Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc.

Decision Date19 July 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-2330.,04-2330.
Citation415 F.3d 342
PartiesElaine L. CHAO, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RIVENDELL WOODS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Rivendell Woods Family Care, d/b/a/ Rivendell Woods; Landraw-I, LLC; Andrea Wells James, individually; Rodney James, individually, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

ARGUED: Carol Beth Feinberg, United States Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Kevin Patrick Kopp, Jacqueline Denise Grant, Roberts & Stevens, P.A., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Howard M. Radzely, Solicitor of Labor, Steven J. Mandel, Associate Solicitor, Paul L. Frieden, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, United States Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jackson D. Hamilton, Roberts & Stevens, P.A., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and SILER, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote the opinion, in which Judge KING and Senior Judge SILER joined.

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge.

The Secretary of Labor appeals the district court's order dismissing her action against various defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2000) ("FLSA" or the "Act"). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The FLSA prohibits an "employer" from employing "employees" who are "engaged in commerce" or "employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce" without compensating the employees at a rate of at least one and one-half times their regular rate for the hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). It also requires employers to keep records of the "wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment" of their employees. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c). On June 11, 2003, after an investigation lasting approximately five years, the Secretary of Labor filed a complaint against Rivendell Woods, Inc., Landraw-I, L.L.C., and Andrea and Rodney James (collectively "Rivendell"), seeking injunctive and other relief for alleged violations of these overtime and record-keeping provisions.

After the case was referred to a magistrate judge, Rivendell filed an answer and moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, and Rivendell filed objections seeking dismissal of the complaint. The district court found merit in Rivendell's objections, concluding that the complaint merely "`parrot[ed] the legal standard'" and stated "vague, conclusory and speculative allegations." However, the court denied Rivendell's motion to dismiss "without prejudice to renewal" of that motion by Rivendell if the Secretary failed "to cure the defective complaint" within fifteen days.

The Secretary timely filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint asserts, inter alia, the following factual allegations: (1) Rivendell Woods and Landraw-I are North Carolina corporations, and the individual defendants, Andrea and Rodney James, "acted directly or indirectly in the interest of [these] corporations in relation to their employees" and, therefore, are "employer[s] within the meaning of . . . the Act"; (2) the defendants "engaged in related activities performed either through unified operation or common control for a common business purpose" and, therefore, "constitute an enterprise within the meaning of ... the Act"; (3) the enterprise "operates an institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective" and, therefore, "constitutes an enterprise engaged in commerce... within the meaning of ... the Act"; (4) Rivendell had, since May 1, 2000, violated the overtime provisions of the Act by compensating certain employees, including "Supervisors in Charge," at a rate of less than time-and-a-half for the hours they worked in excess of forty hours per week; and (5) since May 1, 2000, Rivendell had violated the record-keeping provisions of the FLSA by failing to "make, keep and preserve" required records for the Supervisors in Charge and other employees, including records reflecting the regular hourly rate of pay for weeks when overtime payment was due; the hours worked each day and week; the total daily or weekly regular pay; the total overtime pay; the total wages per pay period; and the date of payment and period covered by payment. The Secretary sought an injunction "restraining the withholding of payment of back wages ... for the period since June 11, 2001," as well as other appropriate relief, including interest on the wages, and costs.

The district court granted Rivendell's renewed and amended motion to dismiss, finding the complaint still did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court characterized the Secretary's allegations as "merely boilerplate recitations of the statute itself." The court also asserted the complaint was deficient for failing to identify the Supervisors in Charge, the dates of their employment, and the nature of the employment relationship. According to the district court, the deficiencies in the complaint made it "virtually impossible for the Defendants to prepare a defense." The court therefore entered an order stating that the "action is hereby dismissed without prejudice in its entirety."

II.

Although the parties did not raise the question, we must initially determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider the district court's dismissal without prejudice. See Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 635 (4th Cir.2002) ("[W]hen our appellate jurisdiction is in doubt, we must sua sponte raise and address the matter.").1

In Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir.1993), we held that the district court's dismissal of the complaint without prejudice "qualifie[d] as a final order subject to appeal." The appellee had argued that the order dismissing the complaint was not appealable because "such an order does not preclude the losing party from filing a new complaint," and, thus, could not be considered final. Id. at 1066. But we reasoned that allowing an appeal from such an order would not frustrate the interests of judicial economy, if it were clear that amendment of the complaint could not cure its defects. Id. at 1067. "Under this approach, an appellate court may evaluate the particular grounds for dismissal in each case to determine whether the plaintiff could save his action by merely amending his complaint." Id. at 1066-67. Thus, Domino Sugar requires us to examine the appealability of a dismissal without prejudice based on the specific facts of the case in order to guard against piecemeal litigation and repetitive appeals.

Engaging in that inquiry here, we conclude that amendment of the Secretary's complaint would not "permit [her] to continue the litigation in the district court." Id. at 1067. First, the district court did not merely dismiss the complaint, but dismissed the "action ... in its entirety." In Domino Sugar, we noted the difference between an order dismissing an action without prejudice and one dismissing a complaint without prejudice, stating that the latter order is generally not appealable. See id. at 1066; Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir.2004) ("Where an action, and not merely an amendable complaint ..., is dismissed without prejudice, the order of dismissal is final and appealable."); see also Furnace v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 218 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir.2000).

Moreover, the Secretary contends that she must be able to employ similarly-worded complaints throughout the country for consistency, and so elects to stand on the complaint presented to the district court. The Secretary asserts that the amended complaint "is consistent with her longstanding practice" and argues that it is "crucial that the Secretary be able to challenge the district court's erroneous application of [Rule] 8(a) to her FLSA complaints so as to maintain a uniform, nationwide practice." Supp. Brief of Appellant at 5. By electing to stand on her complaint, the Secretary has waived the right to later amend unless we determine that the interests of justice require amendment. See, e.g., Cohen v. Ill. Inst. Tech., 581 F.2d 658, 662 (7th Cir.1978). The Secretary's election, and consequent waiver, thus protect against the possibility of repetitive appeals that concerned us in Domino Sugar. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 463 (7th Cir.1988); DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir.1987); Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir.1976).

Therefore, we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

III.

Turning to the merits, we review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 273 (4th Cir.2002). A district court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief." De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A.

The district court apparently concluded that the Secretary's amended complaint did not satisfy Rule 8(a). The rule requires a complaint to include "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends ..., (2) a short and plain statement of the...

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