Chapman, In re

• Decision Date: 27 January 1978
• Docket Number: No. 49669,49669
• Citation: 14 Ill.Dec. 479,69 Ill.2d 494,372 N.E.2d 675
• Parties: , 14 Ill.Dec. 479 In re Gerald McNamara CHAPMAN, Attorney, Respondent.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 675

372 N.E.2d 675

69 Ill.2d 494, 14 Ill.Dec. 479

In re Gerald McNamara CHAPMAN, Attorney, Respondent.

No. 49669.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 27, 1978.

Sidney Z. Karasik, Chicago, for respondent.

Mary M. Conrad, Chicago, Atty., for the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.

GOLDENHERSH, Justice:

In a five-count complaint, the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission charged that respondent, Gerald McNamara Chapman, who was licensed to practice in Illinois on June 19, 1950, had been guilty of conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice and bring the legal profession into disrepute. The Hearing Board of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, and the Review Board concurred in that recommendation.

In both counts I and II respondent was charged with failure to properly represent the complainant, Mrs. Florence J. Budd, in an appeal, in count I as intervenor-appellee, and count II as appellant. Concerning count I, it was stipulated that Mrs. Budd had retained respondent to file an appellee's brief in the case of Gibraltar Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Flobudd Antiques, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees (Florence J. Budd, Intervenor-Appellee), 131 Ill.App.2d 545, 269 N.E.2d 515. Gibraltar had filed an action in the circuit court of Cook County to foreclose a deed of trust on real estate executed by Flobudd Antiques, Inc. This real estate was also involved in the litigation out of which arose the charges contained in count II. The complainant, Florence J. Budd, intervened in the foreclosure action, alleging that she was the owner of the property and that the transaction out of which the litigation arose was a subterfuge to enable Gibraltar to charge interest in excess of that permitted under the Illinois Interest Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 74, par. 1 et seq.). The circuit court found that there was no consideration for the conveyance from Mrs. Budd to Flobudd, that the transaction was a sham and that the loan had been made at a usurious rate of interest. It denied foreclosure, found that by reason of the usurious interest charged, the sum due Gibraltar should be reduced from $28,245.72 to $5,726.96 and entered judgment in favor of Gibraltar and against Mrs. Budd in that amount. Gibraltar appealed and counsel who had represented Mrs. Budd at trial arranged for respondent to represent her in the appeal. No brief was filed on behalf of the intervenor-appellee, Mrs. Budd, and the appellate court reversed pro forma. See 131 Ill.App.2d[69 Ill.2d 497] 545, 269 N.E.2d 515.

With respect to count II it was stipulated that in an action instituted by the Attorney General against Illinois Protestant Children's Home, Inc., and Florence J. Budd the circuit court of Cook County rendered a decree adverse to Mrs. Budd and that respondent filed a notice of appeal in her behalf. No appeal was thereafter prosecuted. With respect to count III it was stipulated that following trial in the circuit court of Cook County of the case of Paul B. Sayad Company v. Trebels Millwork and Supply Corporation, in which Trebels was represented by other counsel, respondent was retained by Trebels, that he filed a post-trial motion and thereafter failed to prosecute the appeal. Although it cannot be determined from the record whether or in what amount other sums were paid respondent by Trebels, there is no dispute that Trebels, shortly after receiving a letter requesting $300 to pay for the transcript of the trial proceedings, sent respondent a check in that amount. Respondent received, endorsed, and cashed the check.

Concerning the Gibraltar appeal, respondent testified that upon receipt of Gibraltar's brief he commenced the preparation of the intervenor-appellee's brief. Because he anticipated that the Chicago Mortgage Bankers' Association would request and be granted leave to file an amicus curiae brief, he requested several extensions of time and after the amicus brief was filed, respondent requested and was granted an eighth extension of time. Shortly thereafter, at the request of the appellant and the amicus, the date for oral argument was advanced. Respondent testified that the notice of setting for oral argument was sent to the attorney who had been trial counsel for Mrs. Budd rather than to him, and that he was not informed of the new time for argument until shortly before the scheduled date. Having failed to file a brief prior to that date, he was of the opinion that he was precluded from presenting oral argument, and when the case was argued he did not appear or participate. His explanation of his failure to do so was that he intended to file a brief immediately following oral argument, believing that he would encounter no difficulty in being granted leave to file such brief instanter. The appellate court opinion came down six days after oral argument. He attempted to file the intervenor-appellee's brief within the time provided for filing a petition for rehearing, but leave to do so was denied. He filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court, and the petition was denied. Both respondent and Mrs. Budd testified that respondent was paid no money for his services in connection with this matter.

In the litigation involved in count II the Attorney General had sought an injunction and other relief against Florence J. Budd, the Illinois Protestant Children's Home, Inc., and other parties. In its decree the circuit court set aside and held null and void the deed by means of which the Illinois Protestant Children's Home, Inc., had conveyed to Mrs. Budd the real estate referred to as the "Loeb property." It also set aside and declared invalid the deed from Mrs. Budd to Flobudd Antiques, Inc., and the deed of trust executed by Flobudd Antiques, Inc., to secure the loan made by Gibraltar. It found that there was due and owing from Florence J. Budd to the assignee of Gibraltar the sum of $48,601.24.

Although admittedly respondent filed a notice of appeal on behalf of Mrs. Budd, he testified that nothing further was done because of her failure to provide funds to obtain the necessary transcript. Mrs. Budd testified that one of the other parties to the litigation was possessed of a transcript of the proceedings which was available to respondent for use in the appeal. Again, no money appears to have been paid to respondent for his services, and although they do not agree on the amount paid, both respondent and Mrs. Budd testified that he had paid certain moneys to her. Mrs. Budd testified that because of his mishandling of other litigation he had paid her approximately $2,100 or $2,200. He testified that to keep her from complaining to the disciplinary authorities he had...