Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch

• Decision Date: 04 December 1975
• Docket Number: INC,OBSERVER-DISPATC
• Citation: 379 N.Y.S.2d 61,341 N.E.2d 569,38 N.Y.2d 196
• Parties: , 341 N.E.2d 569, 1 Media L. Rep. 1693 Joseph L. CHAPADEAU, Appellant, v. UTICA, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 61

379 N.Y.S.2d 61

38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 1

Media L. Rep. 1693

Joseph L. CHAPADEAU, Appellant, v. UTICA OBSERVER-DISPATCH, INC., Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Argued Oct. 22, 1975.

Decided Dec. 4, 1975.

G. Gerald Fiesinger, Jr., Little Falls, for appellant.

Robert A. Bankert, Utica, for respondent.

WACHTLER, Judge.

This appeal concerns the granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a defamation action. Appellant, Chapadeau, is a public school teacher who was arrested in Utica on June 10, 1971 and charged with criminal possession of a hypodermic instrument and criminal possession of a dangerous drug, heroin, in the fourth degree. The next day, respondent's newspaper, The Utica Observer-Dispatch, reported Chapadeau's arrest in an article which also related that two Herkimer men had been arrested on misdemeanor drug charges. After reporting the three arrests the newspaper account went on to state that, 'The trio was part of a group at a party in Brookwood Park where they were arrested. Drugs and beer were found at the party, police charge.' Appellant claims that the quoted sentences which were false and maliciously published, libeled him. The newspaper admitted the falsity of those sentences but contended that in its entirety the article was a fair and true report and moved for summary judgment.

The trial court denied the motion but was subsequently reversed. The Appellate Division held that in light of Chapadeau's occupation and the nature of the crime his arrest was a matter of public interest and therefore qualifiedly privileged. Relying on Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296, the Appellate Division concluded that the communication was privileged absent malice and the mere showing of defendant's failure to discover and correct the error was insufficient to warrant a trial on the issue of malice.

On appeal the appellant contends that the Appellate Division order must be overturned because the constitutional privilege with respect to matters of public interest which had been mandated by Rosenbloom (supra) was eliminated by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997 41 L.Ed.2d 789. Thus, the principal issue is on what basis, subject to the limitations enunciated in Gertz, (supra) may a publisher of defamatory falsehoods about a private individual be held liable. We agree with the appellant that liability for publishing matters of public interest should be governed by some sort of fault standard, nevertheless, we conclude that in this case summary judgment was proper.

Prior to the landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, the constitutional protections embodied in the First Amendment did not extend to defamatory statements. However, in the New York Times case, the Supreme Court brought the law of libel within the ambit of constitutional protection by holding that a public official could not recover for a defamatory statement about his official conduct in the absence of proof of malice. Although this constitutional privilege was limited in applicability to public officials, it was soon greatly expanded to include lower echelon officials (e.g., Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 992, 13 L.Ed.2d 892 (police chief); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (recreation supervisor); Beckley Newspapers v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 88 S.Ct. 197, 19 L.Ed.2d 248 (county clerk); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (Deputy Sheriff)); candidates for public office (e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v . Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35; Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 91 S.Ct. 628, 28 L.Ed.2d 57) and plaintiffs classified as public figures (Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094). The apogee of this development was Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct . 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296, Supra. Despite the fact that it was a badly split plurality, the court held that libelous statements about a private individual involved in a matter of public concern were privileged and liability would result only where actual malice was established.

Under the compulsion of Rosenbloom our court extended the constitutional privilege to publishers of libelous statemen concerning private individuals who were involved in matters of public interest (Trails West v. Wolff, 32 N.Y .2d 207, 344 N.Y.S.2d 863, 298 N.E.2d 52; Twenty-Five East 40th St. Rest. Corp. v. Forbes, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 595, 331 N.Y.S.2d 29, 282 N.E .2d 118; Kent v. City of Buffalo, 29 N.Y.2d 818, 327 N.Y.S.2d 653, 277 N.E.2d 669; Frink v. McEldowney, 29 N.Y .2d 720, 325 N.Y.S.2d 755, 275 N.E.2d 337). Subsequently, the Supreme Court, sensing that the balance between free speech and private reputation had tipped too far in the direction of free speech, retreated from Rosenbloom. In Gertz, a plurality opinion by Mr. Justice Powell, the court stated that Rosenbloom transgressed the legitimate State interest in providing a remedy for defamations injurious to the reputation of private individuals (Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 343, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, Supra). The court felt that private individuals are more vulnerable because t...