Chandler v. Armontrout, 90-1784

• Decision Date: 17 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-1784,90-1784
• Citation: 940 F.2d 363
• Parties: Darrell CHANDLER, Jr., Appellant, v. Bill ARMONTROUT, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 363

940 F.2d 363

Darrell CHANDLER, Jr., Appellant, v. Bill ARMONTROUT, Appellee.

No. 90-1784.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 11, 1990.

Decided Aug. 1, 1991.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Denied Sept. 17, 1991.

Rickey R. Roberts, Kahoka, Mo., for appellant.

Ronald L. Jurgeson and Stephen D. Hawke, Jefferson City, Mo., for appellee.

Before BEAM, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOODS, ^* District Judge.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Darrell Chandler, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the district court ¹ denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1988). The district court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge. ² Chandler asserts that the district court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claims and in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before addressing the ineffectiveness claims. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 10, 1986, Chandler entered an Alford plea of guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. ³ Chandler's guilty plea was entered after a previous conviction for capital murder was reversed by the Missouri Supreme Court. State v. Chandler, 698 S.W.2d 844 (Mo.1985). ⁴ During the plea hearing, the state indicated that Chandler intended to enter an Alford plea and summarized the evidence the state would have presented at trial, including prior testimony of Chandler's two brothers. Chandler's brother Michael testified at Chandler's previous trial, placing Chandler at the murder scene and implicating Chandler in the murder, and Chandler's brother Richard testified at the trial of a co-defendant, similarly placing Chandler at the scene and implicating him in the murder. Chandler denied being at the scene and disclaimed any involvement in the murder. However, Chandler stated his belief that the state's evidence would convict him of the murder, that he feared a jury trial on capital murder, and that he preferred to accept punishment for second-degree murder. After confirming that Chandler understood his plea and its consequences, the court accepted the plea and imposed a life sentence.

Chandler filed in state court a pro se motion for post-conviction relief to vacate his conviction and sentence. Chandler attached to the motion an affidavit of his brother Richard stating that Richard had given false testimony at the co-defendant's trial when he implicated Chandler in the murder. In his motion, Chandler asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea, that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate Richard's testimony and challenge the court's jurisdiction, and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. The state court determined that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary and denied Chandler's motion. The denial of post-conviction relief was affirmed by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Chandler v. State, 763 S.W.2d 351 (Mo.Ct.App.1988), and rehearing by the Missouri Supreme Court was denied.

Chandler subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court reasserting his arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, that his trial counsel was ineffective, and that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because of counsel's ineffectiveness. The district court referred Chandler's petition to the magistrate judge, who recommended denial of the petition. The magistrate judge accepted the state post-conviction court's determination that the trial court had jurisdiction, determined that Chandler's trial counsel provided effective assistance, and concluded that Chandler's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. The district court adopted the report and recommendation.

On appeal to this court, Chandler raises the same ineffectiveness claims based on trial counsel's failure to investigate his brother Richard's testimony and challenge the court's jurisdiction, and Chandler also reasserts the claim that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because of counsel's ineffectiveness. In addition to these claims, Chandler argues that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing on his habeas petition.

II. DISCUSSION

On review of an application for habeas corpus, the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact. Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct. 1944, 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989). Thus, this court reviews the district court's conclusions on ineffectiveness de novo. The district court's findings of fact, however, are reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. We conclude that the district court did not err in denying Chandler's petition. Furthermore, the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Chandler must satisfy the two-step test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, Chandler must establish that counsel provided professionally unreasonable service. Counsel's errors must be so egregious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Second, Chandler must demonstrate that counsel's inferior performance prejudiced the defense to the extent that he was denied the right to a fair trial. There must be a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Upon reviewing a claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the court presumes that counsel's performance "falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The court need not consider the prejudice element if the performance element has not been satisfied, and vice versa. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069-70.

Trial counsel's performance was not ineffective under the two-step test of Strickland. Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to investigate the testimony of Chandler's brother Richard. Chandler has not demonstrated that a failure to investigate his brother Richard's testimony prejudiced his case. In light of the substantial evidence against Chandler, a failure to investigate Richard's testimony and verify its veracity would not have changed the end result of Chandler's plea. The testimony of Chandler's other brother, Michael, placed Chandler at the murder scene and implicated Chandler in the murder. Michael's testimony was used against Chandler in Chandler's prior trial, where Chandler was convicted of capital murder, and the state intended to use this testimony again in a second trial. Further, Chandler's brother Richard had maintained since the murder that Chandler was not involved, but recanted while testifying in a co-defendant's trial and implicated Chandler in the murder. Both the state and Chandler's counsel agreed that the state "potentially had a stronger case than [it] did the first time" because Richard was no longer available as a defense witness. Joint App. at 80. In any event, trial counsel's performance was not deficient because counsel verified the substance of Richard's testimony by contacting the attorneys involved in the co-defendant's trial.

Chandler also argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court and advise Chandler of a potential problem with jurisdiction. Chandler contends that the trial court, located in Cape Girardeau County, lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea because that court was divested of jurisdiction over his case when it allowed a substitute information to be filed the morning of the first trial, which increased the charge from first-degree murder to capital murder, in violation of applicable law and court rules. Chandler asserts that although his first conviction was reversed by the Missouri Supreme Court and an amended information...