Chandler v. State

Decision Date08 December 1988
Docket NumberNo. 69708,69708
Parties13 Fla. L. Weekly 713 Jim Eric CHANDLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Jeffrey H. Garland and Michael J. Kessler, Port St. Lucie, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Robert S. Jaegers, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Chandler appeals his sentences of death imposed on resentencing. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and affirm the sentences.

A jury convicted Chandler of, among other things, the first-degree murder of an elderly couple and recommended that he be sentenced to death, which the trial court did. On appeal this Court affirmed Chandler's convictions, but ordered him resentenced because the trial court improperly excused two prospective jurors. Chandler v. State, 442 So.2d 171 (Fla.1983). The newly impaneled jury unanimously recommended that Chandler be resentenced to death. The trial court agreed, finding that numerous aggravating factors had been established (committed by person under sentence of imprisonment; previous conviction of violent felony; committed during robbery or kidnapping; * committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest; committed for financial gain; heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and cold, calculated, and premeditated), but that no mitigating circumstances existed.

In sentencing proceedings subsection 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that "evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant" and that "[a]ny such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements." Chandler claims that the trial court improperly allowed the state to introduce hearsay statements into evidence pursuant to subsection 921.141(1). He also claims that the statute is unconstitutional, on its face and as applied in this case, because it denied his sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.

The sixth amendment's confrontation clause guarantees an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). There is nothing in subsection 921.141(1) which denies a defendant the right to confront the state's witnesses. Moreover, Chandler's counsel conducted a vigorous and extensive cross-examination of the witnesses presented by the state. We do not find subsection 921.141(1) unconstitutional on its face.

A resentencing is not a retrial of the defendant's guilt or innocence. King v. State, 514 So.2d 354 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241, 108 S.Ct. 2916, 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988). Because a jury cannot be expected to make a decision in a vacuum, it must be made aware of the underlying facts. Teffeteller v. State, 495 So.2d 744 (Fla.1986). Both the state and the defendant can present evidence at the penalty phase that might have been barred at trial because a "narrow interpretation of the rules of evidence is not to be enforced." State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1950, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974); Alvord v. State, 322 So.2d 533 (Fla.1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct. 3234, 49 L.Ed.2d 1226 (1976). To be admissible, however, evidence must be relevant, Muehleman v. State, 503 So.2d 310 (Fla.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 882, 108 S.Ct. 39, 98 L.Ed.2d 170 (1987); Teffeteller, and the admission of evidence is within the trial court's wide discretion. King; Muehleman; Teffeteller. Subsection 921.141(1) recognizes these principles and provides that evidence which "the court deems relevant" or which "the court deems to have probative value" may be presented. To protect against the unwarranted admission of evidence, the statute also directs that a defendant must be "accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements."

We do not find that the introduction of hearsay testimony rendered subsection 921.141(1) unconstitutional as applied in this case. As stated before, Chandler's counsel vigorously cross-examined the state's witnesses. That Chandler chose not to rebut any hearsay testimony does not make the admission of such testimony erroneous. The currently objected-to testimony came from a police detective and concerned statements made by a police chief, another detective, and a state expert. Those individuals had testified, consistent with what the detective stated they said, during the guilt phase. Chandler has not demonstrated an abuse of the trial court's discretion regarding hearsay testimony in allowing the recitation of this testimony by the detective.

Chandler also argues that the court erred by refusing to give his requested instruction regarding the voluntariness of statements he made to the police. Chandler's original jury had the duty to determine the voluntariness of his statements during the guilt/innocence phase of his trial. Jury instructions must relate to issues concerning evidence received at trial. Butler v. State, 493 So.2d 451 (Fla.1986). Because the voluntariness question had been decided previously, it was not at issue in the new penalty proceeding. The trial court, therefore, did not err by refusing to give the requested instruction.

The victims suffered blunt trauma wounds to their heads. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked the medical examiner if the wounds were consistent with being struck from behind. On redirect examination the state asked if the wounds were consistent with the victims being on their knees and their being struck on the top of their heads. Defense counsel objected to that hypothetical situation. In response to that objection the prosecutor stated: "Your honor, Mr. Udell [Chandler's attorney] asked him [the medical examiner] if this was, you know, consistent from behind, you know, what evidence is there that he hit from behind, I mean, no one knows at this point except for Mr. Chandler." Chandler, himself, then objected to the last part of the prosecutor's statement as a comment on Chandler's right to remain silent. Defense counsel continued that objection and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the objection and motion and, in an abundance of caution, told the jury to disregard the statement that only the defendant would know. Chandler now claims the comment to be reversible error.

Chandler's original jury convicted him of these murders, and the resentencing jury had to accept those convictions as facts. The state, therefore, may have been correct in arguing to the trial court that the statement was a fair comment on the evidence. At most it was only an inferential comment on Chandler's silence, but, assuming for the sake of his argument that the state commented on Chandler's right to remain silent, we find any such error harmless. Given the fact that Chandler had been convicted of these murders and, therefore, would know how they were committed, we are convinced...

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