Chandler v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
Decision Date | 02 October 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 94907.,94907. |
Citation | 798 N.E.2d 724,207 Ill.2d 331,278 Ill.Dec. 340 |
Parties | Paulette CHANDLER, Adm'r of the Estate of Douglas Chandler, Appellee, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Kurt E. Reitz and Heath H. Hooks, Belleville (Thompson Coburn, L.L.P., of counsel), for appellant.
Bruce N. Cook, of Cook, Ysursa, Bartholomew, Brauer & Shevlin, Ltd., Belleville, for appellee.
Vincent B. Browne and Kenneth J. Sophie, Jr., of Harrington, Thompson, Acker & Harrington, Ltd., Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
On January 16, 1997, a motor vehicle driven by Douglas Chandler collided with a railroad train owned and operated by defendant, Illinois Central Railroad Company (Illinois Central), at the Center Street crossing in Tilden, Illinois. Chandler sustained fatal injuries in the collision. Plaintiff, Paulette Chandler, administrator of decedent's estate, filed an action under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 1996)) in which she alleged that Illinois Central's negligence was the proximate cause of the death. Illinois Central filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 and section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2000)) and a motion for summary judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2000)). The circuit court of St. Clair County granted the motion to dismiss. The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 333 Ill.App.3d 463, 267 Ill.Dec. 178, 776 N.E.2d 315. We granted Illinois Central's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill.2d R. 315). Following briefing and oral arguments in this case, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and subsequently moved this court to dismiss the appeal as moot. However, because the appeal presents "(i) a question of public interest, (ii) an issue in need of authoritative determination for future guidance, and (iii) a situation likely to recur" (see Callis v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 195 Ill.2d 356, 364, 254 Ill.Dec. 707, 748 N.E.2d 153 (2001)), we address the issues raised by this appeal and now affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the appellate court. Owing to the parties' settlement, however, there is no need for this court to remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.
In 1962, Illinois Central operated a railroad line running generally in a northwesterly-southeasterly direction between East St. Louis, Illinois, and Carbondale, Illinois. Train operations over the railroad line were by train order and timetable utilizing two main tracks for directional running. The railroad line crossed various streets and highways at grade in Randolph County and St. Clair County, including the crossing at issue in the Village of Tilden. In a petition filed with the Illinois Commerce Commission on March 10, 1962, Illinois Central proposed to install a centralized traffic control system on one of the main tracks and to retire the other main track. The centralized traffic control system would improve operating efficiency by allowing train movement in both directions on a single track. With the retirement of one main track, various grade crossings on the railroad line would change from double main line grade crossings to single main line grade crossings. At crossings where there would be no possibility of two or more trains occupying the crossing at the same time, the existing gate installations would be removed, leaving automatic flashing light signal installations. Illinois Central described the proposed grade crossing changes in detail, attaching blueprint drawings to its petition.
Following a hearing, the Commission made the following findings:
The Commission ordered that Illinois Central "proceed in making the changes in the existing automatic flashing light signal and gate protection at the crossings of * * * Center Street in the Village of Tilden, Randolph County, Illinois."
Illinois Central changed the Center Street crossing in conformity with the Commission's order. Thus, on the date of the collision, the crossing was equipped with luminous flashing signals only. Traveling in a southerly direction on Center Street, decedent's vehicle entered the crossing and was struck by a train proceeding in a westerly direction. Plaintiff filed this wrongful death action on behalf of decedent's next of kin.
Plaintiff filed the original complaint in Randolph County on October 6, 1997. On January 11, 1999, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff filed a nearly identical complaint in St. Clair County on January 11, 2000. Plaintiff amended the complaint on November 28, 2000. The circuit court dismissed the first amended complaint without prejudice on February 23, 2001. On March 2, 2001, plaintiff filed a pleading entitled "Third Amended Complaint," the pleading at issue in this appeal. Plaintiff has never filed a second amended complaint.
In paragraph five of the third amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that Illinois Central:
Plaintiff complained that, as a direct and proximate result of the negligent act or omissions of Illinois Central, decedent was not given adequate notice of the approach of the train, and decedent sustained fatal injuries in the ensuing collision.
The circuit court granted Illinois Central's motion to dismiss. In so ruling, the court noted, "Plaintiff has conceded that Paragraph 5(h) of her Third Amended Complaint should be dismissed based on federal preemption, and based on that stipulation, the Court orders that Paragraph 5(h) of the Third Amended Complaint is dismissed." The court then found that title 92, section 1535.335, of the Illinois Administrative Code (92 Ill. Adm.Code § 1535.335 (1996)) does not impose a duty to place signals within 15 feet of the near rail at a crossing. Accordingly, the court dismissed paragraph 5(c). Next, the court dismissed paragraph 5(i), finding that the allegations did not relate back to plaintiff's original complaint. Citing section 18c-7401(3) of the Illinois Commercial Transportation Law (Transportation Law) (625 ILCS 5/18c-7401(3) (West 1996)) and Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill.2d 107, 208 Ill.Dec. 662, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995), the court found a conclusive legal presumption that the warning devices at the crossing were adequate. Consequently, the court dismissed paragraphs 5(d), 5(e), 5(j) and 5(k). The court dismissed the remaining paragraphs for failure to allege a duty owed to decedent by Illinois Central.
The appellate court reversed and remanded. The court found no proper basis for dismissal of plaintiff's action, except with regard to paragraph 5(h), which plaintiff conceded should be dismissed based upon federal preemption.1 333 Ill.App.3d at 474, 267 Ill.Dec. 178, 776 N.E.2d 315. We allowed Illinois Central's petition for leave to appeal. We also allowed the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff.
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...the same occurrence as in the original complaint, the motion to amend should be granted. [See Chandler v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. , 207 Ill 2d 331 (2003).] Courts are to consider the following factors when deciding whether to grant leave to amend pleadings: (1) whether the proposed am......
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Parties
...the same occurrence as in the original complaint, the motion to amend should be granted. [See Chandler v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. , 207 Ill 2d 331 (2003).] Courts are to consider the following factors when deciding whether to grant leave to amend pleadings: (1) whether the proposed am......
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Parties
...the same occurrence as in the original complaint, the motion to amend should be granted. [See Chandler v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. , 207 Ill 2d 331 (2003).] Courts are to consider the following factors when deciding whether to grant leave to amend pleadings: (1) whether the proposed am......