Chapin v. Stewart, 7701

Citation230 P.2d 998,71 Idaho 306
Decision Date02 May 1951
Docket NumberNo. 7701,7701
PartiesCHAPIN et ux. v. STEWART et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

V. K. Jeppesen, Nampa, for appellants.

Cleve Groome, Caldwell, for respondents.

TAYLOR, Justice.

William P. Kennedy, a bachelor, died intestate on or about January 31, 1916, leaving, as his only heirs at law, one sister and five brothers. February 9, 1916, one of the heirs, Daniel W. Kennedy, filed a petition for administration of the estate in the probate court of Canyon County. Letters were issued to him February 28, 1916. On or about March 25, 1916, another of the heirs, John R. Kennedy, a resident of Glendale, California, died survived by his widow and four children. In his will John left three-fourths of his estate to his widow and one-fourth to the four children equally. On the 2nd day of May, 1917, the final account and petition for distribution of the estate of William P. Kennedy was heard, settled and allowed, and decree of distribution was made and entered. In this decree it is adjudged that the same six persons, the sister and five brothers, named in the petition for letters, are left surviving him as his heirs at law 'and all of whom are at the present time living'. The entire estate is distributed one-sixth to each, including one-sixth to John, who as noted had died the year before. On February 7, 1918, the probate court decreed the estate fully administered and discharged the administrator. Daniel W. Kennedy, the administrator, testified that by correspondence with the other heirs he arranged for a sale of the real property of the estate to a Mr. Clark. Apparently this was after the decree of distribution was entered. He says the price was $17,000.00, that Clark made a down payment of $2,000.00 and a deed to him was placed in escrow; that Clark forfeited the contract; after talking it over with the others and at their request he, Daniel, 'took it over', paid the other heirs the $15,000.00 balance due on the price and received from them a deed. The lands involved are farm lands and it appears that certain livestock was included in the sale to Clark, which did not go to Daniel when he took over.

The deed from the coheirs to Daniel W. Kennedy is dated April 17, 1918, and was recorded October 24, 1919. The late recording is perhaps due in part at least to the fact that the makers lived in scattered localities; three of them at different points in Canada, one in Portland, Oregon, and the other in California, and the last acknowledgment is dated in February, 1919. The makers are the sister, the three brothers, 'and Martha Kennedy McNary, widow and devisee of John R. Kennedy, late of Glendale, being, together with the grantee hereinafter named, all of the heirs of William P. Kennedy deceased'. In other respects the deed is in the usual form and purports to convey to the grantee the entire title and estate in the property described, and contains a covenant of warranty. In addition to her individual signature as a maker, John's widow also signs and acknowledges the deed as 'Martha Kennedy McNary, Executrix of the last will and testament of Joseph Kennedy, deceased.' (The name Joseph evidently is an error.) John Kennedy's will was probated in California, and in Ada County, Idaho, where he also held property. The share of the William Kennedy estate which descended to John was not listed as an asset of his estate, nor was any distribution made thereof in those proceedings. John's share of the proceeds of the sale to Daniel Kennedy was paid to his widow, Martha Kennedy.

About two months after the conveyance of the property to Daniel, he took possession of the farm involved in this action. He rented it during the first two succeeding years and then he and his wife moved upon the land and thereafter continuously occupied it as their home, until they sold and conveyed it to the plaintiffs (respondents) herein on May 8, 1948. The sale to the Chapins also included property other than the farm in question. This action was brought by them to quiet their title to all of the property conveyed. The appellants, being three of the children of John R. and Martha Kennedy, were made defendants. They appeared and asserted title to a one-forty-eighth share each in that part of the property acquired by Daniel Kennedy from the estate of his brother, William.

Defendants do not allege mistake or fraud. Their defense is that at their father's death they became tenants in common with the heirs of William Kennedy; that Daniel, a cotenant, took possession as administrator and never made any claim or gave them any notice that he was holding adversely to them until the conveyance to plaintiffs in 1948; that they at all times have been residents of California and were unaware of any daverse claim by their uncle Daniel; that they placed their confidence and trust in him believing he would protect any interest they might have in the property of the estate.

The trial court found that plaintiffs and their predecessor in interest, Daniel W. Kennedy, had acquired title by adverse possession, and that appellants' claims thereto are now barred by the statute of limitations. The evidence establishes that from the time Daniel W. Kennedy and his wife took possession in 1918 to the time of their sale to the plaintiffs their possession was continuous, open, notorious, adverse, exclusive and under color of title; that they treated and regarded the property as being exclusively their own; that they made valuable improvements thereon, consisting of a tenant house, barn, chicken house, granary, sheds and two silos, and expended approximately $6000.00 leveling the land, or a total expenditure for improvements of between twenty and twenty-one thousand dollars; that they appropriated unto themselves all of the income and profits therefrom, and paid all taxes and assessments levied thereon.

There is no trust involved. The confidential relationship, which existed between Daniel W. Kennedy, as administrator, and the heirs of the estate of William Kennedy, terminated when the estate was closed and he was discharged by the probate court. The transfer to Daniel, having occurred after his discharge, is not affected by any relationship of trust or confidence, except that which is inherent in the ordinary relationship of tenants in common. And this relationship is repudiated by adverse possession. Olympia M. & M. Co. v. Kerns, 24 Idaho 481, 503, 135 P. 255.

Generally speaking, a cotenant in possession is presumed to hold for all of the cotenants and not adversely. If he acquires an adverse title or interest from a stranger, he is presumed to have purchased it for the benefit of all, and for the protection of the common estate. In the absence of notice to the contrary, brought home to his cotenants, his continued possession will not be regarded as adverse by reason alone of the acquisition and recording of such outstanding title. Anno. 54 A.L.R. 874; Anno. 85 A.L.R. 1535; Miller v. Murphy, 119 Mont. 393, 175 P.2d 182.

Such assumption does not arise, however, where one tenant purchases the share or title of another tenant in common. Obviously he could not in such case be acting for the benefit of all by thus acquiring for...

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13 cases
  • Doe v. Durtschi
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • February 10, 1986
    ...policy of Idaho has been to shelter minor plaintiffs from the insensitive ticking of statutory clocks. See Chapin v. Stewart, 71 Idaho 306, 311, 230 P.2d 998, 1001 (1951). At the time of the instant cases, this policy was embodied in I.C. § 5-230(1), 6 which stated in pertinent If a person ......
  • Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • February 28, 2005
    ...well as the Law Enforcement, Parks & Recreation, and Boise Cascade Building investments. This Court's opinion in Chapin v. Stewart, 71 Idaho 306, 311, 230 P.2d 998, 1001 (1951), is instructive. This Court "[t]he means of acquiring th[e] knowledge was open to them, and, under the facts of th......
  • Hawe v. Hawe
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • August 3, 1965
    ...by Edward. In light of the presumption that a cotenant holds for the benefit of all cotenants and not adversely, Chapin v. Stewart, 71 Idaho 306, 230 P.2d 998 (1951), appellants must show by clear and convincing evidence that the elements of the adverse possession were all present. The find......
  • Yin v. Midkiff
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Hawai'i
    • February 10, 1971
    ...of law constitute in themselves an ouster of the grantee's cotenants or establish an adverse possession in them. Chapin v. Stewart, 71 Idaho 306, 230 P.2d 998 (1951); Holley v. Hawley, 39 Vt. 525, 94 Am.Dec. 350 (1867). Likewise, a purported conveyance and recording of the same is not in it......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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