Champion v. Nationwide Sec., Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 6,Docket No. 100521,6 |
| Citation | 545 N.W.2d 596,450 Mich. 702 |
| Parties | , 70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 558, 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,132 Cheryl CHAMPION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONWIDE SECURITY, INC., Defendant-Appellee, and Eddie Lee Fountain, Defendant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
In this case, we must decide whether an employer is liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment under M.C.L. § 37.2103(i); M.S.A. § 3.548(103)(i) where one of its employed supervisors rapes a subordinate and thereby causes her constructive discharge. We hold that an employer is liable for such rapes where they are accomplished through the use of the supervisor's managerial powers. We believe that this result best effectuates the remedial purpose of the Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.548(101) et seq. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it denies relief under the act. Furthermore, because defendant has made sufficient admissions to establish liability under the rule we announce today, pursuant to MCR 7.316(A)(7), we order the trial court to render judgment in favor of plaintiff under MCR 2.116(I)(2).
The incidents giving rise to plaintiff Cheryl Champion's claim began shortly after she returned from a maternity leave to resume her position as a security guard with defendant, Nationwide Security Services, Inc. At that time, the company assigned Ms. Champion to a new supervisor, Eddie Lee Fountain. 1 There is no dispute that Mr. Fountain scheduled plaintiff's work, trained her, and oversaw and evaluated her performance. He also played a role in disciplining her.
During her first days back at work, Mr. Fountain made sexually suggestive remarks to Ms. Champion, including an admission that he was "flirtatious" and that he found her "attractive." Other remarks and sexually suggestive conduct followed.
One Saturday, less than a month after her return, Mr. Fountain unexpectedly contacted Ms. Champion, who was not previously scheduled to work until the following Monday. He asked her if she would be available to report for duty at Deaconess Hospital in Detroit. Ms. Champion agreed to the assignment and prepared to report for work. However, while getting ready, Ms. Champion accidentally burned her uniform trousers while pressing them. She called Fountain to inform him of the accident, and he gave her permission to use regular black or navy blue trousers. Minutes later, however, he called back with the unusual request that she wear a black or blue dress instead. When Ms. Champion informed Mr. Fountain that she did not have a dress and that she was running late, he allowed her to wear her regular trousers.
When Ms. Champion arrived at her post, she learned that Mr. Fountain had dismissed all other security personnel. Ms. Champion and Mr. Fountain were then the only two security guards at the hospital. After Ms. Champion reported to Mr. Fountain, he informed her that he had a state trooper check into her background to find out if she "had a clean medical background." He then remarked that he thought she was "ready" because she had just had a baby. He also stated that he wanted to go home with her to find out if she had a boyfriend. Finally, Mr. Fountain suggested that her future job security and success were tied to his approval or disapproval. Mr. Fountain asserted that if Ms. Champion went along with him, she would have nothing to worry about as long as she worked for him. He said he would "take care of" her and that she would never have to "worry" about her job. At this point, Ms. Champion flatly rejected Mr. Fountain's offer.
Later that same day, the hospital closed and Mr. Fountain and Ms. Champion were the only two people on the premises. At that time, Mr. Fountain told Ms. Champion to accompany him on security rounds. His stated purpose was to train her. However, after Mr. Fountain had ordered Ms. Champion into a remote part of the building, he locked a door to an examination room and trapped her. He then demanded that she have sex with him. When she refused, he raped her.
Ms. Champion immediately left work and returned home. She then reported the rape to police and was rushed by ambulance to the hospital. She never returned to Nationwide after the attack. 2
Ms. Champion filed the present action in the Wayne Circuit Court on February 14, 1991. Central to this appeal, she alleged that Nationwide, through its agent, Mr. Fountain, had violated her civil rights by engaging in sexual harassment. She further alleged that this discrimination led to her constructive discharge. However, the trial court granted Nationwide's motion for summary disposition of Ms. Champion's sexual harassment claim. The court reasoned that Mr. Fountain was not Ms. Champion's supervisor and, thus, not an "agent" of his employer as required by the Civil Rights Act for recovery.
While agreeing with the result, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the trial court's finding that Mr. Fountain was not Ms. Champion's supervisor. Indeed, the Court of Appeals found that a "question of fact existed regarding whether Fountain was given the necessary authority to be Nationwide's agent, thus subjecting Nationwide to liability under the theory of respondeat superior." 205 Mich.App. 263, 267, 517 N.W.2d 777 (1994). However, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court because it concluded that Ms. Champion had not shown that Nationwide or Mr. Fountain used her response to Mr. Fountain's conduct as a factor in a decision affecting her employment. Specifically, it rejected the plaintiff's claim that her constructive discharge constituted the requisite employment decision. As this opinion makes clear, the Court's reasoning was in error.
Unlike its federal counterpart, the Michigan Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.548(101) et seq., contains a provision specifically designed to outlaw two forms of sexual harassment: hostile work environment sexual harassment and "quid pro quo sexual harassment." Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368, 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993); see also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). This case involves quid pro quo harassment.
The act clearly sets forth two separate theories under which a party may make out a claim for quid pro quo harassment:
(i) Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment which means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature when:
(i) Submission to such conduct or communication is made a term or condition either explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing;
(ii) Submission to or rejection of such conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting such individual's employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing. [M.C.L. § 37.2103(i)(i), (ii); M.S.A. § 3.548(103)(i)(i), (ii).]
A party pursuing a claim under the second subsection must establish two things: (1) that she was subject to any of the types of unwelcome sexual conduct or communication described in the statute, and (2) that her employer or the employer's agent used her submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct as a factor in a decision affecting her employment. See also Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (C.A.6, 1992). 3 It is this second requirement that forms the basis of dispute in the present case and we find that Ms. Champion has satisfied that requirement. 4
It is this Court's opinion that Mr. Fountain's decision to rape Ms. Champion constituted the requisite "decision affecting ... employment." In addition, this was a decision taken in response to Ms. Champion's refusal to voluntarily submit to Mr. Fountain's sexual requests. Indeed, lack of consent is the gravamen of a sexual assault.
In reaching our conclusion that plaintiff has satisfied all the requirements under M.C.L. § 37.2103(i)(ii); M.S.A. § 3.548(103)(i)(ii), we reject two theories that defendant claims absolves it of liability. First, defendant asserts that, because it did not actively terminate plaintiff, it made no employment decision in response to her rejection of Mr. Fountain's advances. Second, defendant claims that Mr. Fountain was not acting as its agent when he raped Ms. Champion because defendant did not authorize the rape. We deal with each of these arguments in turn.
We find that the Court of Appeals acceptance of defendant's first argument to be in error because it misinterprets the law of constructive discharge. It is well established that the law does...
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