Chandler v. Suntag

Decision Date28 June 2011
Docket NumberFile No. 1:11-cv-02-jgm
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Vermont
PartiesCharles Chandler, Plaintiff, v. Hon. David Suntag, Glen Yates, Andrew C. Boxer, Concord Group Insurance Co., Richard M. Kemp, Sharon H. Bjornberg, Campbell and Boyd Insurance Services, and Dennis D. Boyd, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER

(Docs. 6, 11, 14, 15, 31, 35, 41)

Plaintiff Charles Chandler, proceeding pro se, claims his insurer has failed to provide coverage for an accident that occurred on his property. Chandler also claims that in the course of the coverage dispute, Defendants have conspired against him and have denied him various constitutional rights. Defendants include state court Judge David Suntag, the Concord Insurance Group, insurance agents and attorneys.

Defendants have each moved to dismiss the Complaint, and in some instances have moved in the alternative for summary judgment. Citing Chandler's significant litigation history, Defendants have also asked the Court to enjoin him from initiating future vexatious litigation. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED, andChandler is ENJOINED from filing any further actions without receiving leave of the Court.

Factual Background

Chandler alleges that beginning in 2006, he held an insurance policy issued by Defendant Concord Insurance Group. The policy was to cover liabilities incurred in relation to his business, Chandler Electric Company. In May 2009, Faye Ainsworth allegedly fell at the Chandler Electric Company premises and suffered various injuries. Ainsworth has sued Chandler, and is seeking substantial damages. Chandler has admitted liability.

A coverage dispute has arisen between Chandler and his insurer. The matter is currently being litigated in the state courts. Chandler now alleges that prior to and in the course of the litigation, Defendants engaged a series of wrongful acts, including breach of the insurance contract and unfair and deceptive business practices. As to his federal law claims, Chandler alleges that Defendants have violated his constitutional rights and conspired against him in violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.

Specifically, Chandler claims that Defendant Andrew Boxer, relying on "his close relationship with [state court Judge] David Suntag," threatened to file a "False Complaint" if Chandler did not withdraw his claim against Attorney Boxer's client, ConcordInsurance Group. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 6.)1 Chandler also alleges that Attorney Boxer filed false statements about him in a separate state court action. Id. at ¶ 7.

With respect to Judge Suntag, Chandler claims that "Defendant Suntag illegally uses his position to protect his Attorney friends regardless of their unethical behavior." Id. at ¶ 9. As an example, he claims that Judge Suntag allowed Defendants Boxer and Yates to serve subpoenas without providing witness fees. Chandler also claims that Judge Suntag forced Ms. Ainsworth to attend a deposition shortly after she had undergone a spinal injection, and permitted Defendants Boxer and Yates "to perform [a] Medical examination of [Ms. Ainsworth], against her will, and despite neither Defendant is a medical Doctor or has any medical training to perform said diagnosis." Id.

Chandler further alleges that Judge Suntag allowed a "[f]riend" to withdraw a complaint that contained falsehoods, and allowed another "friend" to assault Chandler in the courthouse. Id. at ¶ 11. "Defendant Suntag later rewarded his friend and split monies that said Defendant illegally received in that matter." Id. Chandler asserts that the Vermont state courtsgenerally are "gross[ly] dishonest[]," and that he is unable to secure a fair trial in the state court system. Id. at ¶ 13.

The Complaint sets forth twenty-three "claim[s] for relief." The first fifteen claims assert primarily state law causes of action, including breach of contract, unfair claims practices, and unlawful "seizure of [Chandler's] image." Chandler also makes non-specific references to violations of "Federal law."

Chandler's sixteenth claim alleges that Judge Suntag violated his First Amendment right petition to the government for relief.2 Count Seventeen seeks damages under federal law for "seiz[ure] of Plaintiff's image." Id. at ¶ 44. In his eighteenth claim, Chandler asserts Defendants generally denied him his First Amendment right to petition the government when they "would not allow the Plaintiff the right to resolve a Complaint against him and his interstate Company," presumably referring to the liability claim submitted by Ms. Ainsworth. Id. at ¶ 45.

Count Nineteen alleges that by posing as doctors and asking for allegedly private and protected information in the course of litigation, Defendants violated Chandler's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at ¶ 46.Count Twenty alleges that by collecting insurance premiums, his insurer deprived him of his property without due process of law.

Chandler's twenty-first claim is that Judge Suntag "and his associate Defendants" prevented him from filing a complaint, thereby denying him equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at ¶ 48. Count Twenty-Two asserts a similar claim under the RICO statute. Finally, in Count Twenty-Three, Chandler appears to assert a general civil rights claim against Judge Suntag for ignoring complaints and allowing the other Defendants to perform improper medical examinations.

Defendants have moved to dismiss Chandler's claims, and in some instances have asked in the alternative for summary judgment. Chandler too has moved for summary judgment. As noted above, some Defendants have also asked the Court to enjoin Chandler from filing any further vexatious lawsuits, citing his significant history of pro se filings in the state and federal courts.

Discussion

The Court will first address Defendants' motions to dismiss, and specifically, the viability of Chandler's federal law claims. The Court undertakes this analysis pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

A Rule 12(b)(6) analysis tests the legal, rather than the factual, sufficiency of Chandler's complaint. See, e.g.,Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 2000) ("At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, '[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail ultimately, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'") (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, the Court must accept the factual allegations in the Complaint as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 84, 91 (2007), and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. Bolt Elec., Inc. v. City of New York, 53 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1995).

The Supreme Court has held that the standard governing a complaint's legal sufficiency is one of "plausibility." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-60 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard does not require a probability of liability, but "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. Pleadings drafted by a pro se party must be liberallyconstrued. Fernandez v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 2006).

I. Judge Suntag

Judge Suntag moves to dismiss on the basis of absolute judicial immunity. Judges are entitled to absolute immunity for actions relating to the exercise of their judicial functions. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judicial immunity exists because of the public interest in having judges who are "'at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.'" Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 74 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). Judicial immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously or corruptly. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.12 (1976) (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-54). Indeed, absolute immunity applies "'however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.'" Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985)).

Here, Chandler claims Judge Suntag impeded his right to file complaints, allowed unlawful subpoenas and medical examinations, and permitted Defendants to "report falsehoods to the State of Vermont." (Doc. 1 at ¶ 50.) He also alleges Judge Suntag improperly ordered Ms. Ainsworth to attend a deposition. Each ofthese alleged activities - considering complaints, facilitating subpoenas, and permitting certain forms of discovery - involve fundamental judicial functions, and are protected from liability by absolute judicial immunity. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Even Chandler's allegations of inappropriate ex parte communications and financial agreements are protected. See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980); Manosh v. Hurd, 2010 WL 1235607, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. March 9, 2010); Kane v. Yung Won Han, 550 F. Supp. 120, 121-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). All claims against Judge Suntag are therefore DISMISSED.

II. Constitutional Claims

The Court next considers whether Chandler has set forth viable federal constitutional claims. As discussed above, Chandler alleges the Defendants deprived him of his rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also sets forth a series of statutory claims. The Court will first address his civil rights claims.

To state a constitutional civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as Chandler is trying to do here, a plaintiff must allege conduct by a person acting under color of state law, i.e. state action. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). "The Supreme...

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