Chapman v. Ca Dept. of Educ., C 01-01780 CRB.
| Decision Date | 21 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. C 01-01780 CRB.,C 01-01780 CRB. |
| Citation | 229 F.Supp.2d 981 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | Juleus CHAPMAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. CA DEPT OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants. |
Alison M. Aubrejuan, Rhoda Benedetti, Disability Rights Advocates, Oakland, CA, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Eve H. Cervantez, Morris A. Ratner, Mary Bondy Reiten, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Melissa W. Kasnitz, Joshua Konecky, Disability Rights Advocates, Sid Wolinsky, Oakland, CA, for Learning Disabilities Ass'n of California, Jennifer Lyons, Ryan Smiley, Juleus Chapman.
Suzanne B. Giorgi, Douglas M. Press, Teresa L. Stinson, CA Attorney General's Office, Sacramento, CA, Michael Hersher, Amy Bisson Holloway, Cal. Dept. of Educ., Sacramento, CA, for Cal. Dept. of Educ., Cal. State Bd. of Educ., Delaine Eastin.
Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to halt the administration of the California High School Exit Exam ("CAHSEE") currently scheduled for March 5, 6, and 7, 2002. As an alternative, plaintiffs propose making the CAHSEE voluntary for all students. As set forth below, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have shown that preliminary relief is warranted. Absent a court order, the March administration of the CAHSEE is likely to violate rights guaranteed to learning disabled students under federal law. However, the scope of relief prayed for is not warranted. The Court has crafted an injunction that protects the rights of learning disabled students without derailing the State of California's efforts to improve education in the State.
The CAHSEE was administered to freshmen in the class of 2004 on a voluntary basis in March 2001. On March 5, 6, and 7 of this year, the CAHSEE will be administered on a mandatory basis to all members of the class of 2004 (sophomores) who have not already passed the exam. Under current California law, members of the class of 2004 are required to pass the CAHSEE to receive a diploma. Cal. Ed. Code § 60851(a).
The plaintiff class consists of learning disabled students eligible for either an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), or a Section 504 Education Plan ("504 Plan") pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. These plans, created by a team consisting of the student (where appropriate), parents, educators, and other professionals, are the blueprints of a learning disabled child's education. They assess the current performance of a child, set annual goals, and specify special education and related services a child is to receive.
Federal regulations require the IEP to specifically address state-wide assessments such as the CAHSEE. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(5)(i) (). Where the IEP team determines that a child cannot participate in a particular state-wide assessment, even with modifications, the IEP must include a statement of why the state-wide assessment is not appropriate and how the child will be assessed. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(5)(ii). The evidence before the Court, however, suggests that, with regard to the CAHSEE, most IEP teams have not had time to comply with these provisions.
IEPs in California do address other testing situations. For example, pursuant to their IEPs, the named plaintiffs take classroom tests with certain accommodations. Chapman uses a laptop computer. Smiley uses a calculator and a laptop computer and has his tests presented orally. Lyons is permitted to use a spell checker, a calculator, a computer, a scanner, and a tape recorder. Among other matters, this order addresses the extent to which similar accommodations are appropriate for the CAHSEE.
Plaintiffs claim that a preliminary injunction is warranted on five independent grounds: 1) there is no alternate assessment to the CAHSEE, 2) required accommodations are not provided to learning disabled students taking the CAHSEE, 3) the test violates due process because it covers materials that students have had no opportunity to learn, 4) the test is invalid, and 5) the CAHSEE fails to conform to nationally recognized standards.
As set forth below, the Court concludes that a limited preliminary injunction is warranted based on the first and second of these grounds.
Traditionally, a preliminary injunction will issue where the plaintiff shows: 1) a likelihood of success on the merits, 2) the possibility of irreparable injury, 3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and 4) that preliminary relief is in the public interest. Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir.1999). This test has evolved into the modern test that the plaintiff must "demonstrate either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury if relief is not granted, or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor." First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir.1987). While this test is phrased in the disjunctive, many courts view it as essentially a single test. Viewed as a single test, the greater the showing of likely success the lighter the burden in terms of the relative hardship, and vice versa. See Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. ABC, Inc., 747 F.2d 511, 515 (9th Cir. 1984).
The Court notes at the outset that the State of California is afforded broad latitude in crafting public education policy and setting standards for students and educators. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir.1983); Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.1981). Respecting the state's role in education policy under our system of federalism, this Court "will interfere with educational policy decisions only when necessary to protect individual statutory or constitutional rights." Brookhart, 697 F.2d at 182. Accordingly any relief must be "narrowly tailored to enforce federal constitutional and statutory law only." Clark v. Coye, 60 F.3d 600, 604 (9th Cir.1995).
Defendants claim that plaintiffs lack standing and their claims are not yet ripe for adjudication. Defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing because they are unable to show particularized or imminent injury. In particular, defendants point to the fact that no student has taken a mandatory CAHSEE. Furthermore, no student can show that failure on the CAHSEE will result in denial of a diploma.
"In order to assert claims on behalf of a class, a named plaintiff must have personally sustained or be in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the challenged statute or official conduct." Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 860 (9th Cir.2001) (internal citation omitted). However, in a class action, as alleged here, the Court may consider injuries alleged by name plaintiffs "in the context of the harm asserted by the class as a whole, to determine whether a credible threat" of injury to the named plaintiffs exists. Id. Based on this framework, the Court concludes that the named plaintiffs have standing.
Plaintiffs do not have to take and fail a defective exam to have standing. Furthermore, under the IDEA, plaintiffs have a statutory right to meaningful inclusion in a state-wide assessment, such as the CAHSEE, whether they pass or not. That right is violated, and harm is suffered, at the time the exam in administered. The presence of harm is not dependent upon how the results are used.
Defendants make a related ripeness argument. This argument centers around the fact that development of the CAHSEE is a highly dynamic process. Defendants argue that they need the data of several CAHSEE administrations to finalize policies. They argue that the pass rate is likely to be significantly higher in the future. Defendants also point to a provision in the law permitting the Board to delay the date upon which the CAHSEE becomes a graduation prerequisite. Cal. Ed. Code § 60859.
The Court accepts all of this as true. However, the CAHSEE has already been administered once and will be administered again in March. While the Board may delay the effective date at which the CAHSEE becomes a graduation requirement, the fact remains that under current law the class of 2004 must either pass the CAHSEE or be granted a waiver to receive a diploma. The mere possibility that intervening action might rectify allegedly illegal behavior does not render this lawsuit unripe.
Even more fundamentally, as stated above, plaintiffs have a right to be meaningfully included in the March CAHSEE, regardless of how the test results are used. This suit is ripe.
Defendants claim that there is no private right of action to enforce the IDEA's provisions regarding accommodations and alternate assessments. No case cited by either party specifically addresses a private right of action under these provisions.
The IDEA specifically provides a private right of action, after exhaustion of administrative remedies, for claims "relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). Defendants claim that the inclusion of these specific rights of action evinces a Congressional intent to preclude a private right of action for other matters.
However, as recognized by the Third Circuit in Beth V. by Yvonne V. v. Carroll, 87 F.3d 80 (3rd Cir.1996), the statute does not just...
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