Channell v. Moffatt
| Decision Date | 31 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 59A04–1112–PL–664.,59A04–1112–PL–664. |
| Citation | 973 N.E.2d 110 |
| Parties | Carroll S. CHANNELL, Trustee of the Revocable Living Trust of Carroll S. Channell dated August 21, 2000, et al., Appellant–Defendant, v. Tim MOFFATT and Bill Moffatt, Appellees–Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Orange Circuit Court; The Honorable Frank Newkirk, Jr., Special Judge; Cause No. 59C01–0602–PL–69.
Debra S. Andry, Paoli, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
David W. Stone IV, Stone Law Office & Legal Research, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellees.
Carroll S. Channell (“Channell”), Trustee of the Revocable Living Trust of Carroll S. Channell dated August 21, 2000, et al. (collectively, “the Trust”), has initiated this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's pre-trial order resolving all pending motions in an action originally brought to quiet title to real estate located in Orange County, Indiana. The following restated issues are presented in this appeal:
I. Whether this interlocutory appeal is barred by the doctrine of invited error;
II. Whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars this appeal;
III. Whether the appeal is untimely; and
IV. Whether the trial court's conclusion that Tim Moffatt and Bill Moffatt (“the Moffatts”) are the owners of the real estate in question is supported by the evidence.
We affirm and remand.
On March 16, 2005, Orange County, Indiana by its Board of Commissioners executed a special warranty deed conveying certain real estate consisting of one and one-half acres to the Moffats.
On February 24, 2006, the Moffatts filed a complaint to quiet title claiming to have acquired title to one and one-half acres of real estate from Orange County through its Board of Commissioners. On May 19, 2006, the Trust filed an answer to the complaint and filed a counterclaim claiming to be the owner of the real estate and seeking to quiet title to it. Additionally, the Trust filed what it also designated as a counterclaim for inverse condemnation against Orange County and sought damages for the diminished value of the real estate. The Trust requested that Orange County reply to the claim under penalty of default, and the trial court granted that motion ordering Orange County to reply on or before August 13, 2006. The trial court stated in the order that if no reply was filed by Orange County, a default judgment would be entered against it upon the request of the Trust.
The trial court entered a default judgment against Orange County on December 21, 2006. The trial court found that inverse condemnation had occurred and that the Trust had a cause of action for damages against Orange County. The trial court also set January 19, 2007, as the date for the appointment of appraisers. The Trust prepared the order signed by the trial court, which included the finding that inverse condemnation had occurred.
On April 15, 2008, the trial court appointed appraisers to determine the value of the property, but two days later, the Trust filed an objection to the trial court's order appointing appraisers. The Moffatts filed a motion to strike the Trust's objections, in which they argued that the Trust had waived any objection to the appointment of appraisers by proceeding with her inverse condemnation claim against Orange County. A hearing was held during which the Trust argued that Channell's remedies for inverse condemnation could include a return of the property at issue. The trial court subsequently issued an instruction to the appraisers as to the measure of damages due Channell, and ultimately denied Channell's objection to the appointment of appraisers.
The Trust's attorney said that he made a mistake, and the Trust now wanted the remedy to be a return of the land instead of damages for inverse condemnation. After various motions were filed in which each the Trust and the Moffatts sought to quiet title in the real estate, the Trust filed a “Motion to Withdraw Defense,” in which the Trust sought to set aside the inverse condemnation finding so that the Trust could pursue an award of damages and an injunction instead.
The trial court held a pretrial conference on all pending motions on September 2, 2009, and the issues were taken under advisement by the trial court. Orange County filed an objection to the Trust's “Motion to Withdraw Defense” as untimely filed. On February 26, 2010, the trial court made a pre-trial conference entry denying the Moffatts' motion to quiet title, denying the Trust's motion to withdraw its defense, and setting the matter for jury trial. After a subsequent pre-trial conference, the trial court ordered the parties to submit proposed orders by October 19, 2011.
On October 14, 2011, the Moffatts filed their proposed ruling in which they requested the trial court rule that fee simple title was vested in them and that the only issue remaining before the trial court was the determination of damages. The Trust filed its proposed ruling on October 19, 2011, in which the Trust requested that the trial court enter a ruling that the Moffatts' quiet title action be set for a bench trial and that the Trust was entitled to a jury trial to determine the amount of damages due it by the taking of the real estate through inverse condemnation by Orange County. The trial court entered its pre-trial order, which is the subject of this interlocutory appeal, which finds as follows:
The Court therefore Finds and Orders:
1) That Orange County acquired the Real Estate from Channell via inverse condemnation, as provided for in the Default.
2) That Orange County transferred and conveyed its interest in the Real Estate to Moffatt by way of the Deed.
3) That Channell is entitled to a trial to determine the proper amount of damages to be awarded as a result of Orange County's inverse condemnation of the Real Estate.
4) That this cause is hereby set for final pre-trial conference on the 11th day of JANUARY, 2012 at 1:00 p.m.
Appellant's App. at 9A. The Trust now brings this interlocutory appeal.
The Trust argues on appeal that the trial court's order should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings because the Moffatts have failed to meet their burden of proving ownership of the one and one-half acre in dispute. The Moffatts argue that the Trust sought damages for the inverse condemnation of that real estate and that any error in the trial court's finding of inverse condemnation was invited error.
“The doctrine of invited error, grounded in estoppel, provides that a party may not take advantage of an error that he commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of his own neglect or misconduct.” Breining v. Harkness, 872 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind.Ct .App.2007) (citing Witte v. Mundy ex rel. Mundy, 820 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind.2005)). “A party may not invite error and later argue that the error supports reversal, because error invited by the complaining party is not reversible error.” Booher v. State, 773 N.E.2d 814, 822 (Ind.2002). Invited errors are not subject to appellate review. Gamble v. State, 831 N.E.2d 178, 184 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).
Furthermore, “a party cannot appeal from a judgment which he has expressly or impliedly requested the court to enter.” Becker v. MacDonald, 488 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ind.Ct.App.1986). In this case, the Trust sought the remedy of damages for inverse condemnation. The Trust also sought a default judgment concluding that inverse condemnation had occurred in the event Orange County failed to respond to the Trust's claim. Each of the Trust's requests was ultimately granted by the trial court, and the order entered to that effect was drafted by the Trust. We find that if any error exists, it is invited error, which does not entitle the Trust to a reversal of the trial court's decision.
During a hearing before the trial court, the Trust made clear to the other parties and to the trial court that the theory the Trust was pursuing was damages for inverse condemnation. Now, after obtaining the relief it sought, a finding of inverse condemnation and a trial setting for a determination of the resulting damages, the Trust claims that the inverse condemnation finding was not proper. The Moffatts claim that the Trust's appeal is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
“[J]udicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.” Wabash Grain, Inc. v. Smith, 700 N.E.2d 234, 237 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). “Judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with one previously asserted, and it ‘precludes a party from repudiating assertions in the party's own pleadings.’ “ Gatlin Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Estate of Yeager, 921 N.E.2d 18, 24 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). “[A] party may not generally assume successive positions in the course of the same litigation with respect to the same fact or set of facts which are inconsistent and mutually contradictory.” Lumbard v. Farmers State Bank, 812 N.E.2d 196, 201 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (citing Gregory and Appel, Inc. v. Duck, 459 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ind.Ct.App.1984)).
We reiterate that in this case the Trust proceeded on the theory of inverse condemnation and sought damages as its remedy. Now, the Trust claims that inverse condemnation is not available and the trial court erred in so finding. The trial court did not err by granting the Trust the relief it requested and setting the matter for a trial on damages. The Trust's argument now is inconsistent and contradictory with its previous position in the same litigation. We find that the Trust is judicially estopped from this argument.
The Trust claims that it is appealing the transfer of the right to possession of the...
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