Chapman v. Lawson

Citation89 F.Supp.3d 959
Decision Date24 February 2015
Docket NumberCase No. 1:13–CV–652.
PartiesCharles CHAPMAN, Plaintiff, v. Stephan LAWSON, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Charles Chapman, Marion, OH, pro se.

Peter J. Stackpole, City of Cincinnati, Christian Joseph Schaefer, Cincinnati, OH, Douglas M. Mansfield, Lape Mansfield Nakasian & Gibson, LLC, Powell, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

MICHAEL R. BARRETT, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the July 16, 2014 Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 45). The Report recommends granting (1) the Motion to Dismiss of Hamilton County and the unnamed agents of the Hamilton County Regional Narcotics Unit and Organized Crime Division (“County Defendants) (Doc. 20); (2) the Motion to Dismiss of Agent Steven Lawson of the Cincinnati Police Department and the City of Cincinnati (“City Defendants) (Doc. 25); and (3) the Motion to Dismiss of Sprint Spectrum L.P./ Sprint Inc./Nextel West Corporation (“Sprint”) (Doc. 21). It further recommends that the Court decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. Plaintiff has filed timely objections to the Report. (Doc. 50). The County Defendants have filed a response. (Doc. 51).

I. STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF OBJECTIONS

When objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation are received on a non-dispositive matter, the district judge must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. When objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation are received on a dispositive matter, however, the assigned district judge “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). After review, the district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). General objections are insufficient to preserve any issues for review: [a] general objection to the entirety of the Magistrate [Judge]'s report has the same effects as would a failure to object.” Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.1991). Nevertheless, the objections of a plaintiff appearing pro se will be construed liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff objects to the recommendations in the Report as to the federal claims addressed in all three motions to dismiss. Plaintiff does not raise any specific objections as to the recommendation that the Court decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the federal claims. Those objections as to the federal claims are addressed below.

A. The County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

The Report recommends dismissing Plaintiff's claims against the County Defendants for several reasons. First, it recommends dismissal of the § 1983 claim as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because Plaintiff makes a “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument insofar as he maintains the warrants lacked probable cause and were unlawfully acquired by the County Defendants and unlawfully provided by Sprint. (Doc. 45, PageId 264). Second, it recommends dismissal for failure to state claims under the SCA, ECPA, and the Omnibus Act because the information was disclosed to the County Defendants pursuant to warrants and court orders, and contains legal conclusions that are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. (Doc. 45, PageId 267–68). Third, it recommends dismissal of the allegations that the County Defendants were engaged in unauthorized monitoring because the allegations are speculative, lack supporting factual allegations, and are barred by Heck. (Doc. 45, PageId 268–69). Finally, it recommends dismissal of the municipal liability claim for lack of factual content that would allow the Court to reasonably infer a violation and because a ruling in his favor would cast doubt on the legality of his conviction.

Plaintiff objects to those conclusions on several bases, which are discussed below.

1. Objections as to Recommendations on Constitutional Claims

Plaintiff objects to the recommendation that the constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge misapplied the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine because suppression is not a remedy for those claims and because the intercepted phone calls, text messages, and electronic information was not placed into evidence or used to convict Plaintiff in his criminal case so as to necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. (Doc. 50, PageId 289).

Having reviewed the issue de novo, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims based upon federal constitutional violations are barred by Heck. As the Magistrate Judge recognized, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim relies on his allegations that the affidavit underlying the interception warrants contained information obtained without the requisite court orders or warrants. To that end, the Magistrate Judge correctly recognized that Plaintiff essentially makes a “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument insofar as he maintains that the warrants lacked probable cause, and consequently, that the electronic information obtained pursuant to the warrants was unlawfully acquired by the County Defendants and unlawfully provided by Sprint Nextel. Given that the remedy of exclusion exists for federal constitutional violations, see United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir.2014) ( “Evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be subject to exclusion at trial.”),1 a finding in favor of Plaintiff in regards to those purported constitutional violations would necessarily cast doubt on his conviction and sentence in the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court for drug trafficking, which has not been reversed or otherwise invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364 ; Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 682–83 (6th Cir.2005) ; Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1085–86 (6th Cir.1995).

Plaintiff's citation to the caselaw from the Seventh Circuit concerning an exception to Heck (Doc. 50, PageID 289) does not change the undersigned's conclusion in regards to the constitutional claims. The Magistrate Judge not only considered that argument by Plaintiff in the Report, but she also correctly rejected it (Doc. 45, PageId 266), explaining that the Sixth Circuit has held that [t]he fact that a Fourth Amendment violation may not necessarily cause an illegal conviction does not lessen the requirement that a plaintiff show that a conviction was invalid as an element of constitutional injury. Schilling, 58 F.3d at 1086 ; see also Bell v. Raby, No. 99–72917, 2000 WL 356354, at *6 (E.D.Mich. Feb. 28, 2000). Given that Plaintiff's Complaint demonstrates that his constitutional claims challenge the lawfulness of his conviction and sentence, which have not be overturned or invalidated, he has not alleged an element of his constitutional claims. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a cause of action under § 1983 attacking the validity of the searches and seizures of the electronic information leading to his arrest under the Fourth Amendment or the constitutionality of his conviction generally, his § 1983 claim is barred by Heck. The Report therefore is adopted in that respect.

2. Objections to Recommendations Relating to Statutory Claims and Unlawful Monitoring

Plaintiff makes several objections to the recommendation that his statutory claims be dismissed. First, he claims that his claims are more than speculative because he specifically alleges that Agent Lawson “attests to querying mobile phone numbers on the ‘public records and law enforcement databases' revealing phone association” and appears to claim that those databases “obviously” contain information on mobile phone associations obtained prior to an investigation, court order or warrant such that County Defendants must have violated those statutes. (Doc. 50, PageId 289–90). He contends that those facts also are supportive of a plausible claim for unauthorized monitoring. (Doc. 50, PageId 290–91). Second, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge failed to recognize that “there was never [a] warrant or court order, issued to Sprint” for the Sprint mobile number ending in the numbers 3359. (Doc. 50, PageID 289–90). Third, he contends that Heck is inapplicable to his “SCA and ECPA claims under his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because “suppression of evidence is not a remedy recognized for a Title II violation of the ECPA” or a violation of the SCA. (Doc. 50, PageId 288).

Plaintiff's first objection appears to be directed towards 18 U.S.C. § 2703, which permits a governmental entity to compel a “provider of electronic communication service” or a “remote computing service” to provide subscriber names, addresses, telephone records, and other identifying information. 18 U.S.C. § 2703. The plain language of that provision does not indicate that the processes set forth in the statutory text are the exclusive means by which a governmental entity may obtain the information, nor does the provision limit a governmental entity's ability to obtain information that is otherwise readily available to the general public or to utilize information contained in its own databases. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2703, 2711. To the extent that Plaintiff also intends to argue that the underlying information contained in the public records or the law enforcement databases was obtained in the first instance without the requisite authorization or that defendants are...

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