Chance v. Wmata

Decision Date04 April 2007
Docket NumberNo. 240, September Term, 2006.,240, September Term, 2006.
Citation173 Md. App. 645,920 A.2d 536
PartiesRena CHANCE v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Gretchen A. Rogers, Greenbelt, for appellant.

Sarah O. Rollman, Washington, DC, for appellee.

Panel HOLLANDER, EYLER, DEBORAH S., WOODWARD, JJ.

WOODWARD, J.

Appellant, Rena Chance, was injured during the course of her employment with appellee, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA"). Chance filed a timely claim with the Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission"), which WMATA did not contest. Due to a change in legal counsel and an incorrect date of injury on her claim, Chance, through her new counsel, filed a second claim for the same injury with the Commission. When the error was discovered, Chance moved to dismiss one of the claims. Because of another clerical error, however, Chance's motion sought to dismiss the first claim, rather than the second claim. The Commission granted Chance's motion and dismissed her first claim.

Upon realizing the latest error, Chance filed a motion with the Commission to reinstate the first claim and dismiss the second claim, which the Commission also granted. WMATA then filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The circuit court vacated the Commission's order and remanded the matter for a new hearing on whether the Commission had the authority to reinstate the dismissed claim. The Commission held a hearing, found that it had the authority to reinstate the claim, and reinstated Chance's first claim.

The Commission's order was filed and mailed to the parties on January 6, 2005. WMATA filed a petition for judicial review with the circuit court on February 8, 2005. Chance filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that WMATA's petition was filed after the statutorily prescribed thirty-day appeal period. The circuit court denied the motion. Thereafter, WMATA filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Commission did not have the power to reinstate Chance's first claim. The circuit court reluctantly granted the motion. Chance filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court and presents two questions for our review, which we have rephrased:

I. Did the circuit court err by denying Chance's motion to dismiss WMATA's petition for judicial review as untimely filed?

II. Did the circuit court err as a matter of law by granting WMATA's Motion for Summary Judgment?

For the reasons set forth herein, we answer question I in the affirmative and reverse the judgment of the circuit court. Accordingly, we need not address question II.

BACKGROUND

On the morning of July 30, 2000, Chance sustained an injury to her back while working as a station manager for WMATA. Chance was opening the gate at the Shady Grove Metro Station in Gaithersburg, Maryland, when the gate became jammed on debris in its track, causing her to suffer a jar to her lower back. She reported the injury to WMATA officials and completed an Employer's First Report of Injury.

On March 6, 2001, Chance, through counsel, filed a timely claim with the Commission. The claim was assigned the claim number B517081 ("Claim 081"). However, due to an error on either her or her attorney's part, Claim 081 reported her date of injury as July 31, 2000, instead of July 30, 2000.

On March 28, 2001, WMATA filed a notice with the Commission that it did not contest Claim 081 and that it had mailed the first payment of temporary total disability benefits to Chance on November 30, 2000. WMATA stated that Chance's benefits commenced on August 6, 2000, at the rate of $586.00 per week.

On April 11, 2001, the Commission issued an order finding Chance's injury compensable and awarding compensation to Chance. This order required WMATA to:

1. Pay unto [Chance] compensation at the rate of $589.00 [sic] per week, payable weekly, during the continuance of the temporary total disability of [Chance]. Said compensation to begin on 8/04/2000 provided, however, that if the injury results in disability of more than 14 days, compensation shall be paid from the date of the disability, including the day the injury occurred; subject to a credit for the days the claimant worked and received wages.

2. Promptly provide [Chance] medical treatment and the other necessary medical services as provided by The Labor and Employment Article, § 9-660 through § 9-664 and § 9-689, of the Maryland Annotated Code.

3. When [Chance] receives medical care from a physician of . . . her own selection, . . . she shall provide medical reports and invoices to the insurer and provide the Commission with copies of all medical reports.

Thereafter, Chance severed her relationship with her attorney and retained a new law firm to represent her interests in this matter. In reviewing the status of her claim, Chance's new counsel was unable to locate her claim within the Commission's on-line claims database. This was because Claim 081 incorrectly listed the date of injury as July 31, 2000. On September 16, 2002, Chance, through her counsel, filed a second claim with the Commission for the injury sustained on July 30, 2000. The claim was assigned claim number B558818 ("Claim 818"). Counsel for Chance later conceded to the circuit court that Claim 818 was not timely because it was filed beyond the statute of limitations.

Sometime later, Chance learned that she had two open claims with the Commission for her July 30, 2000 injury. As a remedy, Chance's attorney filed a "Request for Action on Filed Issues" on January 14, 2003, asking the Commission to dismiss one of her claims as duplicative of the other. This request, however, inadvertently listed Claim 081, instead of Claim 818, to be dismissed, a clerical error on the part of her counsel. On February 5, 2003, the Commission granted the request and dismissed Claim 081. Chance did not discover the error until after the Commission's order was issued.

On September 9, 2003, a hearing was held before the Commission on Claim 818, because both parties had raised several issues with regard to that claim. WMATA raised the issue, among others, that Claim 818 was filed beyond the statute of limitations. Chance raised the issue of the nature and severity of her back injury and also requested that Claim 081 be reinstated. WMATA, however, did not appear at the hearing, and the case was continued. According to Chance, Commissioner Lauren Sfekas then advised her to file a separate motion to reinstate Claim 081 and have it set with Claim 818.

On September 29, 2003, Chance filed a "Request for Reconsideration/Modification" of the February 5, 2003 Order, and stated: "This claim [Claim 081] was dismissed as a duplicate of [Claim 818], please reinstate [Claim 081] and set it with [Claim 818]. Correct date of accident is 7/30/00." On October 8, 2003, the Commission rescinded the February 5, 2003 order, and reinstated Claim 081.

On October 29, 2003, WMATA filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County a petition for judicial review of the Commission's October 8, 2003 order reinstating Claim 081. On July 14, 2004, a bench trial was scheduled to be held. WMATA, however appeared and submitted a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court granted the motion, and remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to vacate the October 8, 2003 order and to conduct a full evidentiary hearing on whether the Commission had the authority to reinstate Claim 081.

On January 5, 2005, a hearing was held on whether the Commission had the authority to reinstate Claim 081 under its statutory revisory powers. On January 6, 2005, the Commission issued an order reinstating Claim 081 and dismissing Claim 818 as a duplicate claim, finding that "[Claim 081] was timely filed, was accepted as a compensable claim by the employer and insurer and was mistakenly dismissed by claimant." The Commission's order was mailed the same day that it was issued — January 6, 2005.

On February 8, 2005, WMATA filed a second petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. On March 11, 2005, Chance filed a motion to dismiss WMATA's petition, arguing that the petition was not timely filed. WMATA opposed the motion. A hearing on the motion was held on May 24, 2005. The circuit court (Donohue, J.) denied the motion, finding that WMATA had timely filed its petition for judicial review.1 Chance filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 26, 2005, which the circuit court denied on July 6, 2005.

On January 12, 2006, WMATA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the Commission did not have the power to reinstate Claim 081. Chance opposed the motion, and a hearing was held on February 22, 2006. The circuit court (Thompson, J.) granted WMATA's Motion for Summary Judgment "with a degree of discomfort and a sense of injustice to the claimant."2 Chance filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 24, 2006, which the circuit court denied by Order dated March 27, 2006. Chance filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

DISCUSSION

Chance argues that the circuit court improperly denied her motion to dismiss WMATA's petition for judicial review. Specifically, Chance asserts that the time limit for filing a petition for judicial review of a decision by the Commission is statutorily prescribed as "30 days after the date of the mailing of the Commission's order." Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2006 Suppl.), § 9-737 of the Labor & Employment Article. Chance contends that because the Commission's order was mailed on January 6, 2005, "a timely petition for judicial review must have been filed with the [circuit] court on or before Monday, February 7, 2005."3 Chance asserts that WMATA did not file its petition for judicial review until February 8, 2005, "some 33 days after the mailing of the Commission's Order." Because the petition was not timely filed, Chance contends the court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition.

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