Chaney v. Fayette Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist. & Curtis R. Cearley

• Decision Date: 30 September 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:13–cv–89–TCB.
• Citation: 977 F.Supp.2d 1308
• Parties: Chelsea CHANEY, Plaintiff, v. FAYETTE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT and Curtis R. Cearley, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

977 F.Supp.2d 1308

Chelsea CHANEY, Plaintiff,

v.FAYETTE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT and Curtis R. Cearley, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:13–cv–89–TCB.

United States District Court,

N.D. Georgia,

Newnan Division.

Sept. 30, 2013.

Jamie Ponder Woodard, Paul Frederick Wellborn, III, Wellborn, Wallace & Woodard, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Hieu Minh Nguyen, Phillip L. Hartley, Harben, Hartley & Hawkins, LLP, Gainesville, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

TIMOTHY C. BATTEN, SR., District Judge.

This case comes before the Court on Defendant Fayette County Public School District's renewed motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim [11].

I. Background

On October 25, 2011, Fayette County Public School District (the “District”) hosted a county-wide “Community Awareness Seminar” at Starr's Mill High School, located in Fayette County, Georgia. At the time, Plaintiff Chelsea Chaney was a seventeen-year-old student at Starr's Mill. The seminar discussed a number of topics, including Internet safety and the permanency of postings to social media websites. Defendant Curtis Cearley, director of technology services for the District, created and presented at the seminar a PowerPoint presentation entitled “Internet Safety.”

The presentation was designed to illustrate the permanent nature of social media postings and how those postings could be embarrassing if published by third parties. Part of the presentation included a slide of a cartoon depicting a daughter approaching her mother about the mother's Facebook page from years past, which listed the mother's hobbies as “body art, bad boys, and jello shooters.” Chaney alleges that the obvious implication of this cartoon was the mother was humiliated by this Facebook posting, which according to Chaney labeled her as a “sexually-promiscuous, anti-establishment[ ] abuser of alcohol.”

The slide that immediately followed the cartoon was entitled “Once It's There—It's There to Stay” and featured a picture of Chaney in a bikini standing next to a life-size cutout of singer Calvin “Snoop Lion” Broadus (also known as “Snoop Dogg”). Cearley found this photo by browsing students' Facebook pages for pictures to use in his presentation. The picture was originally taken when Chaney accompanied a friend on her family's vacation, which Chaney contends did not involve sex or alcohol. The slide included Chaney's full name.

Chaney alleges that when the slide featuring her picture is considered in conjunction with the previous slide of the embarrassed-mother cartoon, the implication is that Chaney is also or would also be branded as a sexually-promiscuous abuser of alcohol who should be more careful about her Internet postings. Paper copies of the presentation, including the slide featuring Chaney's picture and name, were distributed to those attending the seminar.

At all times relevant to this case, the District had in place the “District Technology Services Policy—Staff Use of Internet and E–Mail” (“DTSP”). The DTSP included provisions that prohibited District employees from using any electronic communication “in a way that could cause offense to others or harass or harm them ... or [could] in any other way be inappropriatefor the school environment.” The DTSP also prohibited District employees from breaching “principles of confidentiality and privacy” arising from or relating to “accessing ... or disclosing information about students[.]”

The District also had guidelines for the use of social media which, according to the complaint, required employees to obtain approval from their supervisors if the employee was “participating” on a social media site for school or District-related business. Specifically, the guidelines required a District employee to notify a student's parents beforehand of his intended use of and interaction with a student's social media page.

Chaney permitted access to her Facebook page using a semi-private setting that allowed her Facebook “friends” and “friends of friends” to view her page, including her pictures. Because Chaney was a minor, this was the most inclusive privacy setting she could choose. Neither Chaney nor her parents were notified of or consented to Cearley's intended use of and interaction with Chaney's Facebook page prior to Cearley's presentation.

Chaney alleges that Cearley had “final policymaking authority” for the District in relation to certain Internet and technology-related issues, including the planning and execution of the presentation. Chaney additionally alleges that Cearley's acquisition and use of her picture were pre-approved by Deputy Superintendent Samuel F. Sweat, and that Starr's Mill assistant principal, John W. Bouchell, Jr., was also aware of Cearley's acquisition and intended use of Chaney's picture prior to the presentation.

On April 29, 2013, Chaney filed this action in the Superior Court of Fayette County, averring that Defendants violated her constitutional right to privacy under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as several rights afforded her by state law. Chaney sued the District and Cearley in his official and individual capacities.

On May 24, Defendants timely removed the action to this Court. That same day, the District filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on behalf of itself and Cearley in his official capacity. On June 10, Chaney filed an amended complaint prompting this Court to issue an order denying the motion to dismiss as moot on June 12.

On June 24, the District filed a renewed Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on behalf of itself and Cearley in his official capacity. On July 11, Chaney filed her brief in opposition to the motion. Because Cearley has not moved to dismiss the claims against him in his individual capacity, this Order addresses only the claims against the District and Cearley in his official capacity. Also, because this Order does not resolve all issues in this case, the Court intentionally avoids, where possible, commenting on the appropriateness of Cearley's actions.

II. DiscussionA. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Supreme Court has explained this standard as follows:

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citation omitted). Thus, a claim will survive a motion to dismiss only if the factual allegations in the complaint are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

In considering a defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir.2011). But the court need not accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions, nor must it accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, evaluation of a motion to dismiss requires two steps: (1) eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions, and (2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, “assume their veracity and ... determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

B. Chaney's Federal–Law Claims

Even when construing the facts most favorably towards Chaney, her claims that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights to be free from illegal search and seizure and her Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy fail.¹ The Court notes that Chaney's amended complaint and brief in opposition to Defendants' motion blend case law addressing the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. However, the claims are distinct, and the Court has attempted to address her arguments under each separate amendment.

1. Legal Standard

Local governing bodies and local officials sued in their official capacity can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief when the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional “implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 659, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Local governments and local officials in their official capacity may also be sued for constitutional deprivations pursuant to governmental custom even when that custom has not been formally approved. Id.

Alternatively, a local government cannot be held liable under § 1983 “unless action pursuant to official policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Specifically, a local government cannot be held liable on a respondeat-superior theory for the tortious acts of its employees. Id. In Monell, the Supreme Court explained, “the fact that Congress did specifically provide that A's [local government employee's] tort became B's [local government's] liability if B ‘caused’ A to subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent.” Id. at 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018.

A plaintiff must prove two elements to prevail on a § 1983 claim. First, a plaintiff must show a deprivation of constitutionalor federal statutory rights. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct....