Chapman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BONHAM, Justice.
• Citation: Chapman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 172 S.C. 250, 173 S.E. 801 (S.C. 1934)
• Decision Date: 20 March 1934
• Docket Number: 13811.
• Parties: CHAPMAN v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

173 S.E. 801

172 S.C. 250

CHAPMAN v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 13811.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 20, 1934

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of York County; T. S. Sease Judge.

Three separate actions, heard together, by Ella Chapman against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff in each case, and defendant appeals.

Reversed.

McDow & Hildebrand, of York, and Carlisle, Brown & Carlisle, of Spartanburg, for appellant.

Dunlap & Dunlap, of Rock Hill, and Hart & Moss, of York, for respondent.

BONHAM Justice.

The respondent brought separate actions in the court of common pleas for York county on three policies of insurance, in the appellant insurance company, to recover indemnity for alleged total disability. By consent of counsel, the cases were heard together, on circuit and on appeal, and it is agreed that the decision in the one case shall dispose of all of them.

The complaint alleged the issuance of the policy; that, while it was in full force and effect, and while plaintiff had complied with its terms and conditions, she "became, and is now, totally, and permanently disabled by reason of the fact of her contracting heart trouble, asthma and the ill effects received from a recent surgical operation." She alleges that notice of her claim was given to defendant, who failed to furnish the necessary blanks and has refused to pay the claim. The prayer of this cause of action is for half the amount of the face of the policy. In a second cause of action predicated upon the same allegations she demands that the defendant be required to issue to her a paid-up policy as by the terms of the policy sued on.

The answer sets up a general denial of the allegations of both causes of action; that the company issued to the plaintiff the policy sued on, subject to the conditions therein appearing, each of which "was expressly made a part of said contract, and contracted by the insured and every person entitled to claim thereunder to be a part of said contract"; that among the provisions of the policy was the following: " Disability. If, while this policy is in full force and effect and while there is no default in the payment of premium beyond the four weeks grace period, the insured shall lose by severance both hands, or both feet, or one hand and one foot, or lose permanently the sight of both eyes, total and permanent disability will be deemed to exist, and one-half of the amount of insurance then payable in the event of death shall be paid immediately upon receipt by the Company of due proof of such loss and surrender of the policy. Thereafter no further premiums will be required and the Company will issue a free or paid up Policy providing for payment at the death of the Insured of such benefit as would have been payable under the original Policy."

The answer further alleges that plaintiff has not furnished the due proof of loss as is specified in the policy with reference to "Disability." It is further denied that plaintiff has suffered any such loss, and denies any liability.

The case was heard by Judge T. S. Sease and a jury, and a verdict rendered for plaintiff.

The defendant moved for nonsuit, directed verdict, and for new trial upon grounds set out in the record, all of which motions were denied.

The defendant offered no testimony, and now appeals from the judgment entered on the verdict, upon seven exceptions, which appellant's counsel elects to consider under the following statement of issues:

(1) It was error to hold that the disability provision contained in the policies was ambiguous and not susceptible to a clear and ready interpretation. Exceptions 1-8.

(2) It was error to allow the witness S. P. Chapman, for the plaintiff, to testify that the agents of the defendant orally represented to the plaintiff when the policies were issued that the disability clause contained in the policies included and covered disability arising from any cause. Exception 1.

(3) It was error to allow the witness J. H. Green, on behalf of plaintiff, to testify that in other transactions the defendant's soliciting agents interpreted the disability clause in policies similar to these policies in suit as covering disability arising from any cause. Exception 7.

We will consider the exceptions as thus presented by these issues.

It appears that the presiding judge held that the provision of the policy relating to disability was ambiguous because it contained the words "total and permanent disability will be deemed to exist." These words follow in the disability clause the statement, "If while this policy is in full force and effect *** the insured shall lose by severance both hands, or both feet, or one hand and one foot or lose permanently the sight of both eyes." It seems patent that the grammatical, necessary, and only reasonable interpretation of the disputed language is that, if any of the disasters thereinabove set out should befall the insured, then "total and permanent disability will be deemed to exist." Any other interpretation is to wander into the realm of speculation and to impart ambiguity where none exists.

What is ambiguous in this whole clause taken together? The contract says, if in certain named circumstances you lose both hands, or both feet, or one hand and one foot, or the sight of your eyes, I agree that that is total and permanent disability and there will be no dispute over what constitutes total and permanent disability.

Black's Law Dictionary defines ambiguity thus: "Doubtfulness: Doubleness of meaning."

The exact meaning of the language used, if it needed aid in interpreting, is made clear by the further language of the same unbroken sentence of the disability clause: "And one-half of the amount of insurance then payable in the event of death shall be paid immediately upon receipt by the Company of due proof of such loss and surrender of the policy." (Italics added.)

The only losses that have been mentioned are those therein enumerated, all of which relate to the loss of hands, and of feet and of eyesight. The reason for the insertion in this provision of the words, "Total and permanent disability shall be deemed to exist," would seem to be to provide against the possible contention that, even though one suffered any of the things enumerated, one still might be able to do something by way of earning a living. The writer of this opinion knows a man who has lost both hands, who is an accomplished penman, and who was for years the auditor of his county. It is common knowledge that much litigation has occurred over the determination of the question what constitutes total and permanent disability. It is a plain and fair interpretation that in this policy the insurer assured the insured that, if she incurred such loss, she would not be called on to prove "total and permanent disability."

The presiding judge held that the phrase "total and permanent disability will be deemed to exist" created an ambiguity as to the character of the disability covered by the policy. With the purpose, as he stated, of clearing away that ambiguity, he admitted, over objection, the testimony of S. P. Chapman and J. H. Green. S. P. Chapman is the husband of the plaintiff, who is the insured in these three policies, and he is the named beneficiary therein. He testified that he has some ten or twelve policies of a like nature in this and other companies. He is a man of education, is a "smart man." He testified in this case that he negotiated all of these insurance transactions; that, when the policies now sued on were solicited by the agent, he read the policies and knew their contents. Yet he asked the agent each time what the policy covered, and was told it covered total disability from any cause. J. H. Green was allowed, over objection, to testify that he was formerly an agent of this insurance company; that he and other agents of the company interpreted this provision of the policies relating to disability to cover disability from any cause.

From these conditions there arise these questions:

Was it not the duty of the court to interpret this written instrument?

If there was ambiguity, did the testimony of Chapman and Green clear it up, or did it impart into the contract a condition not in it before, and thus alter and vary and contradict the terms of the written contract?

Was the testimony of Chapman and Green admissible?

There is no allegation nor plea of fraud.

The terms of the contract expressly forbid any alteration of the terms and conditions of the contract by any agent. The effect of the testimony thus objected to is to attempt to prove fraud or misrepresentation without having pleaded it.

It seems to be wholly unnecessary to cite authorities in support of the proposition that it is the duty of the court to construe a written contract if there be no ambiguous language which is susceptible of more than one meaning.

We are satisfied that there is no trouble in construing the disability clause in this policy of insurance. The plainest possible language was used, to express without circumlocution or unnecessary verbiage the contract between the parties to the effect that, if the insured suffered any of the losses, therein plainly enumerated, she would be deeed to be totally and permanently disabled. There is literally no reference in the contract to any other sorts of disability. The maxim, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius," applies with peculiar significance here.

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