Chapalain Compagnie v. Standard Oil Co.(Indiana), 78 C 1975

• Citation: 467 F. Supp. 181
• Decision Date: 07 December 1978
• Docket Number: No. 78 C 1975,78 C 1983 and 78 C 1984.,78 C 1975
• Parties: CHAPALAIN COMPAGNIE, d/b/a Hotel Brittany, in Roscoff, France, and Rene Cadiou, d/b/a Hotel Des Bains, for themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY (INDIANA) et al. Gaby BENGANTON, for himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY (INDIANA) et al. BRETAGNE-ANGLETERRE-IRLANDE, S. A. (SOCIETY ANONYMOUS), a French Corporation, d/b/a Brittany Ferries, for itself and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY (INDIANA) et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

467 F. Supp. 181

CHAPALAIN COMPAGNIE, d/b/a Hotel Brittany, in Roscoff, France, and Rene Cadiou, d/b/a Hotel Des Bains, for themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY (INDIANA) et al.

Gaby BENGANTON, for himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY (INDIANA) et al.

BRETAGNE-ANGLETERRE-IRLANDE, S. A. (SOCIETY ANONYMOUS), a French Corporation, d/b/a Brittany Ferries, for itself and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY (INDIANA) et al.

Nos. 78 C 1975, 78 C 1983 and 78 C 1984.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

December 7, 1978.

John J. Kennelly, Kevin M. Forde, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Frank Cicero, Jr., Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

McGARR, District Judge.

I. FACTS

On March 16, 1978, the tanker Amoco Cadiz, while under tow after having lost both an anchor and its hydraulic steering mechanism, went aground and became stranded on rocks off the coast of Brittany, France. The Amoco Cadiz was enroute from the Persian Gulf to the Netherlands, laden with approximately 220,000 tons of crude oil. In rough waters, the disabled tanker broke apart on rocks, disgorging its oleic cargo. The resultant pollution of the Breton coast and marine environment is that on which the plaintiffs base their claims in these three class actions.

These lawsuits were filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on April 20, 1978, against Standard Oil Company of Indiana, Amoco International Oil Company, Amoco Transport Company, and Claude Phillips. On May 19, 1978, the defendants removed the cases to this court. The causes are before the court on the plaintiffs' motions to remand.

II. BASES OF THE MOTIONS

A. Paraphrasing the plaintiffs' positions, they contend that these cases were "improvidently" removed in that this court does not have exclusive jurisdiction within the intent of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1350 (1976), and that because at least one of the defendants is a resident of this state, removal jurisdiction cannot be based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976).

Plaintiffs further maintain that these cases are based simply on the tort of negligence and that federal courts must not encroach upon the right of state courts to hear such actions. In support, the plaintiffs point out the fact that the complaints filed herein do not plead claims contingent upon federal statutes or treaties. In addition, because the state court may properly assert personal jurisdiction, the state court may interpret any federal statutes or treaties which may be applicable.

B. In opposition to the motions to remand, the defendants allege that the causes of action arise under a treaty to which the United States is a signatory, a treaty to which the Republic of France (but not the United States) is a party and, as a result of the applicability of these treaties and the need for uniformity in rules of decision thereunder, federal common law. For these reasons, the defendants assert that this court had original jurisdiction, thus removal jurisdiction.

III. THE CONTOURS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

A. Removal Jurisdiction

The motions to remand seem to be based in part on a misunderstanding of removal jurisdiction. These cases were removed from the state court to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b) (1976). The statute provides in part as follows:

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.

28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976)

Thus, removal jurisdiction is keyed to original jurisdiction. The original jurisdiction of the federal district courts is governed both by the Constitution and statutes. Article III § 2 provides in pertinent part:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . .

U.S.Const. art. III § 2 cl. 1

Pursuant to this constitutional provision, Congress has enacted a general jurisdictional statute which reads as follows:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interest or costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976)

B. The Interpretation of Jurisdictional Grants

1. Article III § 2

In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall gave us the first significant interpretation of constitutionally permissible jurisdiction in the lower federal courts. The companion case to Osborn, Bank of the United States v. Planter's Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 6 L.Ed. 244 (1824), was a contract action in which the appellants argued against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, claiming that general principles of law, not federal statutes or common law, governed the decision. The Court in Osborn observed that the validity of the contract depended on federal law, and the bank, being statutorily created and its powers statutorily delimited, was sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. The Chief Justice interpreted "arising under" in Article III § 2 in terms of what has been termed the "ingredient" theory.

We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.

* * * * * *

If . . . the title or right set up by the party may be defeated by one construction of the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposition construction federal jurisdiction may properly be asserted.

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 821, 6 L.Ed. 204.

This theory reflects a very expansive definition of the phrase "arising under" in Article III § 2. It must be noted, however, that Osborn concerned the constitutionality of a statutory grant of jurisdiction, namely, that which entitled the Bank of the United States to sue and be sued in federal courts, a question related to, but fundamentally different from, the question of whether a case falls within a constitutional, statutory grant of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Osborn contains illuminating dicta regarding the interpretation of the key words, "arising under" and the proper exercise of federal jurisdiction within the parameters of Article III § 2. In addition, it will be seen that identical language in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) has been interpreted much more narrowly. See Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 5 S.Ct. 1113, 29 L.Ed. 319 (1885).

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976)

When the question raised is whether a given case falls within § 1331(a) courts have been more restrictive in their analysis. The Supreme Court, for practical reasons, has held that § 1331 and its statutory predecessor do not confer jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under Article III § 2 despite the similarity of their language. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 506, 20 S.Ct. 726, 44 L.Ed. 864 (1900); National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 613-15, 69 S.Ct. 1173, 93 L.Ed. 1556 (1949); see Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 870-73 (2d ed. 1973).

Decisions under the general statutory grant have tested jurisdiction in terms of the presence of an issue calling for the interpretation of federal law, as an integral part of the plaintiff's claim. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see e. g., Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). It has been held sufficient that some aspect of federal law be essential to the plaintiff's success, Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 41 S.Ct. 243, 65 L.Ed. 577 (1921), although it is occasionally stated that the cause of action must be derived from federal law. See American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987 (1916). As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his dissent in Lincoln Mills, "the litigation-provoking problem has been the degree to which federal law must be in the forefront of the case and not collateral, peripheral or remote", 353 U.S. at 470, 77 S.Ct. at 928, or raised as, or in anticipation of, a defense. See Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908).

The case most utilized in determining whether federal question jurisdiction exists is Gully v. First National Bank, supra. Gully was a suit to collect taxes imposed on a national bank by a state. Writing for a unanimous Court (one Justice taking no part in the decision), Justice Cardozo stated that "the right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another." Id. 299 U.S. at 112, 57 S.Ct. at 97. Thus, the federal issue must be a direct element of the plaintiff's claim. One commentator has suggested that for original federal question jurisdiction to arise there must be "a substantial claim founded `directly' upon federal law." Mishkin...