Chandler v. State

• Decision Date: 17 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 213,213
• Parties: George Edward CHANDLER v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 645

23 Md.App. 645

329 A.2d 430

George Edward CHANDLER v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 213.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 17, 1974.

Richard Karceski, Assigned Public Defender, Baltimore, with whom was Harold I. Glaser, Assigned Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief, for appellant.

Bernard A. Raum, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Milton B. Allen, State's Atty. for Baltimore City, and Thomas R. Kane, Asst. State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before MORTON, MENCHINE and LOWE, JJ.

MORTON, Judge.

The appellant, George Edward Chandler, was found guilty of murder in the first degree by a jury presided over by Judge Robert B. Watts in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. Chandler was sentenced to the jurisdiction of the Division of Correction for the balance of his natural life.

In this appeal two issues are raised: (1) was the trial judge in error when, over appellant's objection, he failed to exclude evidence of prior offenses which were arguably neither connected in point of time nor circumstance to the instant case; and (2) was the trial judge in error when he failed to grant the appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

The victim of the murder was Diana Rosalyn Chandler, the appellant's estranged wife, who at the time of her death, lived alone in an apartment in Baltimore City. Carolyn Smith, a co-worker of the deceased on the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift at Western Electric Company, testified that when Diana Chandler failed to pick her up for work on Tuesday evening, March 13, 1973, and also failed to respond to her attempts to gain entrance to Mrs. Chandler's apartment, she became alarmed and notified the police the next day.

Officer Cannan, a Baltimore City policeman, testified that while working the 4 p.m. to 12 p.m. shift on March 14, he went to Mrs. Chandler's apartment in response to a 'missing person call.' When he could not gain entrance, he contacted the management of the apartment and a representative let him in with a pass key. He turned on a light and discovered Mrs. Chandler's unclad, lifeless body in the bedroom. According to the officer, there were no signs of forced entry, the windows were all locked from the inside and the lock to the front door was a dead bolt type requiring a key to lock and unlock it. After securing 'the crime scene,' he notified the 'Crime Lab Mobile Unit.'

According to the autopsy report, the body was examined at 9:40 a.m. on March 15, 1973, and at that time an electrical cord, cut from a television set, was found to be tightly wrapped around her neck. There were multiple stab wounds of her body, from one of which protruded the handle of a steak knife. The medical opinion was that death occurred between 9:40 a.m. and 9:40 p.m. on March 13, 1973, as a result of strangulation and multiple stab wounds.

A member of the police department's crime laboratory unit testified that of the fourteen identifiable fingerprints found in the apartment, ten of them belonged to the victim and four to the appellant. Appellant's prints were lifted from the bedroom door.

A police detective testified that he interviewed the appellant on March 15, 1973; that the appellant advised him that he and Diana Chandler were married in August, 1969; that they had had financial problems resulting in quarrels during which he may have slapped her; that he had moved out of the apartment about the third week of January, 1973; and that on the day of the murder he had worked from 1:30 p.m. to 10 p.m. at the International Harvester Company in Baltimore. The detective stated that he obtained verification from the employer that the appellant had, in fact, worked that day. According to the detective, appellant voluntarily submitted to fingerprinting for comparison purposes and also to a benzidine test to determine whether bloodstains were on his hands. The latter test proved negative. In the course of his testimony, he stated that he found the keys to the deceased's automobile in her purse but found no other keys in the apartment.

The State then called William Brooks who stated that he was a co-worker of Mrs. Chandler's; that he had a key to her apartment; and that he had dated her at times during her marriage to the appellant.

A brother of the deceased testified that the first time he saw appellant after his sister's murder was at the wake and funeral. About a week or two later he saw appellant driving his deceased sister's car and, when he asked him how he obtained the keys, the appellant stated that he had found them in a drawer by his wife's bed.

A sister of Mrs. Chandler testified that sometime in June or July, 1969, prior to the Chandlers' marriage, she 'looked out the window and George hit Dianna and picked her up and throwed her on the ground.' During the summer of 1970, according to the witness, appellant had on one occasion 'grabbed my sister and slammed her to the back of the wall' of an auditorium.

Belinda Jones testified that she had been a schoolmate of Mrs. Chandler and that once in January, 1971, Mrs. Chandler called her and asked if she could come over to her residence to stay a while because 'her husband had beaten her and knocked her on the bed and put the pillow over her head.'

Sandra K. Pusateri testified that she met appellant and his wife about a year and a half prior to the trial at the 'Adapt Center' and had seen him once knock her down a flight of stairs saying '* * * you are asking for it, one of these days I'm going to kill you.'

Testifying for the defense, Janice McCullough stated that on March 13 and 14, 1973, the appellant was living with her in her apartment and was there when she left for work at 8 a.m. on each of those days; that she customarily telephoned him every morning a 11 a.m. and he always answered the telephone; that she had called him on March 13 and 14 and he had answered the telephone in the apartment both days.

The appellant took the stand and related a brief history of his marriage to the deceased, referring to several separations that had occurred. He stated that he moved back to his wife's apartment in September, 1972, and they lived together until the latter part of January, 1973, when they again separated and he moved out. He stated that on March 13, 1973, he worked the 1:30 p.m. to 10 p.m. shift at the International Harvester Company and that the first time he knew about his wife's murder was when his brother, Daniel, telephoned and so advised him.

We cannot agree with appellant's first contention that the trial judge was in error 'when, over appellant's objection, he failed to exclude evidence of prior offenses, neither connected in point of time nor circumstance to the instant case.'

It is certainly true, as appellant contends, that evidence of prior offenses committed by an accused are ordinarily not admissible, the theory being 'that the jury may be misled into a conviction for an offense for which the defendant is not indicted, or that he may be prejudiced by the accumulation of offenses which he is not prepared to defend.' Gorski v. State, 1 Md.App. 200, 202, 228 A.2d 835, 836, quoting Wharton's Criminal Evidence (10th ed.). On the other hand, there are several well ingrained exceptions to this general rule. As stated in Avery v. State, 15 Md.App. 520, 532, 292 A.2d 728, 739, quoting Gordon v. State, 5 Md.App. 291, 306, 246 A.2d 623:

'* * * evidence of other crimes is admissible to prove the specific crime charged when such evidence tends to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, and (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. To like effect, see Jones v. State, 4 Md.App. 445, 243 A.2d 44; Thomas v. State, 3 Md.App. 708, 240 A.2d 646; Gilchrist v. State, 2 Md.App. 635, 236 A.2d 299; Loker v. State, 2 Md.App. 1, 233 A.2d 342; Gorski v. State, 1 Md.App. 200, 228 A.2d 835.'

In the trial below, the State was clearly endeavoring to demonstrate the appellant's prior course of conduct toward his wife by establishing his belligerent and antagonistic attitude toward her on earlier occasions as related by the witnesses for the purpose of shedding light upon his motive and intent. Because of the remoteness of time in the related episodes and the vague and generalized nature of the testimony, we think that the admission of this evident barely passed muster as being within the 'motive' exception to the rule. On the other hand, we cannot say that the trial judge was wrong in admitting such testimony and we are fortified in this conclusion by the fact that the trial judge carefully and lucidly instructed the jury with respect to this evidence. His instructions bear setting forth here:

'Now, there has been testimony in this case which I've allowed in evidence with respect to other offenses committed by this Defendant. The general rule is that the test with respect to other offenses, that the testimony with respect to other offenses is inadmissible. The theory on which evidence of other offenses is excluded is that the jury may be misled into a conviction for an offense for which the Defendant is not indicted, or that he may be prejudiced by the accumulation of offenses which he is not prepared to defend. And I...