Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass'n v. City of Chanhassen

• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: COYNE; SIMONETT; WAHL
• Citation: Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass'n v. City of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 1984)
• Decision Date: 13 January 1984
• Docket Number: C9-82-1250,Nos. C2-82-1039,s. C2-82-1039
• Parties: CHANHASSEN ESTATES RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, Michael E. Murphy, Thomas Katsonas, David Soenen, R.W. Lownsbury, R.W. Connell, Gary Arndt and Keith Boudrie, Respondents (C2-82-1039), Appellants (C9-82-1250), v. The CITY OF CHANHASSEN, Respondent, and McDonald's Corporation, intervenor, Appellant (C2-82-1039), Respondent (C9-82-1250).

Page 335

342 N.W.2d 335

CHANHASSEN ESTATES RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, Michael E. Murphy Thomas Katsonas, David Soenen, R.W. Lownsbury, R.W. Connell Gary Arndt and Keith Boudrie, Respondents (C2-82-1039) Appellants (C9-82-1250), v. The CITY OF CHANHASSEN, Respondent and McDonald's Corporation, intervenor, Appellant (C2-82-1039), Respondent (C9-82-1250).

Nos. C2-82-1039, C9-82-1250.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 13, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

Permitted and conditional use provisions of a zoning ordinance are part of a comprehensive plan for the regulation of the use of land and buildings in a municipality, relate to the same subject and to each other, and should be construed together.

A fast-food restaurant with a "drive-thru" window is a permitted use under a zoning ordinance which designates restaurants as permitted uses and "drive-ins" as conditional uses in a C-2 commercial zone.

Cragg & Bailly, Ltd., Robert L. McCollum, Minneapolis, for respondents-appellants.

Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, James P. Larkin, Kathleen M. Oates, Minneapolis, for appellant-respondent.

Larson & Mertz, Craig M. Mertz, Minneapolis, for respondent City of Chanhassen.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

COYNE, Justice.

Chanhassen Estates Residents Association (CERA) sued to enjoin the issuance to McDonald's Corporation of the building permit which the Chanhassen city council had authorized on May 10, 1982. The trial court concluded that the McDonald's facility as proposed was a conditional, rather than permitted, use but that the proposed McDonald's restaurant without a drive-thru window was a permitted use, and the trial court directed the city to issue a permit upon receipt of McDonald's plan for the restaurant without a drive-thru window. We reverse and remand for an order directing issuance of the building permit authorized by the city council on May 10, 1982.

In November of 1981 McDonald's entered into an agreement for the purchase of the westerly 1.3 acres of an 8.5 acre tract described as Outlot 2, Chanhassen Estates. Chanhassen Estates, a residential and commercial subdivision in the city of Chanhassen, is bounded on the north by Trunk Highway No. 5 and includes property lying east and west of Dakota Avenue. The McDonald's site is situated at the southeasterly corner of the intersection of Dakota Avenue with Highway 5. Access to the McDonald's site is afforded by the frontage road on the south side of the property. The McDonald's property has been zoned C-2 commercial since 1966, when Chanhassen Estates was platted, and the site is almost completely surrounded by properties zoned commercial or industrial.

On March 5, 1982, McDonald's applied for consideration of its planning request. In accordance with the provisions of Ordinance 33, McDonald's sought approval of its acquisition of part of Outlot 2. Ordinance 33 requires a public hearing before the planning commission and approval by the city council, prior to conveyance, for the division of any tract of land into two or more parcels. The application was also directed to the requirements of Ordinance 47, Chanhassen's zoning ordinance, for the issuance of building permits. Ordinance 47 requires design review, including review of the site plan, by the planning commission and approval by the city council in accordance with the procedures prescribed for the issuance of conditional use permits. Under the zoning ordinance a restaurant is a permitted use and a drive-in is a conditional use. McDonald's sought a permit for the construction of a restaurant with a "drive-thru" window. The city attorney advised the council that he regarded McDonald's proposed use as a permitted use.

The city planner and the city engineer reviewed McDonald's plan and recommended approval. The city engineer included in his report specific recommendations with respect to traffic management. Following a public hearing at which a spokesman for CERA voiced objection to the plan, the planning commission, an advisory body, recommended denial of McDonald's application.

On April 19, 1982, McDonald's application for subdivision plat approval and site plan review came before the city council. The city planner and engineer again recommended approval. Although a public hearing is not required unless the application is for a conditional use permit and although the council's deliberations were not noticed as a public hearing on McDonald's application, spokesmen for CERA spoke at length in opposition. A motion to approve McDonald's application failed to carry; the votes of the four council members present were equally divided.

McDonald's promptly instituted proceedings for a writ of mandamus commanding the city council to approve its application. At the next council meeting on May 3rd the member who had been absent from the previous meeting moved the reconsideration of McDonald's application. The four members present unanimously agreed to reconsider the application at the May 10th council meeting and directed that CERA be notified of the scheduled reconsideration. CERA's spokesman again expressed opposition to the application. By a vote of three-to-two the council approved McDonald's application subject to certain conditions, one of which was the dismissal of McDonald's petition for a writ.

On May 28, 1982, CERA instituted this action for a declaratory judgment that the city council's action of May 10th was invalid and for an injunction against the issuance of a building permit. When McDonald's intervened in the CERA action, McDonald's, the city, and CERA stipulated to the consolidation of the CERA and McDonald's actions. ¹

The trial court found that McDonald's proposed facility was not a permitted use pursuant to Ordinance 47 and remanded the matter to the city council for consideration of McDonald's application as one for a conditional use permit. After the council had denied a conditional use permit, McDonald's and CERA both sought amended findings. In its amended findings issued July 26, 1982, the trial court found that although the facility as originally proposed was not a permitted use, the proposed restaurant without a drive-thru window was a permitted use, and he directed the city council to issue the necessary building permit. CERA's motion for a new trial was denied. Both CERA and McDonald's appeal.

The principal issue is, of course, whether the proposed McDonald's facility is a permitted use or a conditional use under the Chanhassen zoning ordinance. Initially, however, we address the propriety of the city council's reconsideration of McDonald's application. Generally, a motion for reconsideration can be made only by one who voted with the prevailing side. ² The movant for reconsideration of McDonald's application had been absent and had not voted when the original motion for approval failed on a tied vote. The four council members present on May 3rd, however, unanimously agreed to reconsider the matter; the rules of procedure may be waived by a 4/5 vote of the council members; and the fifth council member expressly acquiesced in the reconsideration at the May 10th meeting. If the procedure was technically flawed--i.e., if the motion should have been for waiver instead of reconsideration--to declare an action which the council unanimously agreed to take invalid because incorrectly titled would be indeed to exalt form over substance. We decline to do so.

Whether the McDonald's facility as proposed is a permitted use or a conditional use in a C-2 commercial zone is governed by the zoning ordinance. The relevant sections of Ordinance 47 are these:

Section 4.02, the "Definitions" section of the ordinance, which defines "Drive-In-Establishment" as follows:

An establishment of the drive-in type is one which accomodates the patrons' automobiles, from which the occupants may receive a service or obtain a product which may be used or consumed in the vehicle on the same premises.

Section 10.02, headed "Permitted Uses", which states: Within a C-2 Commercial District, no building or land shall be used except for the following uses:

* * *

4. Restaurants, theaters and taverns, but not including "drive-in" type service.

Section 10.04, headed "Conditional Uses", which states:

Within a C-2 Commercial District, the following uses may be allowed, but only upon the securing of a Conditional Use Permit:

* * *

2. Establishments of the "drive-in" type, except drive-in theaters, offering goods or services directly to customers waiting in parked motor vehicles: provided that, in addition to such other conditions as may be prescribed by any conditional use permit, the following minimum standards shall apply: [standards enumerated for parking, access, etc.] (emphasis added).

The trial court tested the propriety of the council's approval of the McDonald's facility as a permitted use by reference to Secs. 4.02 and 10.02 only. Having found these two sections clear and unambiguous, the trial court declared that the McDonald's restaurant without a drive-thru window was a permitted use; with a drive-thru window, however, the establishment was not a permitted use because the product obtained at the drive-thru window could be consumed in the vehicle on the same premises. The trial court also determined that the proposed facility was not a "drive-in" within the provisions of section 10.04 enumerating conditional uses because customers served at a drive-thru window are not waiting in parked cars. The trial court resolved the conflicting definitions by construction: a use specifically excluded from permitted uses should be considered a conditional use.

When the words of a statute or ordinance in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from ambiguity, judicial construction is inappropriate. ³ Were the ordinance being applied to a 1972 "drive-in," where car-hops serve food on trays to customers in parked vehicles, its meaning would be clear. A "drive-th...