Chanell Holiday v. Atl. Richfield Co.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
• Writing for the Court: JOSHUA P. KOLAR, MAGISTRATE JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
• Decision Date: 23 September 2022
• Docket Number: 2:16-CV-525-JVB-JPK
• Citation: Chanell Holiday v. Atl. Richfield Co., 2:16-CV-525-JVB-JPK (N.D. Ind. Sep 23, 2022)
• Parties: CHANELL HOLIDAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

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CHANELL HOLIDAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:16-CV-525-JVB-JPK

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division

September 23, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, MAGISTRATE JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File First Amended Class Action Complaint with Individual Claims [DE 226]. On August 23, 2021, presiding District Judge Joseph S. Van Bokkelen granted Defendants' dispositive motions and dismissed the complaint in its entirety, but permitted Plaintiffs to file a motion to amend the complaint. Oral argument was heard on April 28, 2022. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to amend is granted for relief different than requested, and Plaintiffs will be permitted to pursue some of their proposed claims.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The proposed amended complaint names six defendants: E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Company (“DuPont”); the Chemours Company (“Chemours”); Hammond Group, Inc. Hammond Lead Products, LLC; Halstab, LLC; and Halox, LLC (collectively, the “Hammond Defendants”). The general allegations are similar to those in the prior complaint. Defendants allegedly owned or purchased lead refineries and other manufacturing facilities in East Chicago, Indiana. The 251 plaintiffs were all residents of the nearby West Calumet Housing Complex (the “Complex”) or students at the nearby Carrie Gosch Elementary School. Plaintiffs allege that, at various times between 1910 and 1985, the companies introduced contaminants (including lead, arsenic, and other substances) into the air soil, and/or groundwater. This caused Plaintiffs to suffer an increased risk of a variety of illnesses, as well as severe emotional distress. Some have already developed illnesses allegedly caused by the contaminants.

Defendants failed to warn Plaintiffs about the contamination. Plaintiffs were unaware of the contamination and had no reason to know about it until July 25, 2016, when East Chicago Mayor Anthony Copeland sent a letter to the Complex's residents, informing them that the ground within the Complex was highly contaminated with lead and arsenic.

In their prior complaint [DE 4], Plaintiffs brought claims of strict liability, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In dismissing that complaint, Judge Van Bokkelen determined as follows:

• Based on Plaintiffs' allegations, they did not learn about the danger posed by the contamination until July 25, 2016, and therefore the lawsuit would not be dismissed for failure to file within the applicable limitations period;

• With regard to the negligence claims, a property owner who processes hazardous materials on its land owes a duty not to contaminate neighboring property;

• Although Plaintiffs had alleged they were exposed to contaminants, they had not sufficiently alleged injury, as was required to sustain negligence and strict liability claims;

• Plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that Defendants acted with the intent to harm Plaintiffs emotionally, as required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

[DE 220]. Judge Van Bokkelen permitted Plaintiffs to file this motion to amend the complaint.

Plaintiffs now seek to bring class action allegations. They propose a “medical monitoring class” of plaintiffs who resided at the Complex or attended the Carrie Gosch Elementary School, and a “bodily injury class” of plaintiffs with current illnesses caused by the contaminants. They also bring individual claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a separate cause of action for medical monitoring. [DE 220-1].

II. ANALYSIS

When a party seeks leave to amend a complaint, the “court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit encourages granting one chance to amend after the dismissal of a complaint, to ensure that cases are resolved on the merits rather than technicalities of pleading: “[I]t is unlikely that the court will be able to determine conclusively on the face of a defective pleading whether plaintiff actually can state a claim.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (2d ed. 1990)).

Leave to amend may be denied “where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice . . . or futility of the amendment.” Villa v. City of Chicago, 924 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 1991). “Futile repleadings include restating the same facts using different language, reasserting claims previously determined, and the inability to survive a motion to dismiss.” Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 114 F.Supp.3d 606, 610 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Garcia v. City of Chicago, Ill., 24 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1994)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d 674, 685 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court must therefore consider whether the facts alleged are sufficient to state a claim under Indiana law. “Where state law provides the rule of decision, the federal courts must predict how the highest court of the state would decide the case if presented with the case today.” Klunk v. Cnty. of St. Joseph, 170 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 1999). Decisions of the Indiana Court of Appeals provide a “strong indication of how [the Indiana] Supreme Court would decide a similar question, unless there is a persuasive reason to believe otherwise.” Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gonzales, 86 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1996).

Nonetheless, “a court should deny leave to amend only if it is certain that amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.” Zimmerman v. Bornick, 25 F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2022). In summary, the Court will attempt to discern whether any or all of Plaintiffs' claims would survive a motion to dismiss. But unless the Court is “certain” of dismissal, the proposed amendment will not be denied as futile. See also Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Mun. Airport Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Unless it is certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile . . . [the] court should grant leave to amend after granting a motion to dismiss.”).

A. Prejudice/Undue Delay/Bad Faith

Several defendants object to the proposed amendment on the grounds of prejudice or undue delay. Although the passage of time can support denial of a motion to amend, “[d]elay must be coupled with some other reason. Typically [that is] . . . prejudice to the non-moving party.” Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 2004)). Courts consider factors such as the number of previous amendments, the reason for the delay, how long the plaintiff knew about any newly pled facts, and the procedural posture of the case. Bennett v. Crane, No. 1:16-CV-00423-TLS-SLC, 2019 WL 1785533, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 24, 2019).

Turning first to the timeline: This case has been pending since November 2016, but the Court does not believe Plaintiffs are intentionally delaying the litigation. Since the case was filed in state court, there has been a removal [DE 1], a contested motion to remand [DE 39], and an agreed stay of roughly eight months while a related case was heard on appeal [DE 134, 144], followed by the previous round of dispositive motions, which were resolved in August 2021 [DE 220]. The Court granted Plaintiffs until October 15, 2021, to seek leave to amend the complaint, and this motion was timely filed. This would be their first amendment to the complaint.

Some defendants argue that the facts of the case have not changed, so Plaintiffs should have pled any “new” details in their previous complaint, or when the motions to dismiss apprised them of the inadequacies. While that would have sped things up, “a formal motion for leave to amend was not necessary at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, and [Plaintiffs were] entitled to wait and see if any pleading problems the court might find could be corrected.” Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 562 (7th Cir. 2010). Consistent with Seventh Circuit precedent favoring the resolution of cases on the merits, Judge Van Bokkelen explicitly directed that Plaintiffs should be allowed to ask for another chance to amend the complaint. Having reviewed the record, the Court does not believe that Plaintiffs were sandbagging^[1], or that the proposed amendment reflects a lack of diligence warranting denial of the motion to amend. Cf. McCoy, 760 F.3d at 687 (denying leave to amend where “the unexplained delay looks more like procedural gamesmanship than legitimate ignorance or oversight”).

B. Class Action Allegations

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' class action allegations cannot satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and should be denied as futile. Attempts to evaluate class allegations at the pleading stage are “generally regarded as premature because the shape and form of the class is to be given time to evolve through discovery.” DuRocher v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 1:13-CV-01570-SEB, 2015 WL 1505675, at *4 n. 2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2015) (listing numerous cases stating that such analysis is premature at the motion to dismiss stage); see also Martin v. City of Fort Wayne, No. 1:15-CV-384-TLS, 2016 WL...