Chandler, In re

JurisdictionOregon
PartiesIn the Matter of Lauryne CHANDLER a child, John E. CHANDLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Oregon, Respondent.
Citation230 Or. 452,370 P.2d 626
CourtOregon Supreme Court
Decision Date18 April 1962

J. Ray Rhoten, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Rhoten, Rhoten & Speerstra, Salem.

C. L. Marsters, Deputy Dist. Atty., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hattie B. Kremen, Dist. Atty., and Jena V. Schlegel, Deputy Dist. Atty., Salem.

Before McALLISTER, C. J., and WARNER, SLOAN and O'CONNELL, JJ.

SLOAN, Justice.

In June 1960, the juvenile court of Marion county ordered the above named child to be made a ward of the court and placed her in a foster home. Later the child's natural parent, John Chandler, petitioned the court to revoke the order and return the child to him. After hearing, the court refused to allow the petition and ordered the child retained as a ward of the court and continued to deprive the parent of custody. He appeals from that order.

The child's mother died some years ago. Later the father remarried. Dissension between this child and the stepmother was the basic cause of the problem. The problem was aggravated by similar dissension between the stepmother and older sisters of this girl which helped to ferment the strife and tended to deprive the girl of the company and companionship of her older sisters. The ill health of the stepmother also contributed to the trouble. On the evening of June 1, 1960, the girl ran away from home and was taken into custody by the juvenile authorities. She was then 13 years old.

The next day an older married sister filed a petition in the juvenile court for Marion county alleging that the child was within the jurisdiction of that court. The petition alleged that the child 'has parents who fail to provide her with care, guidance and protection necessary for her physical health, mental and emotional well being * * *.' On June 6, 1960, the parents, that is both the father and stepmother, were served with summons demanding their presence at a hearing to be held by the court on June 8, 1960, at 1:45 P. M. The hearing was to determine the truth of the allegations of neglect. The father appeared at the hearing with an attorney. A transcript of the brief hearing held on June 8, 1960, is a part of the record. It was 'summary' indeed.

The first assignment of error is directed at the conduct of that hearing. It claims that the court failed to conform to the requirements of ORS 419.500(1). That statute requires that the 'facts alleged in the petition * * * must be established by a preponderance of competent evidence.' Clearly that was not done in this case. However, the court's order making the child a ward of the court and taking her from the custody of her father was a final appealable order. No appeal was taken from the order and we are now foreclosed from any further consideration of the question. It must be remembered that the word 'jurisdiction' as applied to this proceeding is not the kind of jurisdiction that gives the court the power to act at all. In the sense the word is used in ORS 419.476, which specifies the causes which permit the court to make the child a ward of the court, a finding of jurisdiction is a factual determination that the child is dependent or delinquent. It is not the kind of jurisdictional question that can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

The order entered by the court at that time, placed the child in the custody of the Marion County Child Welfare Department with directions to place her in a foster home subject to the supervision of the Department. That was done.

In February 1961, the father and stepmother filed the petition requesting the return of the child. That petition came on for hearing on April 7, 1961. A considerable volume of testimony was taken at that time and in later recessed hearings. On May 19, 1961, the court entered the order appealed from which denied this petition.

Although this is an appeal as in an equity case, there are four assignments of error made here. We have already disposed of the first one. The second contention is that the court should have returned the child to the parents. The disposition we make of this case makes it unnecessary to decide this question.

The next assignment claims that the court erred in refusing to permit the child to be called as a witness and to have been examined in open court. The child was questioned privately by the court in the presence of counsel for the father and for the state. A record of the questions and answers is here. It is said that Kreutzer v. Kreutzer, 1961, 72 Adv.Sh. 421, 425, 359 P.2d 536, is conclusive on the right to examine the child. The Kreutzer case was a contest between divorced parents for the custody of their children. We held that if the children were competent either party could require them to testify and that the trial judge had no discretion to refuse the right. We think that the concept and intent of the juvenile code would be violated if such a rule were to be applied to the proceedings contemplated by the code. The compelling intent of the juvenile code proceeding is to protect the child in any situation in which the court thinks the child may require it. Discretion must be vested in the trial court to make the initial determination if it would be proper to question a child in any given case. We cannot say the discretion was abused in this case.

The last assignment asserts that it was error for the court to refuse to permit petitioner's attorney to examine certain records of the Welfare Department. In this we think there was error. We recognize that ORS 419.567(2) provides that:

'Reports and other material relating to the child's history and prognosis are privileged and, except with the consent of the court, shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the judge of the juvenile court and those acting under his direction.'

and that ORS 411.320 similarly provides the records of the Welfare Department are confidential and that 'In any judicial proceedings, except proceedings directly connected with the administration of public assistance laws, their contents are considered privileged communications.'

In this case the state had intervened in a family to take a child from the custody of its parent. It was placed in the custody of the Welfare Department. The conduct of the case workers who were supervising the child and the relationship of these people to the child and to the parent and stepmother was directly in issue. During the trial, counsel sought to elicit certain information from this file and was unable to satisfactorily obtain it. He then moved to put the entire file in evidence. This was denied. However, the real question presented here is, should counsel have been permitted reasonable access to the file in order to use that part of it that was relevant to the issues being presented to the court? We think the court should have permitted such an examination. No one asked to take the file away from the immediate custody of the court. The court could have required such safeguards as he may have felt necessary in respect to the examination of the file, but complete denial of access to the file was wrong.

It would be unthinkable to say that an agency of the state may seize a person's child and then be the sole judge of how much of the evidence in respect to the agency's conduct it will refuse to divulge. It could not...

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26 cases
  • State v. Thompson
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • January 7, 1966
    ... ...         Some indication appears from the decisions of other states as to what they may do when clearly confronted with the problem. It would appear that in two states the Jencks rule will be followed. State v. Morgan, 67 N.Mex. 287, 354 P.2d 1002; Chandler v. State, 230 Or. 452, 370 P.2d 626. Two states may have implicitly adopted the discretionary rule. Russom v. State (Fla.App.) 105 So.2d 380; State v. Miller (Ohio App.) 176 N.E.2d 296. If indulging in speculation of this kind is of any value, it might appear that three states are likely to ... ...
  • Dep't of Human Servs. v. K. W. (In re H. W.)
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • October 7, 2020
    ... ... See Chandler v. State , 230 Or. 452, 455, 370 P.2d 626 (1962) ("It must be remembered that the word jurisdiction as applied to this proceeding is not the kind of jurisdiction that gives the court the power to act at all. In the sense the word is used in [ former ORS 419.476 (1991) ], which specifies the ... ...
  • Dep't of Human Servs. v. C. M. H. (In re S. R. R.)
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • May 6, 2021
    ... ... In fact, at least one early case under the 1959 juvenile code necessarily rejected petitioner's proposal that the wardship determination is what brings a case within the scope of the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction. In Chandler v. State , 230 Or. 452, 454-55, 370 P.2d 626 (1962), a father sought to collaterally attack a juvenile court's clearly inadequate determination that placed the father's child "within the jurisdiction of [the juvenile] court" under former ORS 419.476. This court rejected the father's collateral ... ...
  • Papadopoulos v. State Bd. of Higher Educ.
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • March 21, 1972
    ... ... State v. Cortman, 251 Or. 566, 446 P.2d 681, cert. denied 394 U.S. 951, 89 S.Ct. 1294, 22 L.Ed.2d 487 (1968). Also, material in welfare department files which is [8 Or.App. 460] expressly confidential by statute may, at times, have to be disclosed. Chandler v. State, 230 Or. 452, 370 P.2d 626 (1962). The evidence does not support defendants' further claim that disclosure of the report would make it more difficult to get similar information in the future. Acting President Young testified that the practice of calling in a team of outside consultants ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • § 9.1 Conduct of Jurisdictional Trial
    • United States
    • Juvenile Law: Dependency (OSBar) Chapter 9 Jurisdiction and Disposition
    • Invalid date
    ...in chambers is within the court's discretion. See ORS 419B.310(1); ORS 44.547(1); Beasley, 314 Or at 451; In re Chandler, 230 Or 452, 456, 370 P2d 626 (1962). When questioning a child witness, attorneys and judges should use simple language and regularly confirm that the child understands t......
  • § 8.6 Discovery and Investigation
    • United States
    • Juvenile Law: Dependency (OSBar) Chapter 8 Preadjudication Procedure and Shelter Hearings
    • Invalid date
    ...right to call his or her child as a witness may be limited by the court, to protect the child. In In re Chandler, 230 Or 452, 456, 370 P2d 626 (1962), a dependency case, a father was not allowed to re-call his 13-year-old daughter to testify in open court after she had already testified in ......

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