Chandler v. James
| Decision Date | 12 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 96-D-169-N.,CV 96-D-169-N. |
| Citation | 985 F.Supp. 1068 |
| Parties | Michael CHANDLER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Fob JAMES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Steven Green, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Washington, DC, Stephen L. Pevar, American Civ. Liberties Union, Denver, CO, Elizabeth Joy Hubertz, Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mitchell, Papantonio & Lamb, Birmingham, AL, James A. Tucker, Alabama Civ. Liberties Union, Montgomery, AL, Pamela L. Sumners, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs.
Jere L. Beasley, James A. Main, P. Leigh O'Dell, Beasley, Wilson, Allen, Main & Crow, P.C., Montgomery, AL, Alan Eric Johnston, Johnston, Trippe & Brown, Birmingham, AL, William P. Gray, Jr., Legal Advisor to the Governor, Governor's Office, Montgomery, AL, for Fob James, Jr.
William H. Pryor, Jr., Atty. Gen., Thomas F. Parker, IV, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Montgomery, AL, Jay A. Sekulow, American Center for Law and Justice, Mobile, AL, for Jeff Sessions.
Denise Boone Azar, Michael R. White, Dept. of Educ., Office of General Counsel, Montgomery, AL, Ashley H. Hamlett, Alabama Dept. of Public Health, Montgomery, AL, for Dr. Ed Richardson.
Denise Boone Azar, Larry E. Craven, Dept. of Educ., Office of Gen Counsel, Montgomery, AL, Ashley Hamlett, Alabama Dept. of Public Health, Montgomery, AL, for Bradley Byrne, G.J. Higginbotham, Stephanie Bell, Ethel Hall, Dr. Willie Paul, David Byers, Jr., Sandra Ray, Dr. Mary Jane Caylor.
Donald B. Sweeney, Jr., David P. Condon, Valerie T. Kisor, Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, AL, Oakley W. Melton, Jr., James Eugene Williams, Melton, Espy, Williams & Hayes, P.C., Montgomery, AL, Robert B. French, Jr., Fort Payne, AL, for Weldon Parrish, Jimmy Wilbanks, Johnny Young, Mary Etta Bailey, Willard A. Israel, Tommie Johnson.
Mark A. Rasco, Ralph Gaines, Gaines, Gaines & Rasco, P.C., Talladega, AL, J. Allen Schreiber, Gerald Alan Templeton, Lloyd, Schreiber & Gray, P.C., Birmingham, AL, James Eugene Williams, Melton, Espy, Williams & Hayes, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Charles E. Kearley, James Braswell, T.Y. Lawrence, Jr., Bonnie Miller, Michael O'Brien, Helen Scales.
DE MENT, District Judge.
Pending before the court are several motions and procedural matters that the court finds are due to be addressed.
On November 4, 1997, the Circuit Court of Etowah County issued a temporary restraining order, ("T.R.O."), "to prohibit the implementation of the District Court Permanent Injunction in this jurisdiction."1 (T.R.O. at 3.) On November 6, 1997, Plaintiffs filed a "Motion To Enjoin Proceedings In The Etowah County Circuit Court." On the same date, the court issued an Order inviting all parties to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion on or before 2:00 P.M., November 10, 1997.
On November 10, 1997, the Defendant Attorney General of Alabama filed a Response stating that the Etowah County action, styled Womack v. Etowah County Board of Education et al., CV-97-1282-RSM, was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs in that action. A copy of the "Voluntary Dismissal of Action" was attached to the Attorney General's pleading. In addition, and on the same date, the Defendant Governor of Alabama filed a Response in which he urged dismissal of Plaintiffs' Motion to Enjoin based on the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of the proceedings in the Circuit Court of Etowah County.
Based on the pleadings of the Governor and the Attorney General, as well as the notice of dismissal attached to the Attorney General's pleading, the court finds that Plaintiffs' Motion To Enjoin the Etowah County proceeding is due to be denied as moot.2
Also before the court is Plaintiffs' November 10, 1997 Motion To Alter Or Amend The Court's October 29, 1997 Injunction pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Plaintiffs filed a Brief in support of their Motion on the same date. Plaintiffs contend that "specific factual findings in [the court's October 29, 1997 Permanent Injunction] will be of great benefit to the parties." (Pls.' Mot. to Alter Or Am. at 1.) In addition, Plaintiffs contend that specific factual findings will satisfy the technical requirements of Rule 65.5 (Pls.' Br. In Supp. of Mot. to Alter or Am. at 1-2.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the court "make explicit its reasons for granting the injunctive relief it did." (Id. at 2.)
Prior to the filing of Plaintiffs' Motion To Alter Or Amend, the court was in the process of formulating and entering specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its October 29, 1997 Permanent Injunction, as well as addressing pending motions before the court. On October 23, 1997, counsel for some of the named Defendants in this action, filed a "Request For Conference Call." In that request, counsel stated that "[a] longterm and respected educator in the DeKalb County School System has been quoted as saying that `I'm not going to break the law but I want to find out, or I want our attorneys to find out, if a federal judge can do whatever he wants to whenever he wants to.'" For Conference Call ¶ 1 .) Counsel stated that the purpose of the Request was "to clarify whether `a federal judge has the authority to tell school officials and administrators in DeKalb county how to handle the issue of school prayer.'" (Id. at 1.) Counsel stated to the court that he sought a conference call "with the Court and the parties to see what rational procedure could be followed to make sure [the educator] is clear what jurisdiction this Court has over public officials in DeKalb County and what can be done to assure that [the educator] does not engage in action that would put him or others similarly situated in contempt of this Court." (Id. ¶ 2.)
Counsel's Request reinforced the sensitive and urgent nature of the matter and issues before the court. Prior to his request, the court had issued its March 12, 1997 Memorandum Opinion and Order, ("March 1997 Opinion and Order"), in which the court found that Alabama Code Section 16-1-20.3 was unconstitutional and granted summary judgment for the Plaintiffs on that issue. Plaintiffs' Complaint, however, sought not only a declaration that § 16-1-20.3 was unconstitutional, but also relief from the alleged religiously coercive activities of DeKalb County school officials relying on § 16-1-20.3 in support of their actions.
Even after the court's March 1997 Opinion and Order finding the statute unconstitutional, as noted supra, as of October 23, 1997, several motions and issues were still pending, including the issue of the relief necessary to alleviate the alleged religiously coercive activity in the DeKalb County School System. Based on counsel's request, the plethora of pleadings filed by the parties suggesting courses of action and grounds therefor, and the evidence in the record, the court entered its Permanent Injunction on October 29, 1997.6
As the introductory paragraph of the injunction notes, it was based on "the court's previous opinions, as well as the record as a whole in this cause." (Permanent Inj. at 1.) The court entered its Permanent Injunction for the reasons articulated above, and herein, and now enters this Supplemental Opinion and Order, including the following "Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law," pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7
In order to assist the court with identifying evidence in the record, the court directed the parties on April 24, 1997, to identify with specificity the evidence in the record at that time and to attach where possible copies of any documentary evidence already in the record, without further argument or embellishment, that was pertinent to dispositive motions.9 These submissions, pertinent to dispositive motions, were received in May 1997 from the Plaintiffs and from DeKalb County.
However, further evidence bearing on the Plaintiffs' entitlement to injunctive relief against the DeKalb County Board of Education generally has been filed since May 15, 1997 and is detailed in these findings of fact and conclusions of law. This evidence, generally related to religious practices since that time, has not been challenged or controverted by the DeKalb County Board of Education in any way, by affidavit or otherwise. The court finds that such evidence is appropriately received as bearing on entitlement to injunctive relief against DeKalb County and notes that DeKalb County was welcome to submit, at any time, any evidence that might contravene documents, affidavits, and other evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs in support of their claim for injunctive relief, if it had Such to offer. All of this evidence is aimed at demonstrating to the court that violations have continued despite the pendency of this lawsuit and despite the court's March 1997 Opinion and Order. Accordingly, the court finds it proper and just to consider all evidence in the record for the purpose of issuing these findings of fact and conclusions of law as they bear upon the Plaintiffs' entitlement to permanent injunctive relief and will do so.
The court specifically notes that the Plaintiffs have brought both a facial and "as applied" challenge and that the DeKalb County Board of Education has specifically adopted the position that prayer and devotionals over the intercom, classroom prayer, prayer at high school graduations, and prayer at student assemblies such as D.A.R.E. ceremonies and events are "non-sectarian, non-proselytizing, student-initiated voluntary prayer, invocations, and/or benedictions." This is the language of Alabama Code Section 16-1-20.3 whi...
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Ex parte Moore
...regarding Judge Ira DeMent's ruling in the DeKalb County school-prayer case. See Chandler v. James, 958 F.Supp. 1550, 985 F.Supp. 1062, 985 F.Supp. 1068, 998 F.Supp. 1255 (M.D.Ala.1997). In a letter to Moore, made public earlier this year, the JIC stated that it had ceased its investigation......