Chapman v. City of Staunton

• Decision Date: 28 October 1910
• Citation: 92 N.E. 905,246 Ill. 394
• Parties: CHAPMAN v. CITY OF STAUNTON.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

246 Ill. 394

92 N.E. 905

CHAPMAN

v.CITY OF STAUNTON.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 28, 1910.

Appeal from Appellate Court, Third District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Macoupin County; Robert B. Shirley, Judge.

Action by Julia Chapman against the City of Staunton. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Appellate Court for the Third District, whence the cause comes on a certificate of importance. Affirmed.

Truman A. Snell, City Atty.

(Peebles & Peebles, of counsel), for appellant.

Early & Williamson and J. S. Clark, for appellee.

VICKERS, C. J.

Appellee, Julia Chapman, brought an action of case against the city of Staunton to recover damages resulting from the construction of a sidewalk in front of her premises. The amended count of the declaration, upon which the case was tried, avers that appellee was the owner of a lot fronting 50 feet on Main street, in the city of Staunton, upon which she had constructed a building; that at the time the building was erected the street in front of the premises was level and 20 inches lower than the level of the first floor of the building; that afterwards the city of Staunton caused a concrete sidewalk to be constructed on the street in front of her premises 34 inches above the level of the street, thus raising the sidewalk 14 inches above the first floor of the building, by means whereof the premises were damaged. A judgment for $1,000 in the circuit court has been affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Third District, and the record has been brought to this court upon a certificate of importance.

At the close of appellee's evidence, and again at the close of all the evidence, appellant made its motion for a directed verdict, which motions were severally overruled, and appellant excepted. The only contention seriously insisted upon on this appeal is that under the facts shown appellee was not entitled to recover. It appears from the evidence that appellant has never established any grade for streets or sidewalks. The sidewalk in question was built under the direction of the city and according to the recommendations of its engineer. It is not claimed by appellee that the city was guilty of any negligence in connection with the construction of the sidewalk in question. As we understand appellant's argument, its contention is that it is only liable for any injury that may result to the lot upon which the building stands, but is not liable for resulting damages to the building. Appellant's contention is that, if a lot owner erects a building on his lot where no grade has been established by the city, any consequential damages that may result to such building by the construction of a public improvement in accordance with a grade subsequently established is damnum absque injuria.

The rules of law applicable to the situation presented by the facts of this case have often been announced by this court. By section 11 of article 13 of the Constitution of 1848 it was provided that private property should not be ‘taken or applied to public use without just compensation.’ Under that Constitution the uniform rule in this state was that the owner of property could not recover for mere consequential damages, unless there was an actual appropriation by the state or the public of all or some portion of the property injured. Nevins v. City of Peoria, 41 Ill. 502, 89 Am. Dec. 392;Gillham v. Madison County Railroad Co., 49 Ill. 484, 95 Am. Dec. 627;City of Aurora v. Gillett, 56 Ill. 132;City of Aurora v. Reed, 57 Ill. 29, 11 Am. Rep. 1;City of Jacksonville v. Lambert, 62 Ill. 519;Toledo, Wabash & Western Railway Co. v. Morrison, 71 Ill. 616.

Section 13 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1870 provides that ‘private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.’ After the adoption of the Constitution of 1870 the case of Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64, came before this court. That was an action to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the construction by the city of a viaduct or bridge along Halsted street and across Kinzie street, in the city of Chicago, which was some 220 feet west of the plaintiff's premises. There was no claim that Rigney's possession was in any way disturbed, or that any direct physical injury was done to his premises; but it was contended that his premises were depreciated in value by having his means of access to Kinzie street cut off by the public...