Champion v. Billings Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC
| Docket Number | CV 21-85-BLG-SPW |
| Decision Date | 17 March 2022 |
| Citation | 591 F.Supp.3d 892 |
| Parties | ESTATE OF Edward R. CHAMPION, BY AND THROUGH Debbie CELLAN, individually and as Personal Representative, Plaintiff, v. BILLINGS SKILLED NURSING FACILITY, LLC, d/b/a Avantara of Billings; Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC; Cascade Capital Group, LLC; Shawna Johnson; and John Does 1-25, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
Bryan M. Kautz, Michael P. Manning, Jason S. Ritchie, Ritchie Manning Kautz, PLLP, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff.
Abbie Cziok, J. Daniel Hoven, Oliver H. Goe, Browning Kaleczyc Berry & Hoven, P.C., Helena, MT, for Defendants Billings Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC, Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC, Cascade Capital Group, LLC.
Peter J. Stokstad, Elijah Inabnit, Garlington Lohn & Robinson, PLLP, Missoula, MT, for Defendant Shawna Johnson.
This action was originally brought by Plaintiff, Estate of Edward R. Champion (the "Estate") in the Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County (DV-21-0134) on February 2, 2021, against Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC; Cascade Capital Group, LLC; and Shawna Johnson ("Johnson"). (Doc. 8.) On June 16, 2021, the Estate filed an Amended Complaint, joining Defendant Billings Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC, d/b/a Avantara of Billings ("Avantara"). (Doc. 9.) Avantara timely removed the action to this Court, invoking federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442. (Doc. 1.)
Presently before the Court are Avantara's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5), the Estate's Motion to Remand (Doc. 12), and Johnson's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for the Court's review.
Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Court orders that the Estate's Motion to Remand is GRANTED , and that Avantara and Johnson's Motions to Dismiss is DENIED as moot .
In April 2020, Edward Champion ("Edward") became a resident at Avantara. (Doc. 9 at ¶ 18.) Edward was 71 years old at the time, and he suffered from congenital deafness
and had a history of depressive disorder and generalized anxiety. (Id. ) Johnson was a registered nurse at Avantara and provided care to Edward while he was a resident there. (Id. at ¶ 6.) The Estate alleges that Edward received substandard care while a resident at Avantara, which ultimately resulted in his death.
The Estate alleges Edward could not speak directly to Avantara staff due to his deafness, and could not read the staff's lips due to masks necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Therefore, he required a communication device to interpret and translate sign language. (Id. ) Plaintiff alleges Avantara knew Edward needed this device to communicate, but never installed it, even after repeated requests from Edward and his family. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-23.) Edward was therefore incapable of communicating with staff and his family. (Id. at ¶ 23.) The Estate also alleges Avantara inappropriately sedated Edward by administering a prescribed mood stabilizing drug on days he did not experience agitation; failed to regularly bathe Edward; and placed him in a room with a resident who screamed constantly, joking that Edward would not be bothered due to his deafness. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-27.)
The Amended Complaint further alleges Avantara knew Edward was a high fall risk but failed to prevent or mitigate this risk and did not follow its Falls Management Plan. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-30, 36.) As a result, Edward fell multiple times, two of which required transportation to Billings Clinic. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 31, 34, 47, 48.)
When he was seen at Billings Clinic after a fall on September 4, 2020, Edward tested positive for COVID-19. (Id. at ¶ 31.) His condition was stable enough that Billings Clinic released him back to Avantara with specific instructions to monitor his oxygen saturation
and other vital signs. (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 37.) The Estate alleges Avantara was insufficiently staffed, failed to monitor Edward's vital signs as directed by his physician, and failed to keep his family apprised of his condition. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-37.)
Edward's condition deteriorated on September 13, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Edward had a fever; low blood pressure; a high, irregular pulse; and decreased oxygen saturation
. (Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that Edward fell numerous times that morning and at one point was found face down in his bed struggling to breathe. (Id. at ¶¶ 47-48.) The Estate alleges that Edward fell three more times over the next few hours. (Id. at ¶ 48.) After his final fall, Edward was found at the foot of his bed, and he died shortly after. (Id. ) The Estate alleges Avantara and Johnson did not call 9-1-1, the on-call doctor, or seek other assistance that morning. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-46, 49.)
Based on the foregoing, the Estate asserts eight causes of action: (1) negligent care; (2) negligent management; (3) negligence per se; (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act; (6) wrongful death and survival; (7) unjust enrichment; and (8) conspiracy. (See Doc. 9.)
On August 6, 2021, Avantara removed the action to this Court based on three independent theories for federal jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.) The Estate now moves to remand, arguing that this action must be remanded to Montana state district court because Avantara's grounds for removal are inappropriate here and have been consistently rejected by federal courts. (Doc. 13.)
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Removal of civil actions from state court is permitted only when the federal court has original jurisdiction over the action, and removal is not otherwise expressly prohibited by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. In general, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and in actions where there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Removal is also permitted under federal officer removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1442.
Removal statutes are to be strictly construed. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets , 313 U.S. 100, 108-09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941). "It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen , 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673 (internal citation omitted). The presumption against removal jurisdiction "means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Gaus v. Miles, Inc. , 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Any doubts about federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand. Id.
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal question jurisdiction "exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). It is well-settled that removal must be based on the plaintiff's claims and not on a federal defense, including a defense of preemption. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal. , 463 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). Thus, "[a]s a general rule, absent diversity jurisdiction, a case will not be removable if the complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim." Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson , 539 U.S. 1, 6, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003).
In this case, Avantara argues removal is appropriate because: (1) the Estate's claims fall within the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act ("PREP Act")—a complete preemption statute—and thus arise under federal law; (2) the Estate's claims raise substantial, disputed federal issues; and (3) federal officer removal applies. (Doc. 1.) Avantara is incorrect. Each of these grounds will be addressed in turn.
Avantara first argues removal is appropriate, and federal jurisdiction exists, because the PREP Act completely preempts the Estate's claims. Complete preemption is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Caterpillar , 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425. See also Franchise Tax , 463 U.S. at 24, 103 S.Ct. 2841 (). But complete preemption "applies only where a federal statutory scheme is so comprehensive that it entirely supplants state law causes of action." Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. , 768 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). Complete preemption, therefore, is "rare."1 Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop. , 902 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, "complete preemption for purposes of federal jurisdiction under § 1331 exists when Congress: (1) intended to displace a state-law cause of action, and (2) provided a substitute cause of action." City of Oakland , 969 F.3d at 906. See also Caterpillar , 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425 () (internal quotations and citation omitted).
The PREP Act was enacted in 2005. It authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to issue a declaration determining "that a disease or other health condition or other threat to health constitutes a public...
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