Chaplin v. Freeland
| Decision Date | 13 October 1893 |
| Docket Number | 786 |
| Citation | 34 N.E. 1007,7 Ind.App. 676 |
| Parties | CHAPLIN, ETC., v. FREELAND |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
From the Lawrence Circuit Court.
Judgment reversed.
M. F Dunn and J. D. Alexander, for appellant.
J Giles and J. A. Zaring, for appellee.
This was an action by appellee against appellant, to recover for services rendered to a servant of appellant, who was injured while in his employ.
There are three paragraphs of complaint, each of which was tested by demurrer, and its sufficiency properly presented here. The first paragraph is clearly good. It alleges that appellee was a physician and surgeon, and was called and employed by appellant to treat one Fields, who had been injured; that in pursuance of such employment the services were rendered, and the value, etc.
The second paragraph alleges that appellant Chaplin was a resident of Canada, doing business at Heltonsville, Lawrence county, Indiana, manufacturing buggies, hubs, etc., under the name of the Heltonsville Manufacturing Company; that in November, 1891, one Joseph Fields, during his employment by appellee, was personally injured so as to require the immediate attention of a skilled surgeon, by reason whereof appellee was called and employed to treat him by appellant, by and through one Frank Marvin, "its foreman," and Thomas T. Smith, its superintendent and general manager, and in pursuance of such employment appellee did render the services sued for, of the value of $ 200, which is due and unpaid.
The third paragraph is similar to the second, except it is here directly averred that Fields was, while at work for appellant in the line of duty, badly injured by the machinery of appellant, his wounds being of so serious a nature as to create an emergency for the immediate attention of a physician in order to save such employe's life. It is also alleged that appellee was called by Marvin, the foreman, and then employed by Smith, the sole general manager and agent of the said defendant, and who had entire charge and control of the business of said appellant.
The question for determination, as presented by counsel for both parties, is whether, under these facts, the agents, Marvin and Smith, had authority to bind the appellant.
The quee assumed by appellant, and under which he did business, can not in any manner affect his liability, nor can he be held simply by reason of the assumption of an apparently corporate name to have assumed liabilities such as might pertain to a corporation.
Counsel for appellee thus state the proposition: "It is all narrowed down to one question, viz: Can a sole general manager and agent bind a nonresident principal by his contracts, or can a nonresident principal delegate to another person authority to take charge of and manage his business, and to contract in his name?"
The vital question in this case is not as counsel put it: "Can the principal delegate to another authority," etc., but "has the principal delegated such authority in this instance?"
It may be conceded that under the allegations of this complaint Smith was the general agent of appellant with reference to the manufacturing business at Heltonsville. This, however, does not authorize him to bind his principal by everything he may do.
In Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399, we find the rule correctly laid down on p. 411:
"A general agent is presumed to be authorized to do all acts connected with and proper in the transaction of the business entrusted to his care.
"Whatever acts are usually done by such class of agents, whatever rights are usually exercised by them, and whatever duties are usually attached to them, all such acts, rights and duties are deemed to be incidents to the authority confided to them, in their particular business, employment or character." Story on Agency, section 106, p. 94.
So long as the agent acts within the general scope of his authority, the principal is...
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