Chang v. Judge William C. Bradley
| Decision Date | 09 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-1008-CFC |
| Parties | WEIH STEVE CHANG, Plaintiff, v. JUDGE WILLIAM C. BRADLEY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Weih Steve Chang, Hockessin, Delaware. Pro Se Plaintiff.
Mark L. Reardon, Esquire, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendant Judge William C. Bradley.
Joseph Clement Handlon, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants State of Delaware Office of Management and Budget, Office of Pensions, and Division of Revenue.
November 9th, 2018
Wilmington, Delaware
Plaintiff Weih Steve Chang ("Plaintiff"), who proceeds pro se, commenced this action on October 31, 2016. (D.I. 1) Defendants moves to dismiss. (D.I. 7, 13) Plaintiff opposes both motions. (D.I. 17) Plaintiff also filed a motion for direct certification of questions of law (D.I. 12) and a motion to compel (D.I. 20), and later asked the Court to postpone ruling on the motion for certification and to withdraw the motion to compel. (D.I. 26) Defendants State of Delaware Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), Office of Pensions ("OOP"), and Division of Revenue ("DOR") (together "State Defendants") recently filed a motion to stay discovery. (D.I. 29)
Plaintiff is a frequent litigator in state and federal courts. According to the Complaint, the claims arise under U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause as well as the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, which prohibits a state from passing legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. (Id. at 2) Plaintiff also raises supplemental State claims for violations of the Delaware Constitution. (Id. at 2, 8, 9) In the civil cover sheet, Plaintiff frames the matter as a taxpayer lawsuit seeking recovery of overpayment, as well as a civil rights action for violations of the Equal Protection Clause and the Commerce Clause. (See D.I. 1-1)
Plaintiff, a resident of the State of Delaware since 2004, alleges that he has paid state and federal income taxes and business taxes. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Judge William C. Bradley ("Judge Bradley") engaged in sexual misconduct with minorsfrom the 1970's through the 1990's, illegally concealed the crimes, managed to evade civil and criminal claims, became a judge, received a judicial salary, retired from his judicial position, and continues to receive a State pension and other State benefits at taxpayers' expense. (D.I. 1 at 1-3) Plaintiff alleges that he has taxpayer standing to enjoin Judge Bradley's judiciary pension because he contributed to public funds and the public funds were directly expended to compensate Judge Bradley. (Id. at 5, 7)
The Complaint refers to three victims, one of whom is Wayne Averill ("Averill"), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware. The Court takes judicial notice that Averill filed a lawsuit against Judge Bradley in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, Averill v. Bradley, C.A. No. N10C-07-128-JRJ (Del. Super.), where it remains pending. Attached to the instant Complaint are two powers of attorney executed by Averill to allow Plaintiff to act on his behalf.1 (Id. at Ex. C)
Counts I and II are raised under Delaware law and allege violations of the Delaware Constitution, and Counts III and IV are raised under federal law and allege violations of the U.S. Constitution. Count I, raised against Judge Bradley, alleges violations of the Delaware Constitution, Article I, § 19, holding office during good behavior. Count I states that, because Judge Bradley allegedly committed heinouscrimes during his tenure on the bench, Judge Bradley violated his oath of office as a qualification for any office of public trust. (Id. at 8-9)
Count II is raised against the OOP. It alleges unlawful expenditure of public funds in violation of the Delaware Constitution Article II, § 21. Count II alleges that Judge Bradley should have been arrested, tried, and convicted, making him ineligible to hold his judgeship and receive his judicial salary and pension. Count II alleges Plaintiff was injured by the OOP's unlawful expenditures of public funds to Judge Bradley.
Count III is raised against the OOP and DOR. It alleges unlawful taxation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by the DOR and OOP for their unlawful portion of taxation and expenditure of public funds, injuring all taxpayers. It also alleges the DOR violated Plaintiff's right to due process when it collected taxes from his interstate business revenues and employment income and passed them onto the OOP to fund the "unlawful expenditure for compensation" such as "judicial pensions and other retirements benefits to Judge Bradley. (Id. at 10)
Count IV is raised against the OOP and DOR and alleges unlawful taxation in violation of the Commerce Clause. Plaintiff alleges Defendants injured his business clients and employers in other federal jurisdictions because State Defendants knowingly authorized unlawful expenditures of public funds to compensation Judge Bradley despite his interstate crimes. The Complaint alleges the unlawful taxation by DOR improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory damages. (Id. at 12)
Defendants move for dismissal on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claims; (2) the allegations are frivolous and fail to state claims; (3) State Defendants are immune from suit; (4) State Defendants are not "persons" capable of suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (5) the Court lacks jurisdiction over the State claims. All Defendants ask the Court to enjoin Plaintiff from filing further actions without leave of court because of his frivolous and vexatious litigation in state and federal courts.
In reviewing a motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. A court may consider the pleadings, public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint, and documents incorporated into the complaint by reference. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be granted only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the complainant, a court concludes that those allegations "could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
"Though 'detailed factual allegations' are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'" Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court is "not required to credit bald assertionsor legal conclusions Improperly alleged In the complaint." In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002). A complaint may not be dismissed, however, "for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014).
A complainant must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has "substantive plausibility." Id. at 347. That plausibility must be found on the face of the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the [complainant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [accused] is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.
The Court turns first to the issue of standing. The Complaint alleges Plaintiff has taxpayer standing to enjoin Judge Bradley's judiciary pension because Plaintiff contributed to public funds, and the public funds were directly expended to compensate Judge Bradley. All Defendants assert that Plaintiff does not have standing to assert the taxpayer claims.
"[S]tate taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayer." Nichols v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 836 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Federal and state taxpayers cannot show Article III standing based on their status as taxpayers "because the alleged injury is not concrete and particularized, butinstead a grievance the taxpayer suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally." Id. (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, under Delaware law, taxpayer standing is "reserved for a narrow set of claims involving challenges either to expenditure of public funds or use of public lands." Lechliter v. Delaware Dep't of Nat. Res. & Envtl., 2015 WL 9591587, at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2015). "It is focused on whether use of public funds or property itself is legal, not merely on the process by which decisions regarding such use are made—otherwise, the breadth of taxpayer standing would be near-limitless." Lechliter v. Delaware Dep't of Nat. Res. Div. of Parks and Recreation, 2015 WL 7720277, at *7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2015).
It is clear from the allegations that Plaintiff does not have taxpayer standing to obtain the...
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