Chapin v. Hulse

Citation599 N.E.2d 217
Decision Date14 September 1992
Docket NumberNo. 54A05-9109-CV-307,54A05-9109-CV-307
PartiesMark W. CHAPIN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Patricia A. HULSE, Appellee-Defendant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

Peter L. Obremskey, Carol Sparks Drake, Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton, Lebanon, Terry E. Harris, Young Harris & Harvey, Crawfordsville, for appellant-plaintiff.

Thomas Todd Reynolds, Rocap Witchger & Threlkeld, Indianapolis, Harry A. Siamas, Crawfordsville, for appellee-defendant.

SHARPNACK, Judge.

Mark W. Chapin appeals the Montgomery Circuit Court's order granting Patricia Hulse's "Consolidated Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order and Motion to Dismiss" on grounds that a prior order, which itself had set aside an earlier judgment, was void. We affirm.

Chapin raises two issues which we restate as:

(1) Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its September 28, 1989, order setting aside its original judgment.

(2) Whether Hulse waived her right to attack the September 28 order by not perfecting an appeal.

The outcome of this appeal turns entirely upon procedural grounds, and we therefore set out a detailed account of this case's convoluted history. As the result of an automobile accident, Chapin filed a personal injury action against Andrew Potter, the driver of the car in which Chapin was riding, and Hulse, the driver of the other car involved in the accident. Chapin reached a $20,000 settlement with Potter prior to trial and the case was dismissed as to Potter. The case against Hulse proceeded to trial during which Hulse, over Chapin's objection, presented evidence regarding Chapin's settlement with Potter. The jury returned the following verdict:

"We, the jury, find that plaintiff, Mark W. Chapin, has been fully compensated by Andrew Potter for all damages suffered and therefore we find for defendant...."

(Record, p. 104.) The trial court then entered judgment for Hulse on August 11, 1988. The following is a summary of relevant events following that judgment:

11/10/88 Chapin filed a motion to correct error.

07/26/89 The trial court denied Chapin's motion to correct error. 1 The trial court found Manns v. State Dep't of Highways (1988), Ind.App., 524 N.E.2d 334 to be controlling on the issue of whether evidence of settlement with someone other than the defendant was admissible and that Manns required the court to submit a verdict form allowing the jury to find payment and satisfaction. However, six days after the denial of the motion to correct error, the supreme court vacated the court of appeals decision in Manns. See Manns v. State Dep't of Highways (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 929.

08/14/89 Chapin responded to the supreme court ruling by filing a motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to correct error.

09/28/89 The trial court granted Chapin's motion to reconsider, vacated its ruling on Chapin's motion to correct error, vacated the August 11, 1988, 2 judgment for Hulse, and continued the case for trial.

11/02/89 Hulse filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's order of September 28, which motion the trial court denied.

11/10/89 Hulse filed a praecipe for the record for transmittal to the supreme court.

11/21/89 Hulse filed a petition with the supreme court requesting it to issue a permanent writ of mandamus and prohibition requiring the trial court to vacate its September 28, 1989, order.

02/05/90 The supreme court notified Hulse that her petition would be denied without a hearing.

08/17/90 Hulse filed a consolidated motion for relief from judgment or order and motion to dismiss, pursuant to T.R. 60(B)(6), 12(B)(1), and 12(B)(2) 3 requesting the trial court to vacate its September 28, 1989, order on the basis that the order was void for want of jurisdiction.

11/01/90 The supreme court issued its written opinion denying Hulse's petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition. State ex rel. Hulse v. Montgomery Circuit Court (1990), Ind., 561 N.E.2d 497. 4

06/04/91 The trial court granted Hulse's consolidated motion for relief from judgment and motion to dismiss (filed 8/17/90) and reinstated its July 26, 1989, order overruling Chapin's motion to correct error as the final order in the case.

In her T.R. 60(B) motion, Hulse contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant Chapin's motion to reconsider. According to Hulse, the court lost its jurisdiction when it denied Chapin's motion to correct error. Furthermore, Hulse claimed that the motion to reconsider was deemed denied per T.R. 53.4(B) when the trial court failed to act upon it within 5 days of its filing.

We agree with Hulse that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over this case prior to the September 28 order. Once a trial court acquires jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction until it makes a final disposition of the case. State ex rel. Kelly v. Marion County Criminal Court, Div. Three (1978), 269 Ind. 46, 47, 378 N.E.2d 833, 834. After final judgment, the issuing court retains "only such continuing jurisdiction as is permitted by the judgment itself, or as is given the court by statute or rule." Id. In the present case, the trial court made a final disposition of the cause when it entered judgment on the jury's verdict. We are aware of no statute or trial rule that provides the court with continuing jurisdiction over the case. Arguably T.R. 53.4 allows a court, pursuant to motion, to reconsider any ruling or order. However, such motions are deemed denied if not acted upon within five days pursuant to T.R. 53.4(B). Likewise, although the trial court has the power pursuant to T.R. 59(B) to correct error on its own motion, it must do so within the time allowed for filing a motion to correct error. Id. Sufficient time expired here to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction under either rule. Furthermore, Chapin is afforded no relief from I.C. Sec. 33-1-6-3, which provides that courts generally retain jurisdiction over their judgments for 90 days because the September 28 judgment was clearly outside the 90-day period.

Chapin, however, argues that a trial court has limited jurisdiction to vacate judgments pursuant to T.R. 60(B), and that, although not denominated as such, his motion to reconsider was substantively a T.R. 60(B) motion. According to Chapin, his motion alleged the existence of a new fact: the supreme court's reversal in Manns, which removed the underpinnings of the trial court's denial of his motion to correct error. We disagree.

T.R. 60(B) provides that, upon such terms as are just, a court can relieve a party from the entry of a final judgment based upon:

"(2) any grounds for a motion to correct error, including without limitation newly discovered evidence, which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a motion to correct error under Rule 59.

* * * * * *

(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4)."

However, neither of the above quoted provisions contemplates a subsequent change in law as grounds for relief. Sheraton Corp. of America v. Korte Paper Company, Inc. (1977), 173 Ind.App. 407, 410, 363 N.E.2d 1263, 1264-1266. Trial Rule 60(B) is not to be used as a substitute for direct appeal. The fact that a subsequent decision in a different case recognizes a similar legal error "merely demonstrates that had the claimant appealed he would have succeeded, assuming the allegedly identical evidence." 173 Ind.App. at 412, 363 N.E.2d at 1265.

Chapin next argues that Hulse has waived her right to assert that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the September 28 order by virtue of her failure to appeal from that order. 5 Hulse responds that, due to the asserted lack of jurisdiction, the trial court's judgment was void and a void judgment may be attacked at any time.

To succeed under T.R. 60(B)(6), the petitioner must show that the judgment is void not merely voidable. D.L.M. v. V.E.M. (1982), Ind.App., 438 N.E.2d 1023, 1029. The distinction between the terms "void" and "voidable" is critical in this context. That which is "void" has no legal effect at any time and cannot be confirmed or ratified by subsequent action or inaction. That which is "voidable" has legal effect until such time as challenged in the appropriate manner and can be ratified or confirmed by subsequent action or inaction. Trook v. Lafayette Bank and Trust Co. (1991), Ind., 581 N.E.2d 941, 944 trans. denied. A judgment (or appealable order) that is voidable may only be attacked through a direct appeal, D.L.M., 438 N.E.2d at 1028, whereas a void judgment is subject to collateral attack. Trook, 581 N.E.2d at 944.

Because Hulse failed to appeal the September 28 order, we must address the question of whether the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to enter that order renders it void, or merely voidable. As the Trook court noted, "[n]owhere is the distinction between 'void' and 'voidable' more clearly brought into focus than in the area of jurisdiction." Id. According to the Trook court, there are three jurisdictional elements in every case: personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the particular case. Id. 6 Of the three, only judgments for which the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction are void. Id.; see also Behme v. Behme (1988), Ind.App., 519 N.E.2d 578.

Under the Trook approach, the answer to our question lies simply in classifying Hulse's jurisdictional attack under one of the above-mentioned categories. The relevant inquiry in a determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is whether the type of claim advanced falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon the court by the Constitution or statute. Behme, 519 N.E.2d at 582. The Montgomery Circuit is a court of general jurisdiction, and thus had subject matter jurisdiction to decide a tort action. See I.C. Sec. 33-4-4-3.

However, a Trook...

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