Chandler v. Denton, 59516

• Citation: 1987 OK 38,741 P.2d 855
• Decision Date: 12 May 1987
• Docket Number: No. 59516,59516
• Parties: David R. CHANDLER, Appellee, v. Richard L. DENTON and Edith P. Denton, Appellants.
• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Page 855

741 P.2d 855

1987 OK 38

David R. CHANDLER, Appellee, v. Richard L. DENTON and Edith P. Denton, Appellants.

No. 59516.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 12, 1987.

As Corrected May 13, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1987.

John C. Niemeyer, John R. Hargrave, Messrs. Foliart, Mills & Niemeyer, Linda G. Alexander, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

Gene Stipe, Oklahoma City, Carl Hughes, Messrs. Hughes, Nelson & Gassaway, Oklahoma City, for appellants.

OPALA, Justice.

Three issues are presented for review on certiorari: When the same operative facts support multiple theories of liability that are governed by different limitation periods, does the savings clause in 12 O.S. 1981 § 100 extend the time for the commencement of an action predicated on those theories that would have been timely pressed had they been actually raised in the original suit? Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence the testimony of certain attorney-client communications that were claimed to be privileged? and Was the jury verdict for the plaintiff excessive and without a proper evidentiary foundation? We answer the first issue in the affirmative and the second in the negative; the third issue is answered in the negative except for the punitive damages verdict; the latter award, found to be excessive, is conditionally affirmed on plaintiff's remittitur.

The appellee, David R. Chandler [Chandler], seeks review by certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision that reversed a $1,100,030 judgment on jury verdict in his favor, holding that his theories of recovery were barred by the statute of limitations.

I

THE ACCOUNTING ACTION [CHANDLER I]

On April 6, 1976 Mary Francis Denton, Chandler's former mother-in-law, brought an accounting suit against Chandler, in her capacity as the administratrix of her husband's estate, to recover money allegedly owed to the estate by Chandler who had been the decedent's business partner.

On January 10, 1978 Chandler filed a counterclaim and "cross-petition" and sought damages for assault, battery, extortion and trespass. He alleged that, on June 14, 1976 at 1 a.m., his former brother and sister-in-law, Richard and Edith Denton [Dentons], came to his home, kicked in the front door, committed assault and battery and extorted from him a $32,000 check as payment of the amount claimed to be due in the accounting suit.

On April 19, 1978 the trial court ruled on the mother's-in-law demurrer and her motion to strike Chandler's "cross-petition" by dismissing his claims on the ground that the allegations of his pleadings did not relate to any fiduciary duties in the administration of the estate. The record before us refutes Dentons' argument that Chandler's counterclaim and "cross-petition" was reached and decided on the merits.

                Chandler sought reconsideration by motion filed on April 27, 1978.  Approximately one year later, on April 12, 1979, 1 the court overruled that motion.   In Chandler I 2 the Court of Appeals affirmed this disposition.  It concluded that the April 19, 1978 order operated as a dismissal of Chandler's "cross-petition" and counterclaim
                

II

CHANDLER'S RECOMMENCED LAWSUIT [CHANDLER II]

On August 30, 1979 Chandler filed a separate lawsuit that contained allegations of the June 14, 1976 altercation with his former siblings-in-law [Chandler II ]. Chandler sought compensatory and punitive damages for assault and battery. The Dentons demurred to this petition on October 12, 1979 asserting that Chandler's action was time-barred. On December 18, 1979 Chandler amended his petition to include his mother-in-law as a party defendant, both individually and as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate. He also sought damages against all three defendants for assault, battery, trespass, extortion, damage to property and intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress. Chandler sought to consolidate this action with the then still pending accounting suit. The Dentons demurred to the amended petition. After a hearing on various motions, the trial court on April 24, 1980 (a) refused to consolidate the two lawsuits; (b) overruled the Dentons' demurrer except as it related to Chandler's assault-and-battery ground for recovery; (c) ruled that any assault-and-battery predicate for liability was barred by the statute of limitations and (d) determined that trespass, extortion and infliction of emotional distress were all timely pressed and available theories of Chandler's claim.

On September 15, 1981 Chandler added, by the last amendment to his petition, a new ground for recovery--invasion of privacy. In this amendment he also alleged that on the day the Dentons broke into his home they held a knife to his genitalia and threatened to castrate him if he did not pay the money that they insisted he owed. ³ The mother-in-law was later dismissed with prejudice as a party defendant, and the cause came to trial on September 21, 1982. The $1,100,030 jury verdict awarded Chandler explicitly compensates him for harm asserted by him under the legal rubrics identified below:

III

THE RATIONALE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CHANDLER II

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment on jury verdict in Chandler II and directed the trial court to render, on remand, its judgment for the Dentons. The appellate court reasoned that all of Chandler's theories of liability had been time-barred. The assault-and-battery predicate Applying this analytical framework to the theories of recovery raised by Chandler's petition and subsequent amendments in Chandler II, the Court of Appeals found all of them time-barred. Since the only grounds for recovery--other than assault and battery--which were brought in Chandler I within two years of the operative event were extortion and trespass, the Court of Appeals reasoned that only those theories could have been saved by recommencement of the action within one year of April 12, 1979, the date the claims were originally dismissed otherwise than on the merits. Of the various theories raised by Chandler's pleadings in the instant suit, extortion and trespass were not tendered until September 15, 1981. The Court of Appeals accordingly held that Chandler had clearly failed to bring them within the one-year limit prescribed in 12 O.S. 1981 § 100. The remaining theories of recovery-- intentional infliction of mental distress and property damage--were raised for the first time on December 18, 1979. Since the two-year period of limitation had lapsed before these theories were first tendered in the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that they also were barred and Chandler could not hence benefit from the § 100 savings clause.

                of liability was held to have been barred by limitations when it was originally pled by counterclaim in the accounting suit brought on January 10, 1978.  Since the operative event alleged in his "cross-petition" occurred on June 14, 1976, the one-year statutory limit 4 for bringing a claim predicated on an assault-and-battery theory of recovery had already lapsed.  As to the remainder of Chandler's theories of liability--trespass, invasion of privacy, wrongful taking and detaining property, and intentional infliction of emotional distress--the Court of Appeals noted that these were subject to a two-year statutory limitation. 5  The court held that this time limit could be extended by the savings provision in 12 O.S. 1981 § 100.  The cited statute affords a claimant an additional year to recommence a timely-filed lawsuit that has been dismissed otherwise than on the merits even though the claim would have been time-barred if it were then asserted for the first time. 6
                

At the outset of our review we notice that the judgment roll ⁷ in the 1976 case [Chandler I ] was not incorporated into the record on this appeal and is not before us. The contentions of the Dentons invoke the protection of a legal bar claimed to be afforded by the "judgment" in that case. It was thus incumbent upon the Dentons to designate for inclusion in this record the judgment roll in Chandler I and to make it a part of the record in this appeal. ⁸ Our inquiry into the prior decision's

                legal effect cannot extend beyond the instruments that are comprised within the judgment roll of the case.  Because the record on this appeal does not contain the Chandler I judgment roll, we may not look beyond the Court of Appeals' opinion in Chandler I as a source for ascertaining what actually stood adjudged in the prior lawsuit. 9  Since the Chandler I opinion describes but a few pleadings, there is scarcely enough here before us for a searching and meaningful review of the Dentons' claim that Chandler II was barred by the 1976 judgment in Chandler I. 10  In short, we must conclude that the appellate court's opinion in Chandler I--the only source available for our scrutiny here--does not provide a sufficient foundation to overcome the law's presumption of correctness that attaches to the trial court's judgment in Chandler II, the case now under review. 11
                

IV

THE LIMITATIONS ISSUE

At the outset of our analysis we must determine here the meaning of the term "cause of action" as it affects the provisions of 12 O.S. 1981 § 100. ¹² The Court of Appeals apparently ascribed a narrow meaning to that phrase. It no doubt assumed that each theory of recovery pled by Chandler constituted a distinct cause of action or a separate claim. We disagree. ¹³

Oklahoma jurisprudence uses the transactional approach for its definition of a "cause of action." ¹⁴ The operative event that underlies a party's claim delineates the parameters of his cause of action. ¹⁵ This conceptual approach ensures that litigants will be able to assert different theories of liability without violating the purposes of the statute of limitations. ¹⁶ That statute is designed to ensure that a party has notice of a claim against him within a statutory period of time ¹⁷ and an adequate opportunity to prepare his case before potential evidence is lost...