Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:02-CV-1174-VEH.,2:02-CV-1174-VEH. |
| Citation | 568 F.Supp.2d 1300 |
| Parties | Elaine L. CHAO, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. TYSON FOODS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Carol Beth Feinberg, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC, Michael Kirby Hagan, Robert Walter, United States Department of Labor, Atlanta, GA, Howard M. Radzely, John A. Black, U.S. Department of Labor-Office of the Solicitor, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.
David M. Smith, Tony G. Miller, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Birmingham, AL, Joel M. Cohn, Michael J. Mueller, Akin
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Before the court are
(1) the Motion of the Defendant, Tyson Foods, Inc. (hereinafter "Defendant"), for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 149);
(2) the Motion of the Plaintiff, Elaine Chao, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor (hereinafter "Plaintiff") (doc. 151);
(3) the Motion of Defendant to Strike the Declarations of Plaintiff's Witnesses, Mary Ziegler and Michael Murray (doc. 184); and
(4) the Motions of Plaintiff to Strike various evidentiary submissions of Defendant, incorporated into her submissions in support of her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
For the reasons explained herein, the motions are due to be DENIED, in part, and GRANTED, in part.
Plaintiff brings this action, asserting that Defendant has violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., for failing to compensate its employees for hours worked in excess of 40 per week. (doc. 1, Part VI). Specifically, Plaintiff seeks overtime compensation for Defendant's employees at its Blountsville, Alabama plant for time spent donning, doffing, and washing their protective outer clothing at the beginning and end of each work shift, and for certain rest, breaks scheduled during each eight-hour shift. (doc. 1, ¶ 2(A)). Further, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to compensate its employees at all of its plants nationwide for their time spent donning, doffing, and washing and for their second, uncompensated daily "meal break." (doc. 1, ¶ 2(B)).
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing her Complaint on May 9, 2002. (doc. 1). After various pleadings were filed and discovery conducted, Defendant filed its pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 23, 2007. (doc. 149). Plaintiff filed her pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, including various motions to strike, also on July 23, 2007. (doc. 151). Defendant filed its Motion to Strike on August 24, 2007. (doc. 184).
Under FED.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023; Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023. If the evidence presented by the nonmoving party to rebut the moving party's evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.
The method used by the party moving for summary judgment to discharge its initial burden depends on whether that party bears the burden of proof on the issue at trial. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-17, citing U.S. v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc). If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, then it can meet its burden on summary judgment only by presenting positive evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact; i.e., facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115. Once the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce significant, probative evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial.
If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. First, the moving party may produce affirmative evidence negating a material fact, thus demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial. Once the moving party satisfies its burden using this method, the nonmoving party must respond with positive evidence sufficient to resist a motion for a directed verdict at trial.
The second method by which the moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment is to affirmatively show the absence of any evidence in the record in support of a judgment for the nonmoving party on the issue in question. This method requires more than a simple statement that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial but does not require evidence negating the nonmovant's claim; it simply requires the movant to point out to the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-16. If the movant meets its initial burden by using this second method, the nonmoving party may either point to evidence in the court record, overlooked or ignored by the movant, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict, or the nonmoving party may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. However, when responding, the nonmovant can no longer rest on mere allegations, but must set forth evidence of specific facts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 119 L.Ed.2d 351(1992).1
Defendant seeks summary judgment as to (1) Plaintiff's claim that a second, 30-minute rest break during an eight-hour shift is compensable in its entirety, and (2) Plaintiff's claim that Defendant's employees should be compensated for pre- and post-shift donning, doffing, and washing.
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs second meal period claim, because the meal period constitutes a "bona fide meal period," and is therefore not compensable under 29 C.F.R. § 785.19.
29 C.F.R. § 785.19 provides, in relevant part, that
(a) Bona fide meal periods. Bona fide meal periods are not worktime. Bona fide meal periods do not include coffee breaks or time for snacks. These are rest periods. The employee must be completely relieved from duty for the purposes of eating regular meals. Ordinarily 30 minutes or more is long enough for a bona fide meal period. A shorter period may be long enough under special conditions. The employee is not relieved if he is required to perform any duties, whether active or inactive, while eating. For example, an office employee who is required to eat at his desk or a factory worker who is required to be at his machine is working while eating.
The standard for determining whether a meal period is a "bona fide meal period" in the Eleventh Circuit is set forth in Kohlheim v. Glynn County, Ga., 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir.1990). To satisfy this standard, the employer must establish that an employee is "completely relieved from duty."3 To be completely relieved from duty, employees cannot be subject to "significant affirmative responsibilities" during the meal period. 915 F.2d at 1477. The "essential consideration" is whether the employees "are in fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal." Id.
The court instructed in Kohlheim that "what matters in meal period cases is whether the employees are subject to real limitations on their personal freedom which inure to the benefit of their employer." 915 F.2d at 1477 n. 19, citing Wahl v. City of Wichita, 725 F.Supp. 1133, 1138-44 (D.Kan.1989) (emphasis added).4
Applying the completely relieved from duty standard as set forth in Kohlheim, the court must examine whether the second rest break is allotted "for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal," whether Defendant's employees retain "significant affirmative responsibilities" during the meal period, and whether the employees are subject to "real limitations on their freedom" during the break which inure to Defendant's benefit. See Kohlheim, 915 F.2d...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Anderson v. Perdue Farms, Inc.
...Ultimately, the primary beneficiary of donning, doffing, and sanitizing PPE is a disputed issue of material fact. Chao v. Tyson Foods, 568 F.Supp.2d 1300, 1315 (N.D.Ala.2008), is instructive. In that case, Tyson Foods required employees to wear a smock, hairnet, beard net, earplugs and, dep......
-
Walsh v. E. Penn Mfg. Co.
...PPE on a particular day does not rebut a finding that the activities are performed on a regular basis. See Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 568 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1321 (N.D. Ala. 2008).The Secretary submits that whatever practical administrative challenges inherent in measuring the time worked ar......
-
Lugo v. Farmer's Pride Inc.
...Gatewood v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, 569 F.Supp.2d 687, 696–97 (S.D.Miss.2008) (Starrett, J.) (same); Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 568 F.Supp.2d 1300, 1316–17 (N.D.Ala.2008) (Hopkins, J.) (same); Jordan v. IBP, Inc., 542 F.Supp.2d 790, 809 (M.D.Tenn.2008) (Trauger, J.) (holding that donning ......
-
Peterson v. Nelnet Diversified Solutions, LLC
..."an average gap time that is less than three minutes per shift." Hubbs , 2018 WL 5264143, at *9 ; see also Chao v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 568 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1319 (N.D. Ala. 2008) ("Regardless of the number of employees for whom Plaintiff seeks back wages, or the length of time for which suc......