Chandler v. James

• Citation: 998 F.Supp. 1255
• Decision Date: 17 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. CV 96-D-169-N.,CV 96-D-169-N.
• Parties: Michael CHANDLER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Fob JAMES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

998 F.Supp. 1255

Michael CHANDLER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Fob JAMES, et al., Defendants.

No. CV 96-D-169-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

December 17, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Steven Green, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Washington, DC, Stephen L. Pevar, American Civ. Liberties Union, Denver, CO, Elizabeth Joy Hubertz, Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mitchell, Papantonio & Lamb, Birmingham, AL, James A. Tucker, Alabama Civ. Liberties Union, Montgomery, AL, Pamela L. Sumners, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs.

Jere L. Beasley, James A. Main, P. Leigh O'Dell, Beasley, Wilson, Allen, Main & Crow, P.C., Montgomery, AL, Alan Eric Johnston, Johnston, Trippe & Brown, Birmingham, AL, William P. Gray, Jr., Legal Advisor to the Governor, Governor's Office, Montgomery, AL, for Fob James, Jr.

William H. Pryor, Jr., Atty. Gen., Thomas F. Parker, IV, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Montgomery, AL, Jay A. Sekulow, American Center for Law and Justice, Mobile, AL, for Jeff Sessions.

Denise Boone Azar, Michael R. White, Dept. of Educ., Office of General Counsel, Montgomery, AL, Ashley H. Hamlett, Alabama Dept. of Public Health, Montgomery, AL, for Dr. Ed Richardson.

Denise Boone Azar, Larry E. Craven, Dept. of Educ., Office of Gen Counsel, Montgomery, AL, Ashley Hamlett, Alabama Dept. of Public Health, Montgomery, AL, for Bradley Byrne, G.J. Higginbotham, Stephanie Bell, Ethel Hall, Dr. Willie Paul, David Byers, Jr., Sandra Ray, Dr. Mary Jane Caylor.

Donald B. Sweeney, Jr., David P. Condon, Valerie T. Kisor, Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, Al, Oakley W. Melton, Jr., James Eugene Williams, Melton, Espy, Williams & Hayes, P.C., Montgomery, AL, Robert B. French, Jr., Fort Payne, AL, for Weldon Parrish, Jimmy Wilbanks, Johnny Young, Mary Etta Bailey, Willard A. Israel, Tommie Johnson.

Mark A. Rasco, Ralph Gaines, Gaines, Gaines & Rasco, P.C., Talladega, AL, J. Allen Schreiber, Gerald Alan Templeton, Lloyd, Schreiber & Gray, P.C., Birmingham, AL, James Eugene Williams, Melton, Espy, Williams & Hayes, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Charles E. Kearley, James Braswell, T.Y. Lawrence, Jr., Bonnie Miller, Michael O'Brien, Helen Scales.

ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court is a "Motion For Partial Stay Of Permanent Injunction" ("Defs.' Mot.") filed on November 10, 1997 by the Attorney General of the State of Alabama, the Alabama State Board of Education and its individual members, and the DeKalb County, Alabama, Board of Education and its individual members ("Defendants"). Defendants filed a "Memorandum In Support" ("Defs.' Mem. In Supp.") on the same date. Plaintiffs filed their "Opposition To `Defendants' Motion To Stay'" ("Pls.' Opp'n") on November 18, 1997 to which Defendants filed a Reply ("Defs.' Reply") on November 24, 1997. On the same date, Plaintiffs filed their "Supplemental Opposition To `Defendants' Motion To Stay'" ("Pls.' Supplemental Opp'n"), and the "Declaration Of Susan Jane Neely In Opposition To `Defendants' Motion To Stay' Injunction" ("Neely Decl."). On December 5, 1997, Plaintiffs filed their "Reply To `[Defendants'] Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Partial Stay,'" ("Pls.' Reply"), and the Declaration of John Woodfin ("Woodfin Decl.").¹ On December 4, 1997, counsel for the DeKalb County Board of Education and its Superintendent, filed a "Report to Court of Counsel of DeKalb County Board of Education, et al." ("DeKalb Sch. Bd. Report To Ct.") On December 15, 1997, Plaintiffs filed their "Additional Evidence In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Stay." ("Pls.' Add. Evid.").

Defendants move the court, pursuant to Rule 62 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a stay of sections 6(a), 6(b), 6(c), 6(d), 6(e) and 7 of the court's October 29, 1997 Permanent Injunction ("Permanent Inj."), pending review by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (Defs.' Mot. at 1.) Defendants contend that these sections of the Permanent Injunction are "vague and overbroad." (Defs.' Mem. In Supp. at 1.) Plaintiffs argue that the "proscriptions are all specific and under the totality of the circumstances give ... an extremely clear understanding of the conduct that is proscribed." (Pls.' Opp'n at 7.) After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, as well as relevant law, the court finds that Defendants' "Motion For Partial Stay Of Permanent Injunction" is due to be granted as to twelve words of the court's three-thousand, seven-hundred and fourteen word Permanent Injunction, and otherwise denied.

DISCUSSION

On March 12, 1997, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order finding unconstitutional Alabama Code Section 16-1-20.3, Alabama's fourth incantation of a "school prayer" statute. Chandler v. James, 958 F.Supp. 1550, 1568 (M.D.Ala.1997). The challenge to the statute arose in the context of officially initiated, promoted and/or sanctioned religious activity that was occurring in the public schools of DeKalb County, Alabama. On October 29, 1997, the court issued a Permanent Injunction enjoining various state and local officials from enforcing Alabama Code Section 16-1-20.3. (See Permanent Inj. at 1-3.) The Permanent Injunction also prohibited a variety of officially initiated, promoted and/or sanctioned activities that the court found to be in violation of the First Amendment.² (Id. at 3-12.) Provisions were made to ensure compliance and to protect the rights of those citizens who were subject to the activity found unconstitutional. (Id. at 3-16.) In the Motion To Stay currently before the court, Defendants do not challenge those portions of the Permanent Injunction prohibiting enforcement of Alabama Code Section 16-1-20.3; their challenge is limited to specific sections of the Permanent Injunction applicable to DeKalb County, Alabama.³

For purposes of clarity, and in order to rectify convoluted interpretations of the terms of the court's Permanent Injunction, the court will: (1) state the applicable law; (2) restate the specific provisions of the Permanent Injunction that are at issue; (3) summarize the arguments of counsel; and (4) analyze the arguments of counsel in light of applicable law and the terms of the Permanent Injunction.

I. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Standard Of Review

Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "the court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party." Fed. R.Civ.P. 62(c). In Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987), the Supreme Court stated that:

Different Rules of Procedure govern the power of district courts and courts of appeal to stay an order pending appeal. See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. [sic] 62(c); Fed.Rule App.Proc. [sic] 8(a). Under both Rules, however, the factors regulating the issuance of a stay are generally the same: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

Hilton, 107 S.Ct. at 2119 (citations omitted).⁴ These factors "contemplate individualized judgment in each case, [and] the formula cannot be reduced to a set of rigid rules." Id.

Defendants urge the court to also consider their Motion under what they describe as the "alternate standard" outlined by the Eleventh Circuit in Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir.1986). (Defs.' Mem. In Supp. at 3.) There, the Eleventh Circuit, as quoted by the Defendants, stated that "[o]rdinarily the first factor is the most important ... [b]ut the movant may also have his motion granted upon a lesser showing of a substantial case on the merits when the balance of equities [identified in factors 2, 3, and 4] weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay." (Defs.' Mem. In Supp. at 3 (citing Garcia-Mir, 781 F.2d at 1453).) Defendants argue that they are "not only likely to prevail on appeal, but the last three factors weigh heavily in favor of granting the stay. Therefore, the movants are entitled to prevail under the Eleventh Circuit's alternate standard." (Id.)

As an initial matter, the court notes that in Garcia-Mir, the Eleventh Circuit addressed an "emergency motion to stay" filed in the court of appeals, rather than in the district court in which the action originated. Garcia-Mir, 781 F.2d at 1451, 1453; see also, United States v. Bogle, 855 F.2d 707 (11th Cir.1988) (applying factors articulated in Garcia-Mir in context of emergency appeal before the Eleventh Circuit and citing to Eleventh Circuit Rule 27-1(b)).⁵ The Eleventh Circuit specifically noted the "emergency" nature of the motion to stay at issue there, and noted the "extraordinarily high standards of review of motions for emergency stays." Id. at 1451, 1454. In contrast, the Motion To Stay at issue in this action was filed with this court, a United States District Court, not the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and is in a non-emergency posture.

Utilization of the four Hilton factors in an "emergency" context ordinarily entails analysis of substantially more compelling factual and legal circumstances than in ordinary motions to stay. Predictably, that is why provisions are made for "emergency" motions, and why the factors may be entitled to different weight in that context. In an "emergency" appellate proceeding, emphasis may be placed on the likelihood of success on the merits, in part because the appellate court must determine that the trial court below was "clearly erroneous." Garcia-Mir, 781 F.2d at 1453. Once this determination is made, the likelihood of reversal on appeal may justify granting a stay, regardless of the other three factors. That is...