Champion v. Mannington Mills, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 May 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:21-cv-00012-TES
• Citation: 538 F.Supp.3d 1344
• Parties: Jaquaishala CHAMPION, Plaintiff, v. MANNINGTON MILLS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

538 F.Supp.3d 1344

Jaquaishala CHAMPION, Plaintiff,

v.MANNINGTON MILLS, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:21-cv-00012-TES

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division.

Signed May 10, 2021

John M. McCall, Kenneth E. Barton, III, Macon, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Joseph A. Ciucci, Patrick M. Corley, Adam C. Keating, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MANNINGTON MILLS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

TILMAN E. SELF, III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Jaquaishala Champion ("Champion") sued her employer, Defendant Mannington Mills ("Mannington"), for discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq , based on her association with her brother, who tested positive for COVID-19. [Doc. 1]. Mannington filed a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 4], arguing that Champion fails to state a claim because she fails to allege that her brother was "disabled" as that term is defined by the ADA. [Doc. 4-1]. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for the Court's consideration.

BACKGROUND

Champion worked as a Quality Assurance Technician at Mannington's Madison, Georgia, facility. [Doc. 1, ¶ 10]. Her brother, Alvin Evans ("Evans"), worked at the same facility. [Id. at ¶ 14]. Around 5:00 p.m. on March 26, 2020, Champion had a conversation with Evans in the parking lot following her shift, but before he started his shift. [Id. at. ¶ 30]. During their roughly four-minute conversation, Evans sat in his vehicle and Champion stood several feet away. [Id. at ¶¶ 30, 32]. About four hours later, Evans starting feeling ill and Mannington sent him to the emergency room where he was tested for COVID-19. [Id. at ¶ 19]. On March 30, 2020, Evans’ test came back positive. [Id. at ¶ 22]. Before Champion came to work that day, Director of Human Resources Dawn Simmons asked her if she went to Evans’ workstation on the day he got sick, and she said that she had not. [Id. at ¶ 23]. Simmons also asked Champion if she had been around her brother at work or outside of work around the time he became symptomatic, and she said no. [Id. at ¶ 24].

Champion forgot about the parking lot conversation with her brother and did not tell Simmons about it at this time. Champion went on to work her shift. [Id. at ¶ 26].

Michael Fowler, Champion's supervisor, confronted Champion and told her that three of her fellow employees told him that they saw her speaking to her brother in the parking lot on March 26, and that they saw her in the car with her brother. [Id. at ¶¶ 27–29]. After Fowler questioned her, she recalled the parking lot encounter with her brother, told him about it, and even apologized for forgetting about it earlier. She also denied ever being in Evans’ vehicle. [Id. at ¶¶ 28, 31, 32]. Fowler told Champion to go home and quarantine for 14 days. [Id. at ¶ 33]. Champion alleges that Fowler made her feel "diseased" and "discarded." [Id. at ¶ 34].

The next day, March 31, Simmons phoned Champion and accused her of dishonesty because she did not disclose the parking-lot conversation with her brother when initially asked. [Id. at ¶ 37]. Simmons expected Champion to have remembered the encounter because it was her own brother. [Id. at ¶ 38]. Simmons told Champion she "could have infected other employees." [Id. at ¶ 37]. The next day, April 1, Simmons again called Champion and told her that she was being terminated from her position. [Id. at ¶ 39].

Champion alleges that Mannington did not investigate whether any of the other employees had close contact with Evans; they only investigated her because she was related to him. [Id. at ¶ 42]. Champion also alleges that she was the only employee accused of dishonesty upon initially forgetting about her encounter with Evans in the parking lot. [Id. at ¶ 43]. Champion alleges that of all the employees who had contact with Evans, she was the only one not permitted to work from home, take paid leave while in quarantine, or continue working on-site even at higher rates of pay, and was the only employee made to feel "diseased" and "discarded." [Id. at ¶¶ 44–45]. At bottom, Champion alleges that she was never in "close contact" with her COVID-positive brother as the Center for Disease Control defined it at the time he was infected. [Id. at ¶ 48]. Champion submitted a charge of discrimination to the EEOC, and the EEOC issued her a Notice of Rights. [Id. at ¶¶ 49–51].

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, district courts must accept the facts set forth in the complaint as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 572, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it alleges sufficient factual matter (accepted as true) that states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. McCullough v. Finley , 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). In fact, a well-pled complaint "may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted).

Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does require "more than [ ] unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]." McCullough , 907 F.3d at 1333 (citation omitted). To decide whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, district courts use a two-step framework. Id. The first step is to identify the allegations that are "no more than mere conclusions." Id. (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). "Conclusory allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. (citation omitted). After disregarding the conclusory allegations, the second step is to "assume any remaining factual allegations are true and determine whether those factual allegations ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’ " Id. (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

Furthermore, a complaint attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion must be dismissed if it fails to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A plaintiff must plead more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." McCullough , 907 F.3d at 1333 ; see also Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "To be sure, a plaintiff may use legal conclusions to structure his complaint, but legal conclusions ‘must be supported by factual allegations.’ " McCullough , 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). While courts, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true; they are not bound to accept a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Courts must "identify conclusory allegations and then discard them—not ‘on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical’ but because their conclusory nature ‘disentitles them to the presumption of truth.’ " McCullough , 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

The issue to be decided when considering a motion to dismiss is not whether the claimant will ultimately prevail, but "whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer , 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). The factual allegations in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and cannot "merely create[ ] a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 545, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Finally, complaints that tender " ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’ " will not survive against a motion to dismiss. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Stated differently, the complaint must allege enough facts "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" supporting a claim. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

B. Champion's Claim for Association Discrimination

Whether Champion has stated a claim under the ADA depends entirely on the answer to one question: was her brother's COVID-19 infection a "disability" as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) ?

The ADA prohibits association discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). Specifically, it is unlawful to "exclude[e] or otherwise deny[ ] equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship." Id. The ADA considers an individual to have a disability if that person has "a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;" "a record of such an impairment;" or is "regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3))." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The Court will consider whether Champion's allegations regarding Evans’ COVID-19 infection satisfy any of those three grounds.

Champion alleges that Evans, her brother, became ill at work on March 26, 2020, went to the emergency room, took a COVID-19 test, and quarantined as ordered by his medical provider while awaiting his test results, which came back positive four days later. [Doc. 1, ¶¶ 18–22, 56 ("Plaintiff's brother became symptomatic on March 26, 2020, and was later diagnosed with coronavirus disease, or COVID-19.")].

Champion also alleges information about COVID-19 generally. Specifically, she alleges:

Coronavirus disease, or COVID-19, is a physical impairment arising from a contagious virus. Infection with coronavirus disease causes an individual to develop symptoms that can impact the respiratory system, immune system, and nervous system,

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