Chancey v. State
Decision Date | 13 November 1986 |
Docket Number | 43482 and 43483,Nos. 43481,s. 43481 |
Parties | , RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 6440 CHANCEY v. The STATE. JORDAN v. The STATE. CAGLE v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Johnson, Turner & Henritze, P.C., Walter Moore Henritze, Jr., Atlanta, for Harold Smith Chancey.
Jere Field, Monroe, for Audie Jordan.
Charles E. Day, Day & Dickinson, Monroe, for Charles I. Cagle.
John M. Ott, Dist. Atty., Monroe, John T. Strauss, Asst. Dist. Atty., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., George P. Shingler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles C. Olson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The appellants in this case are Harold S. Chancey, Audie Jordan, and Charles I. Cagle. On August 24, 1982, the Walton County Grand Jury returned a 5-count indictment. Count 1 charged appellants, and others, with the offense of violating the "Georgia RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) Act." OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq. Counts 2 through 5 charged appellant Harold Chancey, as well as Ruth Chancey and Bobby Gene Goswick, with murder and arson. Ruth Chancey's motion for severance was granted, and the trial court subsequently declared a mistrial on the murder/arson charges as to Goswick and Harold Chancey. Appellants were each convicted of violating the RICO statute; they were each fined, and in addition they were each given a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment. They appealed, arguing, among other things, that the RICO statute is unconstitutional.
The Georgia RICO Act (OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq.) is patterned after the federal RICO statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. The federal statute was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Although the state Act is patterned after the federal Act, there are differences between the two statutes.
The overriding purpose of the federal RICO statute is to deal with the problem of the infiltration of organized crime into all areas of American life through the money derived from its illegal endeavors. The provisions of RICO are intended to repair "defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime ..." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2531, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981); United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 32 (2nd Cir.1981).
Similarly, the Georgia RICO statute was enacted because of "a severe problem ... posed in this state by the increasing organization among certain criminal elements and the increasing extent to which criminal activities and funds acquired as a result of criminal activity are being directed to and against the legitimate economy of the state." OCGA § 16-14-2(a). Consequently, the expressed intent of the Georgia statute "is to impose sanctions against this subversion of the economy by organized criminal elements and to provide compensation to private persons injured thereby." OCGA § 16-14-2(b). However, § 16-14-2(b) goes on to state that
The activities prohibited by the federal RICO statute are set out in subsections (a) through (d) of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Subsection (a) makes it "unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from" what is termed a "pattern of racketeering activity ... in which such person has participated as a principal" to "use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income ... in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise ..." Under subsection (b), it is "unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity ... to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise ..." Under subsection (c), it is "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ..." Finally, subsection (d) of § 1962 makes it unlawful to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) defines "racketeering activity" as encompassing various specified criminal offenses, e.g., murder, gambling, arson, dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, wire fraud, securities fraud. "Enterprise" is defined under subsection (4) of § 1961 as including "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Under subsection (5), " 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of [the RICO statute] ..."
United States v. Turkette, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 583, 101 S.Ct. at p. 2528.
The "prohibited activities" under the Georgia RICO statute are set out in OCGA § 16-14-4. Subsection (a) makes it "unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity or proceeds derived therefrom, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise, real property, or personal property of any nature, including money." Under subsection (b), "[i]t is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." Subsection (c) provides that "[i]t is unlawful for any person to conspire or endeavor to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this Code section."
The Georgia RICO statute is significantly broader than its federal counterpart in that OCGA § 16-14-4(a) makes it unlawful for any person through proceeds derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain any real property, or personal property of any nature, including money. In contrast, the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), only targets investors who participate in the pattern of racketeering activity as a principal. See "Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act," 20 Ga.Bar J. 34 (1983). And, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) only makes it unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain any interest in or control of an enterprise; the federal statute does not contain a proscription against the acquisition of real and personal property, including money, which is not part of the enterprise.
The forfeiture provisions of the state and federal statutes are, likewise, different. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), with OCGA § 16-14-7(a).
However, as previously stated, the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and the state statute, OCGA § 16-14-4(b), are similar in that the foregoing core provisions both make it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.
In one respect, the Georgia RICO statute is narrower than the federal statute, in that OCGA § 16-14-3(2) defines "pattern of racketeering activity" as "at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after July 1, 1980 ..." The federal RICO statute, of course, requires a connection between the racketeering activity and the enterprise, but it does not on its face require any interrelatedness between the predicate crimes themselves. See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899, note 23 (5th Cir.1978).
The Georgia RICO statute broadly defines "enterprise" to mean "any person, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, union chartered under the laws of this state, or other legal entity ... and it includes illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental as well as other entities." OCGA § 16-14-3(1). The federal RICO statute does not expressly state that the term "enterprise," as used therein, includes illicit as well as licit enterprises. However, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted RICO as including both. United States v. Turkette, supra.
The Georgia RICO statute's venue section provides that in any criminal RICO proceeding "the crime shall be considered to have been committed in any county in which an incident of racketeering occurred or in which an interest or control of an enterprise or real or personal property is acquired or maintained." OCGA § 16-14-11.
The remaining provisions of the state and federal RICO statutes are not applicable here and, therefore, will not be...
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