Chandler v. W.E. Welch & Associates, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 February 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 06-794 (PLF).
• Citation: 533 F.Supp.2d 94
• Parties: Johnny Ray CHANDLER, Sr., Plaintiff, v. W.E. WELCH & ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

533 F.Supp.2d 94

Johnny Ray CHANDLER, Sr., Plaintiff, v. W.E. WELCH & ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 06-794 (PLF).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

February 5, 2008.

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Johnny Ray Chandler, Sr., Petersburg, VA, Pro se.

Stanley James Reed, William A. Goldberg, Lerch, Early & Brewer, Bethesda, MD, for Defendants.

OPINION

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¹ Upon consideration of the motion the opposition, and the entire record in this case, the Court will enter judgment in favor of defendants with respect to plaintiffs breach of employment contract claims. The Court will dismiss plaintiffs constitutional claims, Section 1983 claims, and employment discrimination claims.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Johnny Ray Chandler, Sr. brings a variety of claims against his former employer, W.E. Welch & Associates, Inc. ("Welch"), and Welch employees Jeff Mahoney and Kim Gipe. Plaintiff contends that defendants unlawfully discriminated against him, deprived him of his constitutional rights, and violated duties imposed upon them by Welch's employment policies when they terminated his employment. Plaintiff seeks relief under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 ("Title VII"), Maryland's antidiscrimination law, and Welch's official employment policies as set forth in W.E. WELCH & ASSOCIATES, INC. MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK (October 2005) ("Employee Handbook").

II. BACKGROUND

A Facts

Plaintiff, a sheet metal worker, began working for defendant Welch in or about October 2005. See Defs.' Mot. at 2; Compl. at 2. He was terminated from his position by defendant Jeff Mahoney, his supervisor, on March 6, 2006. See Defs.' Mot. at 2; Compl. at 2.

Plaintiff subsequently telephoned defendant Gipe, who works in Welch's human resources department, to verify his discharge. See Compl. at 2. Ms. Gipe verified plaintiff's discharge and explained that he had been discharged "because Mr. Mahoney had written [plaintiff] up." Compl. at 3. Plaintiff protested that he had never been informed of any of these "write up[s]." Id. On March 7, 2006, plaintiff sent a letter to Welch's human resources department in which he argued that his discharge amounted to "un-fair [sic] employment termination" in "violation of the W.E. Welch Employee Handbook." First Mot. to Amend, Ex. A at 1 ("March 7, 2006 Letter"). Plaintiff maintained that his discharge was unfair because company policy requires supervisors to issue written warnings before firing employees, and plaintiff had received no warnings. The March 7, 2006 Letter asked for reinstatement, reassignment to another job site, and compensation. See Mar. 7, 2006 Letter at 2-3.

On March 17, 2006, plaintiff received his final paycheck from Welch in the mail. See Compl. at 2. Included with that paycheck were photocopies of four employee disciplinary reports related to plaintiff. See id. Each report documented a specific violation of company policy by plaintiff, and each report was signed by defendant Mahoney. See id., Exs. A-D ("Employee Disciplinary Reports").² Although the Employee Disciplinary Reports include a space for the employee to sign, plaintiffs signature did not appear on any of the reports. See id. After receiving the reports, it appears that plaintiff wrote another letter to defendant's human resources department. See Compl., Ex. E ("March 17, 2006 Letter"). Plaintiffs second letter reiterated his earlier argument that defendant Mahoney's failure to properly issue written warnings violated company policy. See Mar. 17, 2006 Letter at 2. Plaintiff further argued that his discharge violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because another sheet metal worker had received a written warning for poor performance. See id. He demanded reinstatement and compensation, and he asked Welch to reprimand defendant Mahoney and remove Mr. Mahoney from his supervisory position. See id. He then filed the instant lawsuit.

B. Procedural. History

Plaintiff filed his complaint against Welch and defendant Mahoney in the Superior Court of the District of. Columbia on March 29, 2006. See Compl. at 1. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that defendants Welch and Mahoney discharged plaintiff in a planner that "constituted "Bias Discrimination," deprived plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and violated Welch's employment polices. See id. at 1, 4-6. On April 5, 2006, plaintiff filed a motion seeking to add as a defendant Kim Gipe, another Welch employee. See First Mot. to Amend.

On May 1, 2006, defendants filed a notice of removal and removed the case to this Court. See Notice of Removal at 2-3 (invoking Court's diversity jurisdiction).³ On January 5, 2007, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff filed his opposition on April 4, 2007. On that same day, plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint, seeking to add a Fifth Amendment claim for violation of his due process rights. See Second Mot. to Amend at 2. Defendants opposed this motion on April 11, 2007, arguing that it was futile. See Second Mot to Amend. Opp. at 1.

On May 1, 2007, this Court issued an Order observing that certain parts of defendants' motion to dismiss — specifically, those parts addressing plaintiffs claims under Welch's Employee Handbook — relied upon evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint. The Court therefore (1) converted defendants' motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment with respect to those portions of the motion and (2) gave the parties an opportunity to supplement the pleadings accordingly. See Chandler v. WE. Welch & Assoc., Inc., et al, Civil Action. No. 06-794, Order at 1-2 (D.D.C. May 1, 2007) ("Conversion Order") (citing Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C.Cir.2003) (trial court abuses its discretion when it "MN to comply with the procedures set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" by considering materials outside of the pleadings "without converting the proceeding to a Rule 56 proceeding and permitting [the nonmoving party] to either conduct discovery or come forward with additional evidence")). Defendants 'did not submit any further materials in response to that Order. Plaintiff submitted several documents. See Mot. to Produce at 3-5 (submitting evidence' of the "mandatory language" used by Welch's Employee Handbook); Pl.'s Supp. Resp. at 4-5 (arguing that plaintiffs complaint states claims under the Constitution, "Standard Company Policy," and Section 1983); and Third Mot. to Amend at 2 (seeking leave to amend plaintiffs complaint to include "procedural due process" claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).

III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

A. Construing Plaintiffs Claims

Two of plaintiffs claims require some clarification. First, plaintiff claims that Welch engaged in "Bias Discrimination" because one of plaintiff's co-workers was provided with written and verbal notice of poor performance, while plaintiff was provided with no notice before he was discharged. Compl. at 1; see also id. at 3-4. Plaintiff has not contradicted defendants' interpretation of this claim, as a claim for employment discrimination based on Title VII and, perhaps, Maryland's anti-discrimination laws. See Defs.' Mot. at 6-7. Thus, the Court will address plaintiff's claim of "Bias Discrimination" as a claim of employment discrimination under applicable law.

Second, plaintiff claims that Welch is liable for, alleged violations of its own employment policies. See, e.g., Compl. at 4-6. Defendant argues that this claim should be viewed as a breach of employment contract claim See Defs.' Mot. at 4-6. Plaintiff insists that he is not asserting a breach of employment contract claim, but rather a claim for "negligence." See Pl.'s Opp. at 2. In other words, plaintiff seems to argue that the defendants are liable in tort for their failure to follow company policy as described above. Notwithstanding plaintiff s protestations to the contrary, plaintiffs papers suggest that he is seeking relief under a contract theory, because he repeatedly argues that defendants are liable for violating the terms of the Employee Handbook. See, e.g., Compl. at 1; Mar. 7, 2006 Letter at 3; Pl.'s Supp. Resp. at 4. Moreover, as plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that defendants' failure to observe the niceties of Welch's written warning and exit interview policies constitutes tortious conduct — and the Court is unaware of any such authority — the Court concludes that defendants' contract theory of plaintiffs claim is more plausible than (what appears to be) plaintiff's tort theory.⁴ The Court will therefore address plaintiffs claim as a claim for breach of employment contract.

B. Plaintiffs Miscellaneous Motions

Currently pending before the Court are several miscellaneous motions filed by plaintiff. See Second Mot. to Amend (seeking leave to add a Fifth Amendment due process claim); Mot for Extension (seeking additional time to respond to the Court's May 1, 2007 Conversion Order); Mot. to Produce (seeking leave to submit evidence of the "mandatory language" of Welch's Employee Handbook in response to the Conversion Order); and Third Mot. to Amend (seeking leave to add a "procedural due process" claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). Defendant has opposed plaintiff a Second Motion to Amend.

The Court will grant plaintiffs Motion to Produce and consider the evidence submitted in that motion.⁵ The Court will deny both motions to amend because they would be futile. See...