Chandler v. Jones

• Decision Date: 09 August 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10–cv–00903 (ABJ).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: Aaron CHANDLER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Gregory JONES, et al., Defendants.

802 F.Supp.2d 13

Aaron CHANDLER, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Gregory JONES, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10–cv–00903 (ABJ).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Aug. 9, 2011.

James Phillip Chandler, Sr., The Chandler Law Firm, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Kerslyn D. Featherstone, Office of the Attorney General, for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, District Judge.

Plaintiffs brought this action against the District of Columbia and a number of Metropolitan Police Department officers, alleging various torts and violations of their constitutional rights. Defendants Adrian Fenty, Cathy Lanier, Brian Hollan, Orlando Torres, Brian Bradley, and Benjamin Fetting have moved to dismiss. On July 20, 2011, after a return of service had been filed for defendant Gregory Jones, he indicated that he wished to adopt the motion. Upon consideration of the motions, plaintiffs' opposition, and the entire record of the case, the Court will grant defendants' motions.

BACKGROUND

Aaron Chandler (“A. Chandler”), David Chandler (“D. Chandler”), and Raymond Hamilton (collectively “plaintiffs”) brought this suit against the District of Columbia,¹ Mayor Adrian Fenty, Chief of Police Cathy Lanier, twelve individual Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Officers,² and “unknown MPD officers and staff” (collectively “defendants”) seeking in excess of fifty-six million dollars in damages for alleged violations of their constitutional rights. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 1 (“Defs.' Mot.”); Am. Compl. (“2d Compl.”) ¶¶ 66–113.

Plaintiffs' claims arise from a series of encounters on the streets of the District of Columbia with Officer Jones. One or more of the plaintiffs was involved on each occasion, and the allegations identify various other MPD officers who played a role on different dates. While the complaint does not describe them in an order that is easy to understand, the events giving rise to this lawsuit are as follows:

1. August 24, 2004: Officer Jones's stop and search of an automobile driven by Hamilton, and his detention and release on the scene of Hamilton and D. Chandler, who was driving a separate car and objected to the traffic stop involving Hamilton. Id. ¶¶ 46–56.

2. April 15, 2007: Officers Jones's demand that A. Chandler take a field sobriety test, and his arrest of A. Chandler, assisted by Officer Hollan, when A. Chandler refused to do so. Id. ¶¶ 31–34.

3. May 22, 2007: The arrest of Hamilton and D. Chandler by Officers Jones, Fetting, and Bunnels. Id. ¶¶ 35–45.

4. May 31, 2007: Officer Jones's arrest of A. Chandler, with the participation of Officers Mitchell, Bradley, Torres, and Hollan. Id. ¶¶ 15–30.

From these incidents, plaintiffs allege eight claims: (1) false arrest, (2) defamation, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) violations of the Fourth Amendment, (5) violations of the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, (6) violates of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, (7) malicious prosecution, and (8) negligence. Id. at ¶¶ 66–113.

Plaintiff A. Chandler filed a substantially similar complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on June 3, 2008 against the District of Columbia, Officer Jones, Mayor Fenty, Chief Lanier, Acting General Counsel Peter Nichols, and nine John Doe MPD officers. Chandler v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 08–01158, 1st Am. Compl., at 1 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2008) (“1st Compl.”). In that suit, plaintiff A. Chandler brought claims of false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, violations of his Fifth Amendment rights, violations of his Eighth Amendment rights, assault, and battery. Id. ¶¶ 112–147. Those claims also stemmed from the April 15, 2007 and May 31, 2007 arrests of plaintiff A. Chandler that are described in the instant complaint. Id. ¶¶ 15–111.

The defendants removed the first action to the District Court on July 1, 2008 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and filed a motion to dismiss on December 2, 2008. See Chandler v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 08–01158, Motion to Dismiss at 1 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2008). Under Local Rule 7(b), plaintiff A. Chandler's opposition to defendants' motion was due, at the latest, on December 16, 2008. See Local Rule 7(b). No opposition was filed. Plaintiff A. Chandler attempted to file an amended complaint on April 8, 2009—nearly four months late—without an accompanying motion for an extension of time making the requisite showing of excusable neglect as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). See Chandler v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 08–01158, Report & Recommendation at 3–4 (D.D.C. Sep. 3, 2009). At the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the court ordered the dismissal of plaintiff A. Chandler's claims on September 30, 2009, citing plaintiff's noncompliance with the Court's local rules. See Chandler v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 08–01158, Order Adopting Report & Recommendation (D.D.C. Sep. 30, 2009) (“Dismissal Order”).

On June 1, 2010 plaintiffs filed this complaint, and they amended it on August 16, 2010. On August 30, 2010 defendants Mayor Fenty, Chief Lanier, Officer Torres, and Officer Hollan moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On September 16, 2010, defendants Officer Bradley and Officer Fetting filed a similar motion.

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEWA. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6) ] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 129 S.Ct. at 1949. And “[s]econd, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 1950.

A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’ ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Id. at 1950, quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A pleading must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” id. at 1949, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, a court may ordinarily consider only “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice.” Gustave–Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F.Supp.2d 191, 196 (D.D.C.2002) (citations omitted).

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint “is construed liberally in [plaintiff's] favor, and [the Court should] grant [plaintiff] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Nevertheless, the Court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff's legal conclusions. See id.; Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002).

B. Statute of Limitations

Under D.C.Code § 12–301, each of plaintiffs' eight claims has, at maximum, a three-year statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for false arrest (Count 1), libel and slander (Count 2), and malicious prosecution (Count 7) is one year. D.C.Code § 12–301(4). Plaintiffs' claims of negligent hiring and supervision (Count 8) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 3) would ordinarily fall within the residuary three year provision in the statute. Id. § 12–301(8). But here, the emotional distress claim arises out of the same facts that give rise to the claims for libel, malicious prosecution, and false arrest, so it is covered by the one year statute. Rogers v. Johnson–Norman, 466 F.Supp.2d 162, 173 (D.D.C.2006) (“[I]f claims of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress are ‘intertwined’ with a tort specifically mentioned by D.C.Code § 12–301(4), such claims are subject to a one-year limitations period.”), citing Parker v. Grand Hyatt Hotel, 124 F.Supp.2d 79, 87 (D.D.C.2000). Finally, plaintiffs' section 1983 claims for violations of their constitutional rights (Counts 4, 5, and 6) have a statute of limitations of three years. See Carney v. American Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1096 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“The Supreme Court has held that in states with multiple statutes of limitations, claims under section 1983 are governed by the residual or general personal injury statute of limitations (like section 12–301(8)) ....”), citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 243–50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989).

II. PLAINTIFF A. CHANDLER'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, FENTY, LANIER AND JONES ARE PRECLUDED BY RES JUDICATA

Plaintiff A. Chandler's claims arising out of his 2007 arrests are barred by res judicata. “The doctrine of res judicata prevents repetitious litigation involving the same causes of action or the same issues.” I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear Mfg. Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946 (D.C.Cir.198...