Chaney v. Lewis
| Decision Date | 28 November 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-2664,85-2664 |
| Citation | 801 F.2d 1191 |
| Parties | Anthony Lee CHANEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Samuel LEWIS, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections; and Lloyd E. Bramlett, Superintendent, Arizona State Prison, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Michael V. Stuhff, Las Vegas, Nev., for petitioner-appellant.
William J. Schafer, III, Chief Counsel, Diane M. Ramsey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Phoenix, Ariz., for respondents-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Before MERRILL and CHOY, Senior Circuit Judges, and KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.
Anthony Lee Chaney appeals the summary denial of his habeas corpus petition. Chaney filed his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 to challenge his murder conviction and death sentence. We affirm the dismissal of Chaney's purely legal claims regarding the unconstitutionality of Arizona's death penalty statute and his right to counsel in his habeas petition as well as the dismissal of his factual claims regarding juror bias and improper denial of a change of venue or restriction of venire pool because of local prejudice. We reverse the district court's summary dismissal of the remaining issues raised in Chaney's habeas petition.
Chaney and a female companion entered the state of Arizona in a stolen truck. They were stopped by a Coconino County sherriff's deputy who called in a description of the truck to the dispatcher and asked Chaney for identification. Chaney pointed a gun at the deputy while Chaney's companion removed the deputy's firearm. Chaney then handcuffed the deputy to a nearby tree and drove away.
In the meantime, the dispatcher determined that the truck Chaney was driving had been stolen and tried to so inform the deputy. When unable to do so, the dispatcher notified a second officer.
The second officer spotted Chaney's truck approaching his own patrol car along a dirt road. When Chaney saw the officer, he jumped out with his gun and fired over thirty bullets at the advancing officer's vehicle. One bullet nearly severed the officer's arm. When Chaney was nine feet behind the officer, he fired again, leaving powder burns on the victim's body. Chaney left the dying officer and drove away. The officer, a doctor and part-time deputy, was conscious for about thirty minutes after the attack, during which time he was fully aware of his impending death.
State police apprehended Chaney after he stole another pickup truck from two boys in the area. Chaney was tried and convicted by an Arizona state court jury of first degree murder, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, burglary, and theft and was sentenced to death for the murder conviction. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the murder conviction and death sentence.
Chaney then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district judge summarily denied Chaney's petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Chaney contends that the district court erred in dismissing his petition without first reviewing the state court record or conducting an evidentiary hearing.
A district court's decision on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is reviewed de novo. Chatman v. Marquez, 754 F.2d 1531, 1533 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 124, 88 L.Ed.2d 101 (1985).
Chaney challenges the district court's summary dismissal of the claims raised in his habeas petition, including: 1) the unconstitutionality of Arizona's death penalty statute; 2) the denial of access to a compentent psychiatrist to assist in the preparation of his defense; 3) the district court's failure to appoint counsel in Chaney's petition for writ of habeas corpus; 4) improper exclusion of a juror because of her scruples about the death penalty; 5) improper denial of a change of venue or a restriction of the venire pool to exclude Flagstaff and Sedona communities because of local prejudice; 6) improper restriction of voir dire concerning the jurors' view of the insanity defense and neurological illness; 7) violation of Chaney's right to remain silent; 8) improper restriction of Chaney's right to cross-examine a prosecution witness; and 9) the State's failure to preserve exculpatory evidence.
Chaney contends that the district court erred in summarily denying his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing or first reviewing the state court record. A district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition may not be affirmed unless the record on appeal indicates that the court independently reviewed all relevant portions of the state court record. Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 636 (9th Cir.1985); Rhinehart v. Gunn, 598 F.2d 557, 558 (9th Cir.1979). The district court could not rely on the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion as a substitute for independent review of the state court record. See Rhinehart v. Gunn, 598 F.2d at 558.
Nothing in the record on appeal indicates that the district court independently reviewed the state court record. At most, the record shows that the court reviewed Chaney's petition: "In reviewing the petition it is determined that the Arizona Supreme Court applied the proper legal standard." However, nothing in the record shows that Chaney presented the state court record for the district court's review. The issue before us is whether the district court was obliged to obtain sua sponte and examine the state court record before ruling on Chaney's petition.
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the state court findings challenged in Chaney's habeas petition are factual in nature. Austad v. Risley, 761 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 163, 88 L.Ed.2d 135 (1985). If they are, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) requires a federal habeas court to accord such findings a presumption of correctness unless the petitioner establishes certain defects to overcome the presumption. Id. at 1350. As to purely factual issues, a district court is under no duty to sua sponte obtain and review the state court record. Id. at 1350.
A determination of a juror's partiality or bias and the extent to which pretrial publicity was prejudicial are factual determinations to which 2254(d)' § presumption of correctness applies. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2891, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984); Austad 761 F.2d at 1350. As to these issues, therefore, Chaney had the burden of providing the district court with the relevant portions of the state court record, or of showing his inability to do so. The district court properly dismissed Chaney's challenge to these factual determinations because Chaney failed to overcome the section 2254(d) presumption.
The section 2254(d) restrictions on federal court review of habeas petitions apply only to issues of fact found by state courts. Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1190 n. 21 (9th Cir.1983). The presumption of correctness does not extend to federal court review of state decisions regarding either purely legal questions or mixed questions of fact and law. Id. Rather, the federal court reviews such non-factual questions de novo. Butcher v. Marquez, 758 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1190 n.21 ().
i. Legal questions.
As to purely legal questions, review of the state court record is unnecessary. The district court must examine the state court record only when the petition raises issues of fact, which if resolved in favor of the petitioner would entitle the petitioner to relief. See Duncan v. Carter, 299 F.2d 179, 181 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 952, 82 S.Ct. 1602, 8 L.Ed.2d 818 (1962).
Chaney's claim that the Arizona death penalty statute is unconstitutional on its face and his claim that he was entitled to representation by counsel on his habeas petition are purely legal questions. We hold that the district court was under no obligation to obtain and examine the state court record in disposing of these issues of law.
Chaney's claim that the Arizona death penalty statute was unconstitutional as applied is arguably a mixed questions of fact and law. However, Chaney does not dispute the facts surrounding his killing of the deputy. He merely claims that the state court erred in its application of the statute to the facts of his case. Since Chaney's claim raises no factual issues, his challenge to the constitutionality of the Arizona death penalty statute as applied is a purely legal question. We conclude that in the circumstances of this case, the district court was under no duty to obtain and review the state court record before ruling on Chaney's claim that the statute was unconstitutional as applied.
2. Mixed questions of fact and law.
While the district court is under no duty to obtain sua sponte and review the state court record in disposing of either purely factual or purely legal questions, it does have such a duty as to mixed questions of fact and law. See Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1428-29 (9th Cir. 1986). As mentioned above, rather than give a presumption of correctness to state court decisions on mixed questions of fact and law, a federal court reviews such decisions de novo. Butcher v. Marquez, 758 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1985). It is obligated to conduct a complete and independent review of the state court record. See Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1190 n.21; Richmond v. Ricketts, 774 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1985). Consequently, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the remainder of the claims raised in Chaney's habeas petition...
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