Chandler v. The Superior Court

• Decision Date: 10 March 2022
• Docket Number: A163833
• Parties: TIMOTHY ANDREW CHANDLER, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NAPA COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

TIMOTHY ANDREW CHANDLER, Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NAPA COUNTY, Respondent;

THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

A163833

California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division

March 10, 2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

(Napa County Super. Ct. No. 20CR002929)

Margulies, J.

Timothy Andrew Chandler was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence. Effective January 1, 2021, the Legislature enacted a new law, Penal Code^[1] section 1001.95, making defendants charged with misdemeanors generally eligible for diversion at the discretion of the trial judge. The law expressly exempts several offenses from eligibility for diversion, but driving under the influence is not one of them. An older law, however, Vehicle Code section 23640, provides that those charged with driving under the influence (DUI) are categorically ineligible for diversion.

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Chandler filed a petition for misdemeanor diversion under section 1001.95, arguing that section 1001.95 superseded Vehicle Code section 23640 with respect to misdemeanor DUIs. After his petition was denied in the trial court, Chandler filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court, asking us to direct the trial court to vacate its order denying his petition for diversion and grant it instead. When he filed his petition, no Court of Appeal had decided the issue presented and there was a split of authority between two published superior court appellate division opinions as to the availability of diversion in cases of misdemeanor DUI. After the matter was fully briefed, Division Three of the Fourth Appellate District issued its opinion in Grassi v. Superior Court (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 283 (Grassi), concluding that section 1001.95 and Vehicle Code section 23640 can be harmonized, and that misdemeanor diversion is unavailable to defendants charged with DUI. Although we, like the Grassi court, believe it is a difficult and close question, we similarly hold the two statutes can be reconciled and that misdemeanor convictions for DUI are not eligible for statutory diversion. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 28, 2020, the Napa County District Attorney charged Chandler with two misdemeanor violations of Vehicle Code section 23152. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (a) & (b); counts one & two, respectively.)

Chandler filed a motion for court-initiated misdemeanor diversion under section 1001.95. At the hearing on Chandler's motion, the trial court heard argument from both sides, then denied the motion.

Chandler filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court appellate division. After he filed his memorandum of points and authorities and the district attorney filed an informal opposition, the appellate division

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filed an order observing that Assembly Bill No. 282 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which would exempt DUIs from section 1001.95, had been approved by the Assembly and was pending in the Senate. The court asked the parties to brief whether the court should stay the matter pending resolution of the legislation. Both parties filed supplemental briefs, and Chandler filed an additional supplemental brief regarding the effect of two superior court appellate division cases, People v. Superior Court (Espeso) (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1 (Espeso) and People v. Superior Court (Diaz-Armstrong) (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th Supp. 10 (Diaz-Armstrong), which reached differing conclusions about whether misdemeanor DUIs are eligible for diversion under section 1001.95.

On October 25, 2021, the superior court appellate division denied Chandler's writ petition, adopting and incorporating by reference the analysis and result reached in the Espeso opinion, which determined section 1001.95 does not allow diversion for misdemeanor DUI offenses.

Chandler subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate and prohibition in this court.^[2]

II. DISCUSSION

Chandler contends section 1001.95 and Vehicle Code section 23640 conflict because section 1001.95 allows for misdemeanor diversion except for offenses specifically exempted under the statute, while Vehicle Code section 23640 prohibits diversion for DUIs. He asserts "[b]oth statutes are unambiguous in their language," but that the legislative history of section 1001.95 reveals the Legislature's "obvious" intent to make

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misdemeanor DUI offenses eligible for diversion. As we discuss below, we find the Legislature's intent with respect to the potential conflict between these statutes anything but obvious. After a careful examination of the statutory language, the legislative history, the canons of statutory construction, and related case law, we conclude diversion is not available to Chandler under the legislation as currently enacted.^[3]

A. Legal Standards

Whether defendants charged with misdemeanor DUI are eligible for diversion raises a question of statutory interpretation for our independent review. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141; People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1166.)" '" 'As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute's words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.'"' [Citation.] '[W]e consider the language of the entire scheme and related statutes, harmonizing the terms when possible.'" (Gonzalez, at p. 1141; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357 [" '[t]he words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible' "].) If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for

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judicial construction and our task is at an end. If the language is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning, however, we may examine extrinsic aids such as the apparent purpose of the statute, the legislative history, the canons of statutory construction, and public policy. (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 838 (Even Zohar); People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177.)

B. Statutory Language

Generally, the most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the words of the statute. (Even Zohar, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 837-838.) Accordingly, we turn first to the plain language of the statutes at issue.

Section 1001.95 provides, in relevant part: "A judge in the superior court in which a misdemeanor is being prosecuted may, at the judge's discretion, and over the objection of a prosecuting attorney, offer diversion to a defendant pursuant to these provisions." (§ 1001.95, subd. (a).) Subdivision (e) further provides that "A defendant may not be offered diversion pursuant to this section for any of the following current charged offenses," and includes any offense for which a person, if convicted, would have to register under section 290 (sex offender registration); violation of section 273.5 (inflicting corporal injury on domestic violence victim); violation of section 243, subdivision (e) (battery on a domestic violence victim); and violation of section 646.9 (stalking). (§ 1001.95, subd. (e).) Under the plain words of the statute, judges have discretion to offer diversion for misdemeanor offenses over the objection of a prosecuting attorney unless the offense is one of the specifically excluded categories listed in subdivision (e).

Vehicle Code section 23640, subdivision (a) provides: "In any case in which a person is charged with a violation of [Vehicle Code] Section 23152 or 23153, prior to acquittal or conviction, the court shall neither suspend nor

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stay the proceedings for the purpose of allowing the accused person to attend or participate, nor shall the court consider dismissal of or entertain a motion to dismiss the proceedings because the accused person attends or participates during that suspension, in any one or more education, training, or treatment programs . . . ." As our courts have concluded, the clear import of this language is that diversion is categorically unavailable to DUI defendants. (Grassi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 291; Tellez v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 439, 443 (Tellez).)

Read separately, the statutes appear to conflict. On the one hand, defendants like Chandler who have been charged with a misdemeanor DUI appear to qualify for judicial diversion under section 1001.95 because DUIs are not expressly excluded from the statute. On the other hand, it appears Chandler does not qualify for diversion under Vehicle Code section 23640 because that statute prohibits diversion for all DUIs.

C. Harmonization

Our Supreme Court has instructed that where statutes possibly conflict, "two principles of statutory construction are especially relevant. First,' "[a] court must, where reasonably possible, harmonize statutes, reconcile seeming inconsistencies in them, and construe them to give force and effect to all of their provisions." '" (Even Zohar, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 838.)" 'Thus, when" 'two codes are to be construed, they "must be regarded as blending into each other and forming a single statute." [Citation.] Accordingly, they "must be read together and so construed as to give effect, when possible, to all the provisions thereof." '" '" (State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 955 (State Dept. of Public Health); Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 634 (Lopez).)

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"Second, all '"' "presumptions are against a repeal by implication" '"' [citation], including partial repeals that occur when one statute implicitly limits another statute's scope of operation [citation]. Thus, '" 'we will find an implied repeal "only when there is no rational basis for harmonizing . . . two potentially conflicting statutes [citation], and the...