion to dismiss to...
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