Champlain v. State

Decision Date13 June 1997
Docket NumberNo. 65S00-9603-CR-237,65S00-9603-CR-237
Citation681 N.E.2d 696
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
PartiesKeith D. CHAMPLAIN, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

Dennis L. Brinkmeyer, Evansville, for appellant.

Pamela Carter, Attorney General, Phillip D. Hatfield, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for appellees.

BOEHM, Justice.

A jury convicted Keith D. Champlain of the murder 1 of Sherri Reeves Vanlue. The trial court sentenced Champlain to sixty-five years in prison. In this direct appeal, Champlain presents several issues for our review. Because we reverse on the first question presented, we address only the following:

I. Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter?

II. Was there sufficient evidence to support the conviction?

We hold that the trial court erred when it refused to give Champlain's tendered instruction on reckless homicide. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arose out of an altercation in a trailer park near Mt. Vernon, Indiana on the night of July 12-13, 1995. The victim, Sherri Vanlue, had apparently been romantically involved with defendant Keith Champlain but was dating Justin Jamison at the time she was killed. Several witnesses offered accounts of the events.

Jamison's Testimony

According to Jamison's account, Champlain had called Vanlue three times earlier that evening "making threats," and Vanlue had taken her phone off the hook after the third call. Some time around midnight, Jamison and Vanlue were in bed in Vanlue's trailer when they heard a car skid to a halt outside. Both got out of bed when a person who later proved to be Champlain banged on the trailer door and said: "Do you want to die? I am going to blow the ... lock off of the door. I am going to kill you." Record at 832. Jamison had never met the defendant, but he assumed at the time it was Champlain. Vanlue said in the direction of the door: "Go away. I am tired of this. I am going to call the cops." Record at 833. As Vanlue asked Jamison to call 911, a single shot was fired through the door. Record at 848. Jamison testified that he saw pellets from the shot strike Vanlue. She fell immediately to the floor, crying out: "Oh my God, Justin, he just shot me." Record at 835, 851. At the time Vanlue was shot, Jamison testified that she was standing "right in the middle of the room" and "right in front of the door." 2 Record at 835, 849. Vanlue died from a single wound a short time later. Jamison watched these events "in amazement" and called 911 for police assistance. Record at 836. Vanlue's two young boys were also in the trailer at the time she was shot.

A second shot was fired no more than thirty seconds after the first and the defendant "kicked the door in, or somehow he was bashing the door in." Record at 835. Jamison, who got through to 911 after the second shot, put the receiver on the bed and said: "Man, what in the hell are you doing? I don't understand." Record at 837. The defendant stuck a shotgun into Jamison's stomach and kept repeating: "You are going to die tonight." Record at 838. Jamison testified that he pushed the gun away, threw Champlain across the room and kicked him in the head, knocking him temporarily unconscious. Jamison then took the gun away from the defendant and returned to the telephone to speak with the 911 operator. 3 When Champlain attempted to get up, Jamison told him to "stay down" and, holding the gun by the barrel, beat Champlain with the stock of the shotgun, causing it to break and the gun to discharge between Jamison's legs. After subduing Champlain, Jamison went outside to seek assistance.

Gini Eatan

A neighbor of Vanlue's, Gini Eatan, had a partially obstructed view of these events from her nearby trailer. She offered a different account. Eatan went to sleep around 10:30 p.m. but was awakened approximately two hours later by a banging noise followed by a gunshot. She heard a second shot and looked out her window toward Vanlue's trailer. Eatan saw a man she later identified as Jamison beating the defendant with a shotgun in Vanlue's doorway, telling him to "[s]tay laying down." Record at 769. Jamison disappeared briefly from view, reappeared in the doorway, and then resumed the assault. Jamison put the shotgun to his shoulder, fired one "level" shot towards the living room in Vanlue's trailer, and beat the defendant again with the butt of the gun. This third shot was the first Eatan testified she had actually seen. She was able to view the altercation because she was no more than twenty feet from Jamison, several lights were on in Vanlue's trailer, and the door to the trailer remained open. Eatan also testified that she saw a "shadow" through the venetian blinds on one of the windows and that Jamison fired the shot in the direction of the shadow. After this shot, Eatan saw the shadow drop and heard what she believed to be a female voice utter a "very short muffled scream." Record at 812. Jamison pumped the gun and pulled the trigger again, causing a "click" of the trigger but no discharge. Eatan never saw a shot discharge through Jamison's legs.

Officer Michael Ricketts

The police soon arrived and, seeing Jamison holding the gun, placed him under arrest. Police officer Michael Ricketts asked the still-prostrate Champlain what had happened, and he mumbled: "The bitch lied to me, so I shot her." Ricketts asked again: "You shot her?" and the defendant replied: "Yes, I shot her." 4 Record at 630.

Vanlue's Brother

Sherri Vanlue's brother, Kevin Reeves, testified that Champlain told him earlier that evening in a phone conversation that (1) he had a loaded shotgun; (2) he was going to kill Vanlue, her two children, and Jamison; and (3) he was going to kill himself.

Champlain's Statements in the Ambulance and at the Hospital

Champlain was badly beaten and was taken to a hospital for medical attention. On the way, he told an emergency medical technician that he had fired the shotgun three times, but did not know if he had shot anyone. The defendant also referred to the dispute as a "lover's quarrel" and "continuously asked" how Vanlue was doing. Record at 653. He repeated the gist of these statements to another paramedic during the ambulance ride. Record at 660. At 1:40 a.m., Champlain's blood alcohol content was measured at 0.15% and 0.19% by two different methods. Record at 710-11. An emergency room nurse who treated Champlain around 2 or 3 a.m. at the hospital testified that Champlain told him: "Well, I was upset with this girl and I shot her through the door to get in the house," and, "Well, I just wanted to scare her. I didn't know she was behind the door." Record at 701, 706. The defendant also told the nurse in essence that he shot the lock off the door to get in the "house" because it was locked and that he "didn't mean to shoot her." Record at 707. Around 4:30 a.m., a police officer went to Champlain's hospital room to arrest him for the murder. As the officer turned to leave the room, the defendant--who had known for at least fifty minutes that Vanlue was dead--volunteered: "I didn't mean to kill her." Record at 690-91. Champlain's statements were admitted via the testimony of others and he did not testify in his own defense at trial.

Champlain was charged with Vanlue's murder and convicted. He appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A)(7).

I. Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses of Murder

Champlain asserts that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to instruct the jury on reckless homicide, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. As explained below, we agree as to reckless homicide and grant Champlain's request for a new trial.

A. Test applied by the trial court

When asked to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, trial courts are to apply the test set forth in Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind.1995). First, the trial court must determine whether the lesser offense is either "inherently" or "factually" included in the crime charged. Id. at 566-67. If either of these prerequisites is met, the question whether to give the instruction hinges on the evidence presented by both parties. More precisely, as we explained in Wright If there is a serious evidentiary dispute about the element or elements distinguishing the greater from the lesser offense and if, in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater, then it is reversible error for a trial court not to give an instruction, when requested, on the inherently or factually included lesser offense. If the evidence does not so support the giving of a requested instruction on an inherently or factually included lesser offense, then a trial court should not give the requested instruction.

Id. at 567 (citations and footnote omitted). We will review a trial court's factual finding--where one is made--on the existence or lack of a "serious evidentiary dispute" for an abuse of discretion. This deference reflects and recognizes the trial court's proximity to the evidence. Nonetheless, Wright clearly dictates that reversal is required if the trial court wrongly concludes that no serious evidentiary dispute exists and refuses to give an instruction on a lesser included offense. If the trial court makes no ruling as to whether a serious evidentiary dispute exists, Wright implicitly requires the reviewing court to make this determination de novo based on its own review of the evidence. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 659 N.E.2d 652, 656-57 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (applying Wright in reversing conviction for failure to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter), trans. denied. We now examine the evidence in this case with these guidelines in mind.

B. Champlain's reckless homicide instruction

The...

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